Before the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Lebanese prime minister stood before the world, laying bare Lebanon’s open wounds and raising existential questions: How can a state rebuild itself while facing external pressures affecting its security and territory, alongside an internal challenge to reclaim sovereignty over its decisions and institutions? Does the international and regional community have the genuine resolve to sustain the ceasefire, support the Lebanese army and fund reconstruction, or will its commitments amount to little more than statements?
More troubling still, to what extent do the Lebanese themselves recognize that international decisions will not save their country without a genuine internal will to reclaim the state before it is too late? Lebanon’s appeal to the international community goes beyond political solidarity or the announcement of commitments. It calls for a transition to tangible support through clear timelines and implementable mechanisms that enable the state to restore its sovereignty and assert its authority across its entire territory.
Accordingly, Lebanon called on Israel to withdraw from all occupied territories, respect its sovereignty, release prisoners, allow displaced people to return to their villages and towns, and implement international legal resolutions, foremost among them UN Security Council Resolution 1701. The appeal also stressed the need to support the Lebanese army, strengthen the state’s ability to assume its security responsibilities, prevent a security vacuum in the south, and provide humanitarian assistance, fund early recovery and support reconstruction.
From this perspective, the international community is not expected to replace the Lebanese state in carrying out its functions, but rather to create the conditions that enable it to reclaim its sovereignty and institutional effectiveness. Any support that fails to change security realities or strengthen public institutions’ ability to fulfil their duties remains inadequate in addressing the root causes of the crisis. Its impact does not extend beyond temporarily containing the consequences.
At the Arab and regional levels, there is no longer room for hope in political and diplomatic statements alone. What matters is respect for Lebanon’s independent decision-making, refraining from using the country in the conflicts of others, and contributing to the conditions necessary for its stability. Lebanon cannot achieve stability as long as its territory remains a platform for exchanging messages and settling scores. Sovereignty is not established simply by asserting it, but by enabling the state to exercise it in practice.
Lebanon’s message is therefore not a call to isolate itself from its regional surroundings, but a demand for an equitable relationship based on respect for state sovereignty and national interests, support for stability, and the reduction of escalation rather than the export of regional crises onto Lebanese territory. This would allow Lebanon to participate in determining its own future instead of serving as a testing ground for agreements reached by others.
Yet the greatest challenge lies in what Lebanon must accomplish on its own. External support cannot substitute for national will. Ending the war, significant as that achievement may be, is not enough to guarantee stability unless it is accompanied by internal reforms that address the shortcomings that have weakened the state and its institutions.
Internal reform must therefore be treated as a national and constitutional necessity that cannot be postponed until after the war. Security, recovery and reform are interconnected components of the broader project of restoring the state. There can be no sustainable stability amid multiple centers of sovereign decision-making, no genuine economic recovery through institutions incapable of reforming themselves and ensuring accountability, and no public trust without a state capable of meeting its obligations to its citizens.
The foremost priority is to establish the state’s exclusive authority in the security and military spheres, guarantee its legitimate monopoly on arms, restrict decisions of war and peace to its constitutional institutions, and exercise effective authority over its entire territory. In this way, sovereignty can move beyond a principle proclaimed to external actors and become an institutional practice through which the state protects its interests and prevents the country from being subjected to military decisions made outside its constitutional institutions.
Restoring the state also requires reforming its institutional, economic and financial structures. This entails implementing serious reforms, strengthening the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary, combating corruption, embedding transparency and accountability, and protecting citizens’ rights and finances. A state seeking international support to rebuild its institutions must demonstrate its ability to reform them, manage resources responsibly and hold those exercising public power accountable under the law.
However, emphasizing national responsibility does not mean that internal reform should become a precondition for international protection. Obligations arising from international law remain in force, and the internal shortcomings of an affected state do not diminish those obligations under international law.
Ultimately, Lebanon does not need a region that exports its crises onto its territory, nor an international community content with managing their aftermath. It needs a regional environment that respects its sovereignty, an international will to honour legal commitments, and a national state capable of reclaiming its decisions and assuming its responsibilities.
*Researcher in International Law and International Relations
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.
