Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan congratulated “the Syrian intelligence service and our national service on their efforts in capturing the criminal responsible for the bloodshed of innocents in Baniyas and Reyhanli, Mihraç Ural (Ali Kayali).” This statement marks the first official Turkish acknowledgment of involvement in a joint operation with Syrian intelligence to kidnap Ali Kayali in the town of Mansourieh, inside Lebanese territory, in a violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty and security.
Lebanese authorities at all levels have made no comment, and the entire operation has been ignored. This does not serve the country’s interests, regardless of the considerations and justifications involved. Meanwhile, the issue is simmering behind the scenes because of its implications for relations with Turkey, which both the president of the republic and the prime minister have visited in recent months, as well as for relations with Damascus. Internal positions vary significantly among Lebanese authorities and institutions regarding the nature of openness toward Syria’s new regime.
The incident also raises questions and concerns likely to be felt by Hezbollah, given fears for its members or leadership should its purported arms be handed over to the Lebanese state. These concerns stem from the party’s actions against Syrians in support of the former Syrian regime led by Bashar al-Assad. This aspect should not be underestimated in any effort to convince the party that disarmament in favor of the Lebanese state is inevitable, particularly since Lebanon’s security was breached in the manner witnessed in Mansourieh. The incident also raises fears among others, albeit for different reasons.
Enthusiasm for opening up to the new Syria is not the issue under discussion, given deeply rooted convictions about Syria’s vital role for Lebanon and the many familiar considerations that can be invoked to justify a particular policy or approach. However, attention should be paid to a reservation recently expressed by Walid Jumblatt, who said that some Lebanese agencies refuse to cooperate with their Syrian counterparts.
According to some, this specifically refers to the General Security Directorate, headed by Major General Hassan Chaker, primarily because of Druze-related considerations and the confusion surrounding the situation in Sweida, which has produced similar divisions among Lebanon’s Druze community. Such a situation, however, cannot be generalized into a policy or approach adopted by the security agencies.
At the same time, there is criticism within Lebanese institutions of the broad openness toward the Syrian regime, involving dealings at various levels. Although this regime stands in stark contrast to its predecessor, it nevertheless carries risks based on at least two factors.
First, the mentality deeply rooted among Syrians in general leads them to approach Lebanon and its reality from the same starting point, one that encourages a sense of superiority toward Lebanon. In this respect, there are no significant differences from the previous regime, although the approach is now more cautious and diplomatic, with greater care taken to avoid reviving Lebanese concerns over past practices. Syria has yet to move beyond this mentality, even if the intentions or plans of the new regime may be entirely different. The kidnapping of the former Syrian official in Mansourieh is a dangerous indicator in this regard, as it involved completely bypassing the Lebanese authorities and security agencies.
Second, genuine fears persist that Lebanon could fall back into the trap in which it found itself under the rule of the Assad family, albeit with different groups or allies, despite the various pressures to revive the Syrian regime through every possible form of assistance. This explains disagreements at the political level itself, rather than between political and security authorities, over the extent and nature of rapprochement with Syria. It also explains the criticism directed at the circumvention of established limits in the process of opening up to Damascus.
Does the emergence of these concerns explain the absence of a presidential visit to Syria, or a Syrian visit to Lebanon? Some see it that way. Yet the opportunity available to both Lebanon and Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime, alongside the beginning of a new era in Lebanon, lies in establishing solid and sound foundations for balanced, equal, and sincere relations. Such relations must be free of evasion and based on parity, rather than sectarian or political subordination to Syria.
Both sides must approach this opportunity cautiously, given signs that have not yet been publicly announced but nevertheless warn of the possibility of easily slipping back into the previous pattern of relations between the two countries. The necessity, importance, and inevitability of relations between Lebanon and Syria remain unquestionable.
rosannabm@hotmail.com Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.
