Iran’s internal crisis: Could growing pressure reshape Tehran’s regional strategy?

The Iranian opposition believes that the ruling leadership is facing a dual dilemma. Continuing the war could increase economic burdens, weaken state institutions, and deepen societal anger. Meanwhile, ending the confrontation without tangible improvements at home could remove some of the pretexts used by the authorities to maintain exceptional measures and security mobilization.

From this perspective, external tensions could offer the regime an opportunity to contain internal divisions and postpone certain social and political demands. However, this hypothesis does not mean that the leadership necessarily wants a new war, or that every military decision is driven by domestic calculations. The ruling system also faces genuine external threats and must account for them, while its institutions may differ in how they assess these threats and the means of confronting them.

The more realistic scenario is that war and domestic discontent have become intertwined factors, with developments on either front affecting the regime's ability to manage the other. Therefore, any assessment of how the confrontation might evolve remains incomplete without examining the regime's economic, security, and social capacity to withstand a prolonged war. Resistance and the street remain an unresolved equation.

Meanwhile, the organized Iranian opposition, led by the National Council of Resistance of Iran and the People's Mojahedin Organization, continues to insist that the country's future must be determined by the organized forces of the Iranian people, rather than through external wars or understandings with the regime.

In a statement issued on October 24, the Council announced that resistance units had carried out 20 operations in June. These developments raise a fundamental question: Can political and social opposition forces turn accumulated discontent into a broad movement united around a democratic vision for the future?

The National Council of Resistance proposes a project for a democratic republic based on the separation of religion and state, free elections, the abolition of the death penalty, equality in rights, and the rejection of the Shah's dictatorship. However, the prospects for any political transition remain linked to the ability of different societal forces to build a broader consensus on the foundations and guarantees of the next political system.

For Lebanon, the significance of these developments extends beyond the possibility of changes in military power balances. One of the key questions concerns how Iran's ruling regime will deal with its regional allies.

If Tehran continues to face economic crises and mounting internal divisions, several scenarios could emerge. First, the leadership might seek to ease regional tensions to reduce its burdens and protect its remaining resources. Second, it could hold on to its sources of influence, including its relationship with Hezbollah, to strengthen its negotiating position with the United States and regional powers. A third possibility involves differing calculations among institutions within the regime, meaning that its position on Lebanon and other regional issues may not necessarily align with its broader negotiating strategy.

It is impossible to predict decisively which course Tehran will take. The relationship between internal crises and regional influence is not automatic. Mounting pressure could push the regime to reduce its external commitments, but it could also encourage it to hold on to them as tools of negotiation and deterrence.

Moreover, monitoring Iran's domestic situation is not separate from examining Lebanon's future. Rather, it is part of understanding the constraints and opportunities that will shape the regime's regional policy.

The comparison between Iran and the Soviet Union in its final years has attracted attention in Arab political debate. It rests on several potentially common factors: widening gaps between official rhetoric and social reality, growing privileges among the elite, the economic costs of foreign policies, and the declining capacity of institutions to reform.

However, each historical experience has its own particularities. A political system can survive for many years despite severe crises, while rapid transformations can occur when divisions within the ruling establishment coincide with widespread social mobilization and institutional inability to adapt.

For this reason, measuring the erosion of the regime's ability to govern is more important than speculating about when it might collapse.

Iran's ruling leadership faces pressure on three fronts simultaneously: a costly external confrontation, a deepening social and economic crisis, and challenges surrounding the distribution of decision-making power within the ruling establishment.

The regime could move toward a limited settlement that buys it additional time, continue its policy of deterrence and escalation, or attempt to combine both approaches. However, none of these options would automatically resolve the crisis of confidence in state institutions or address the structural causes of economic deterioration. This is the issue that deserves close attention from Arab capitals.

Will mounting internal pressure lead Iran to modify its regional behavior, or push it toward greater rigidity and increased reliance on external leverage?

The answer will not only shape the direction of relations between Tehran and Washington but will also affect the calculations of Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and the Gulf states.

The future of Iran's ruling regime will not be determined solely at negotiating tables or by missiles. It will also depend on a society undergoing profound changes, institutions facing increasingly difficult choices, and an opposition seeking to present a political alternative.

While war may be the most visible development, internal transformations could ultimately determine the regime's ability to survive and the role it plays in the region in the years ahead.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.