As Israeli elections approach, Gadi Eisenkot emerges as a prominent challenger to Benjamin Netanyahu, but his approach to Hezbollah could be tougher, more calculated, and potentially more consequential for Lebanon.
As Israeli elections approach, Gadi Eisenkot emerges as one of the prominent names capable of challenging Benjamin Netanyahu for the premiership.
Some cheer and bet on him, but reading Eisenkot from the perspective of Lebanon requires caution. He is not a pacifist general toward Hezbollah, nor a negotiator without conditions, but a tough military man who fundamentally disagrees with Netanyahu on how to use force, when to use it, and what political outcome it should lead to.
And here lies the paradox: Eisenkot's accession to the premiership may be significant for the Lebanese state, while simultaneously being more dangerous for Hezbollah.
Eisenkot is not a newcomer to the Lebanese front. He served in the Golani Brigade, participated in the Lebanon War in 1982, and then spent a significant part of his military career on the northern front. After the July War of 2006, he took over command of the Northern Area, where he worked on rebuilding the Israeli army's capabilities and extracting lessons from the war against Hezbollah.
He focused on intelligence, readiness for ground combat, countering rockets and infiltration, and improving the army's capability to operate in Lebanese territories. During his command of the Northern Area, the borders maintained a high level of deterrence and calm before he later moved to the role of Chief of Staff. But this history carries a more stringent side that cannot be ignored.
Eisenkot's name is associated with what later became known as the "Dahiya Doctrine," an Israeli military approach developed after the 2006 July War. It involves dealing with areas and infrastructure used by Hezbollah to conduct its operations as part of its military system, thereby targeting them with significant force in any future confrontation.
This approach is based on raising the cost of war for Hezbollah and the environment in which it operates, with the aim of enhancing deterrence and preventing a repeat of the July War experience.
Therefore, presenting Eisenkot as less stringent toward Hezbollah would be misleading. He is not less rigorous in assessing the threat posed by the party, but he may be more disciplined in determining when and why Israel uses force, and where it aims to go with it.
The most notable example came after "Al-Aqsa Flood." On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah opened the northern front in support of Gaza. In the following days, the Israeli leadership discussed the possibility of launching a wide strike against Hezbollah and initiating a full-scale war with Lebanon.
Eisenkot, who joined the war government alongside Benny Gantz, opposed initiating a full-scale war with Hezbollah at that time. He later considered that striking Hezbollah at that moment would have been a major strategic mistake, as it would have expanded the war from Gaza to Lebanon, and perhaps to Iran and other Axis components.
This was not a defense of Hezbollah, but a military assessment. Israel had suffered an unprecedented strategic blow on October 7, and it was, in his view, illogical to open a second massive front simultaneously before determining its objectives and capability to end it.
Here, one of Eisenkot's traits becomes clear: he does not refuse to use force, but he refuses to use it without a clear strategic goal.
As the northern front continued, he became more critical of the government due to the lack of clear strategic goals in Lebanon. Keeping tens of thousands of Israelis out of their northern settlements, with ongoing military exchanges, cannot form a permanent strategy.
This may be the real difference between him and Netanyahu. Netanyahu tends to keep the margin of Israeli military action wide and link Israeli withdrawal to the complete disarmament of Hezbollah, which makes the political path prone to stagnation.
Eisenkot, if he were to ascend to the premiership, may be more ready to turn Israeli military superiority into a security and political deal: Israeli withdrawal, Lebanese army deployment, a verification mechanism, and security guarantees in exchange for ending Hezbollah's independent military capability.
And this might be the most crucial point in reading Eisenkot concerning Lebanon. The difference for Beirut may not only be in the size of Israeli military pressure, but in the entity Israel wants to negotiate with. Does Israel deal with Lebanon as a state responsible for securing its borders, or with Hezbollah as the force holding military decisions?
If Eisenkot is more prepared to establish arrangements with Lebanese state institutions, this could open the way to restore the state's consideration in the southern equation. But this will not come free. The expected Israeli price will be clear: ending Hezbollah's independent military capability and subjecting the weapon to Lebanese authority.
This approach cannot be separated from Eisenkot's stance on Iran. The Israeli security establishment does not view Hezbollah as a Lebanese organization detached from Tehran, but as one of the most important components of Iran's regional power. Therefore, any long-term settlement with Lebanon will not be, from the Israeli perspective, merely a border agreement or a cease-fire; it will require assuring that the party's military capabilities are not rebuilt, especially through Iranian support.
From here, Eisenkot may not only aim to keep Hezbollah away from the borders but also prevent the reproduction of its military capabilities after any agreement. This is precisely what could make a potential settlement more difficult for Hezbollah, even if it is more beneficial for the Lebanese state.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.
Thank you for subscribing to our newsletter
