Washington’s tighter economic pressure on Tehran and the resumption of fighting after weeks of calm have raised questions over whether mediators can revive the “Islamabad understanding” and restore its terms. Those hopes appeared increasingly remote on Tuesday after the US resumed strikes on southern Iran on a wider scale. Tehran vowed an appropriate response. US strikes hit areas in Sistan, Baluchestan and Hormozgan. US President Donald Trump said the targets were radars that Iran had tried to rebuild. He described the attacks near the Strait of Hormuz as “large and powerful.” They came, he said, in response to a “failed attempt at adding sea mines to the Strait” and the launch of 8 missiles at a US base in Jordan. Trump also threatened that “there will be very little left” of the Islamic Republic if it retaliated. “They will be hit again at a much harder and higher level, but it will not be the biggest attack of them all, that is waiting in the wings,” he warned. He dismissed the memorandum of understanding as something that “isn't worth the paper it's written on.” The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps warned that the US would regret its attacks, leading to “the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.” The General Staff of the Armed Forces and the Khatam Al-Anbiya Central Headquarters promised to launch a military response and inflict “heavy losses” for US forces. Later, Tasnim news agency reported the “start of the decisive operation by the Iranian armed forces in response to US aggression.” Initial reports from the Iranian Red Crescent in Hormozgan province said two people were killed and 20 wounded in a strike on a wedding in an area of Sirik. The Health Ministry reported several civilian deaths, including a child, and more than 50 wounded in the Kuhestak area. The developments suggest Washington is seeking to establish a new equation that could create conditions for a diplomatic process more favorable to the US than the Islamabad understanding. Washington is pursuing this on two fronts. The first is greater economic pressure through a naval blockade of Iran and restrictions on its trade routes. The second is continued limited military strikes aimed at reducing Tehran’s ability to control the Strait of Hormuz, which has become its main tool for prolonging the confrontation and raising the cost for the US. The administration hopes these measures will alter the balance of power and weaken Iran’s leadership. But a return to the Islamabad understanding appears unlikely in the near term. The main reason is that the June 18 memorandum was, as many in the US acknowledged, closer to serving Iranian interests than US ones. After a 40-day war, Trump failed to secure an outcome that could be presented as a clear victory. That failure, along with criticism of the memorandum, may have strengthened the influence of the pro-war camp inside the administration and contributed to the gradual undermining of the understanding. After a 40-day war, Trump failed to secure an outcome that could be presented as a clear victory. The core of the Islamabad understanding was to end the war and restore the conditions that existed before it. The latest confrontation would effectively be treated as though it had not happened. After the April ceasefire, Washington insisted on a comprehensive agreement to settle the future of Iran’s nuclear program and its stockpile of enriched uranium. Iran, however, wanted the first phase to focus only on ending the war, with disputed issues deferred to a later agreement. The understanding was therefore structured largely around Tehran’s demands. The sides agreed to end the war and address related issues, including Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz and the US lifting its naval blockade. Washington also agreed to issue licenses allowing Iranian oil sales and release frozen Iranian assets. Once those measures were implemented, the sides were to begin 60 days of negotiations, with the possibility of an extension, on the nuclear program and the lifting of US sanctions. The arrangement drew sharp criticism of Trump and questions over its value after a 40-day war. The US had secured no tangible Iranian concession on the nuclear program. Instead, it had ended the war and blockade while allowing Iran to resume oil sales. The criticism appears to have prompted Trump to take steps aimed at hollowing out the first and fifth provisions of the Islamabad understanding. Among them were an agreement between the Lebanese authorities and the Israeli occupation and the opening of the southern route through the Strait of Hormuz without coordination with Iran. Tehran responded by targeting vessels using that route. Washington then reimposed the naval blockade and canceled licenses for Iranian oil exports. Short-term escalation will not necessarily produce a “better deal” from Washington’s perspective. Trump subsequently declared the understanding officially over. The US administration appeared to embark on a new strategy of exhausting Iran through limited military operations and mounting economic pressure. Washington hopes this will produce a new agreement that secures its maximum demands. It would also allow Trump to present the outcome as superior to the 2015 nuclear deal reached under former President Barack Obama. But there are serious doubts that the strategy can deliver the desired result. First, economic pressure and a naval blockade do not necessarily mean Iran will surrender or accept Washington’s maximum demands. The broad war already failed to produce that outcome. Tehran can instead use other tools to raise the cost of the current policy for Washington and its allies. The Strait of Hormuz remains an effective source of leverage. Greater pressure could also harden Iran’s position and reduce its willingness to return to dialogue. The second obstacle is the difficulty of building consensus inside the US over the goals and cost of the strategy. The longer the limited confrontation continues, the greater its impact on energy markets, regional trade and the security of US forces. Domestic opposition to the policy could therefore grow, particularly as the midterm elections approach. Short-term escalation will not necessarily produce a “better deal” from Washington’s perspective. The more likely scenario is a prolonged and tense war of attrition, with both sides seeking to strengthen their negotiating positions before returning to diplomacy. That could produce a new understanding, but not necessarily a full revival of the Islamabad agreement. If negotiations resume, Iran will need more credible guarantees than those offered by previous US commitments. That is especially true after Washington abandoned the earlier understanding within a short period. Putin noted that Russia and Iran were maintaining economic ties despite the current military and political circumstances. Putin Pledges to Help Iran Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian met Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday on the sidelines of a Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Pezeshkian maintained that the US could not impose “illegal positions” on Iran. “We [Iranians] remain committed to the same understanding we signed, and if the US returns to that understanding, we will remain committed to it as well,” he said. Putin noted that Russia and Iran were maintaining economic ties despite the current military and political circumstances. “The Russian people stand in solidarity with the Iranian people defending their interests,” he said. “Russia is trying to help Iran and provide it with essential goods during the difficult situation it is facing.” In remarks to the Bishkek summit before meeting Putin, Pezeshkian said US adherence to the document signed by its president “did not last more than 2 weeks.” Iran responded proportionally to Washington’s breach of its commitments, he maintained. “I say clearly that once the US returns to its commitments under the memorandum of understanding, the Islamic Republic of Iran will take a reciprocal step and return to implementing its own commitments.” Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif described the June 18 memorandum, which resulted from Pakistan’s mediation between Iran and the US, as “the only appropriate path toward establishing lasting peace in the region” during a meeting with Pezeshkian on the sidelines of the summit. This is an edited translation for an article published in Arabic.
