When Israeli strikes start hitting Iranian influence tools one after the other, non-response becomes a problem for Tehran, as ongoing silence may imply the collapse of deterrence.
While Iran faces unprecedented military, economic, and political pressures, and its regional allies' ability to provide protection and deterrence is declining, Israel remains concerned about the possibility of Tehran initiating a new attack against it.
This paradox raises the fundamental question: Why might Iran, in a weaker position, choose to engage in a confrontation it knows beforehand Israel will respond to forcefully?
Israel's response is not based on the assumption that Iran has regained its military superiority, but on the opposite possibility: that Iran's diminishing power may make its leadership more prone to taking risks.
When Israeli strikes begin hitting Iran's tools of influence one after the other, the decision to not respond becomes a problem in itself because continued inaction might signal to Tehran the collapse of the deterrence image upon which it has built its regional influence.
Herein lies the dilemma. Does weakening Iran lead to its deterrence, or does it push it towards escalation? Could the pressure Israel applies on Iran become a factor prompting the Iranian regime to 'run forward' with a direct attack, instead of compelling it to pull back?
This question is no longer entirely theoretical. In South Lebanon, Israel took control of the Ali al-Taher area and destroyed an underground infrastructure belonging to Hezbollah. This occurred despite Iranian warnings, as reported by Reuters, that attacking the site would provoke an Iranian response. However, the response did not materialize at the level Tehran had indicated.
This incident's significance lies in its practical testing of Iran's deterrent limits. If Iran is unable or unwilling to act on its threats when Israel strikes a key ally's site, the message is not only received by 'Hezbollah' but by other Iranian allies and adversaries too: Can Tehran still protect the lines it has drawn?
Faced with two contradictory options, Iran must decide. The first is inaction, with the risk of eroding deterrence. The second is a response, which risks opening a direct confrontation with Israel under circumstances where Iranian capabilities appear less robust, while facing increasing economic crises and security and political pressures internally.
This is exactly what makes Iran's weakness a source of concern for Israel. A strong state can wait and choose the right moment for a confrontation. But a state feeling its options narrowing might see waiting as increasingly costly. If Iran's leadership believes that continued Israeli strikes will gradually dismantle their network of influence, launching an attack now, despite the risks, might seem less costly than waiting for its retaliatory capacity to diminish further.
But there is a strong argument in the opposite direction. Iran knows that a direct attack could provide Israel with the justification needed to expand its targets from military installations and regional networks to critical infrastructure within Iran. According to the Jerusalem Post, Israeli officials have conveyed to Tehran that any Iranian attack would lead to an irreversible response, potentially targeting vital installations hard for a crisis-stricken Iranian regime to rebuild.
This means deterrence operates in both directions. Iran tries to deter Israel from continuing its strikes, while Israel attempts to deter Iran from responding.
Yet, even inaction carries a price. Iran does not face Israel in a vacuum. Its regional influence relies on a network of allies and tools that should grant it the capability to impose a cost on its adversaries. If this network's ability to operate diminishes, Tehran must find other ways to prove that striking its interests will not go unchallenged.
This can explain Iran's increasing focus on maritime geography. With the reduced scope for maneuvering in certain terrestrial arenas, Tehran still holds cards such as the Strait of Hormuz, while the Houthis retain the ability to affect the Bab el-Mandeb. Therefore, a decline in Iran's ability to retaliate in Lebanon does not necessarily mean its pressure capabilities are gone; it might just mean shifting pressure from one arena to another.
But shifting to these tools does not resolve the fundamental problem. The more Iran refrains from a direct response, it preserves its capabilities and avoids a wide-reaching war, but it also risks a deterioration of its deterrent image. Conversely, the closer it gets to a direct response, the more it restores parts of that image, but it also risks facing Israel in a time when its military and economic conditions are not ideal.
Therefore, Israeli concern about an Iranian attack despite all indicators of Iranian weakness can be understood. Israel does not necessarily fear that Iran has become stronger; rather, it fears that their sense of weakness might lead them to make a more dangerous decision.
Herein lies the paradox explaining Israeli fears: the more successful Israel is in weakening Iran, it may very well be approaching its goal, but at the same time, it may be approaching the moment when Iran decides it must strike before becoming weaker.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.
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