The Iranian regime can no longer sustain the state of “neither war nor peace” it has been living under for months. The war has not ended in a way that would allow it to rebuild its military and economic capabilities, while peace has not materialized in a way that would enable it to rid itself of sanctions, the blockade, and ongoing threats.
Against this backdrop, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian’s remarks on November 9 take on exceptional significance. He announced that Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had ordered an end to the state of “neither war nor peace”!
But how does Tehran intend to break out of this impasse? Through a settlement, or by widening the confrontation and raising the cost of the blockade for its adversaries?
Iran’s crisis appears to run deeper than the mere threat of new US or Israeli strikes. Washington is turning the pause in large-scale fighting into a phase of sustained economic and military attrition.
On November 7, US Central Command announced the establishment of a task force named “Iron Gate,” tasked with tracking down routes used to transport weapons, technology, and sanctioned materials across Iran’s land borders and the Caspian Sea, including supply networks linked to Russia and Central Asia.
The US command says its naval blockade has prevented the export of more than $25 billion worth of Iranian oil. Meanwhile, a Reuters investigation revealed that Iran has imported at least $2 billion worth of equipment related to its military capabilities since early 2025 through alternative routes that Washington is now seeking to disrupt.
Thus, “neither war” no longer means an end to losses, but rather their continuation without the United States having to wage an all-out war.
More alarming still is the fact that the circle of countries enforcing the blockade is no longer limited to the United States and Israel. The three European powers, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, have reactivated the international sanctions mechanism linked to Iran’s nuclear program, while the European Union added the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to its list of terrorist organizations in February 2026.
In November, France accused the IRGC of carrying out a cyberattack targeting the cooling systems of hundreds of stores. It also summoned the Iranian ambassador and called for additional sanctions. In Britain, a court convicted two Iranian men of assisting Iranian intelligence in surveilling dissident journalists, and found one of them guilty of preparing for a violent attack.
These developments coincided with US accusations that networks linked to Iran were planning attacks in Europe, including an attack targeting the British RAF Fairford airbase.
Has Tehran begun activating its sleeper cells in Europe to send a message to European governments that participating in the blockade of Iran will come at a security cost?
The accusations and investigations raise this possibility, but so far, they do not establish that Iran's leadership has issued a centralized order to activate these cells.
Meanwhile, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Mohsen Rezaei threatened to target US bases in Europe if they were used to strike Iran. He also linked an end to the confrontation to a settlement on the regional fronts, particularly in Lebanon.
Tehran retains leverage through its allies in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen, while Hezbollah continues to hold on to its weapons despite the Lebanese state’s decisions to place them exclusively under state control. Iran can capitalize on this network to demonstrate that the continuation of the blockade could threaten the stability of the entire region.
Yet this strategy carries a dangerous contradiction: the more Iran expands its threats, from missiles to proxy forces and clandestine cells, the more reasons it gives its adversaries to tighten the blockade.
And therein lies the paradox: Iran wants to end the state of “neither war nor peace” because it is draining its resources. But it may discover that trying to break this cycle of attrition by widening the confrontation will push Europe to become more deeply involved in the US-led campaign, turning the existing blockade into an “even greater blockade.”
