Just as the Israeli elections were described as the first after “October 7, 2023,” the 2026 midterm elections in the United States are taking place amid a war against Iran that has entered its ninth month. There is an ongoing debate within the U.S. administration between those advocating mediation efforts to reach an agreement, even at the last minute, and those pushing for strikes against Iran with Israeli participation, especially as preparations to resume the war have been completed in recent weeks and U.S. forces are awaiting Donald Trump’s decision.
Polls have clearly shown that a significant portion of voters are turning against Republican candidates, influenced by the repercussions of the war, including fuel prices and the cost of living, along with growing opposition to Trump’s policies, even within his own party, during his two years in office. The U.S. president has repeatedly asserted that the midterm elections do not affect his powers, nor do they reflect his popularity or decisions. However, a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives, assuming Republicans retain the Senate, would not allow Trump to continue governing with his authoritarian and manipulative methods. He would certainly face opposition seeking, first, to prevent him from spending on the war and, second, to review controversial laws with the aim of repealing or amending them.
From this perspective, Iran’s procrastination in negotiations and prolongation of the war, while betting on a setback or defeat for Trump in these elections, can be understood as a form of “revenge.” However, the cost has been enormous because of the sharp decline in its revenues, economy, and citizens’ living conditions.
Iran’s current leaders may believe that causing a global crisis will act as a deterrent to any external force that might target it later, or that challenging a superpower such as the United States gives them a strategic advantage. Nevertheless, they are caught in a harsh naval blockade and under intensified sanctions, in addition to tangible U.S. advances toward closing the Strait of Hormuz. In reality, their options for ending the war have remained dependent on decisions taken by the other side.
Despite their constant accusations that the American side does not respect its commitments, Iran’s policies in more than “four Arab capitals” are not considered a model of respect for obligations toward the sovereignty of states and their peoples.
Days before the U.S. midterm elections, several options were available to Tehran, given that the visit by the “Mecca Alliance” delegation was not an ordinary initiative. The Iranian side dealt with it seriously, but also according to its “seven” conditions and by once again proposing its “regional security mechanism,” excluding external parties.
However, Tehran understood the true significance of the visit. The three countries wanted to convey, before it was too late, that the situation swinging between war and negotiation was approaching its end and that continuing the policy of procrastination was no longer beneficial.
Most importantly, the alliance countries confirmed their support for the Qatari-Pakistani mediation, and any agreement reached would be guaranteed by several countries, later said to include Russia and China, giving the ongoing efforts a more decisive character.
Before that, the recent summit between Trump and Xi Jinping resulted in convincing the Chinese side that merely monitoring the war and reaping benefits from it might not constitute a useful policy. Beijing therefore began sending signals recommending a search for a settlement.
Then, the atmosphere of openness and the “diesel deal” between Trump and Vladimir Putin paved the way for Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Tehran, where he revealed a shift in Moscow’s position, particularly regarding the possibility of transferring the stockpile of highly enriched uranium to Russia.
Thus, as the outlines of an “understanding” among the major powers emerged, and based on J.D. Vance’s message to Mohsen Rezaei, the latest Qatari proposal appeared viable. An Iranian negotiating delegation traveled to Doha, awaiting the arrival of an American delegation, amid talk of “breakthroughs.”
What is known about the Qatari proposal suggests that it constitutes a partial agreement, while attempting to satisfy both parties in order to avoid a return to confrontation.
On the one hand, it places Iran’s conditions on an implementation track, beginning with reopening the Strait of Hormuz and allowing Tehran access to part of its frozen funds. In return, Washington would receive an Iranian commitment on the nuclear file intended to prompt it to end its blockade of Iranian ports. Both parties would then return to the negotiating track.
Many questions remain among observers of the mediation efforts. Is the expected agreement sufficient for Trump to declare the “near end of the war,” as he promised, or to persuade him to completely abandon his plan for a “short and intensive war” targeting nuclear sites and some infrastructure?
These sources note that such an agreement could have been reached during the New York negotiations more than a month ago, but Tehran refused to make any nuclear commitment at the time and preferred to continue betting on the midterm elections and their impact on the U.S. administration.
The same sources point to the inflammatory statements by Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and Foreign Minister Abbas Arafgchi’s demand to “reduce American forces” in the region, warning that the same obstacles could re-emerge once negotiations resume.
Iran’s constant concern is the rapid lifting of sanctions, while Washington links this to reaching a final agreement on the nuclear file.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.
