As Iran faces mounting pressure and Hezbollah confronts the consequences of the latest war, Hezbollah’s ability to open a new support front appears increasingly constrained by changes on the ground and within its own community.
Iran has moved the Houthis in Yemen into action in the renewed war with the United States, while keeping Hezbollah away from the current confrontation so far. It is more likely that Hezbollah will not enter the war, even if the confrontations escalate into a full-scale war involving Israel, despite the fact that its rhetoric continues to move in the same direction through statements by some of its leaders, who consider Hezbollah an inseparable part of the Iranian axis and its armies.
Although Hezbollah MP Ali Ammar announced some time ago that Hezbollah “will not leave Iran alone” if a new war is launched against it, it does not appear to be in a position to wage a support war similar to what it did twice: in support of Gaza after “Al Aqsa Flood,” and in support of Iran in revenge for the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The reality on the ground has changed significantly after the second support war. The fortified and heavily armed defensive line in towns and cities along the border was completely destroyed, and Hezbollah lost large numbers of its highly trained fighters. Hezbollah has not announced the number of its fighters who fell in the recent confrontations because many of them remain missing in the towns occupied by Israel, but the mass funeral ceremonies in villages outside the occupied area provide indications of the large number of casualties.
Since achieving the liberation in 2000, a liberation for which it deserves the greatest credit, regardless of all the ambiguities and Syrian and Iranian intersections surrounding it, Hezbollah has acted as a regional power with a role extending beyond Lebanese geography. Its project moved from the Islamization of the Lebanese state, in the long term, after it realized that this was not possible, to moving toward jihad “where we must be,” as its late Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah announced more than once.
“Where we must be” meant, when it was said, the entirety of Syrian territory, parts of Iraq, and other places. This “where,” linked to the Iranian decision, has narrowed considerably, and Hezbollah today faces complex challenges that put its fate at stake.
As the siege on Iran tightens and it comes under painful strikes targeting its military and civilian sites, the party in Lebanon is facing a political campaign against it and its weapons, as well as the consequences of the recent war and its catastrophic results for the Shiite community and its urban fabric and economy. Hezbollah’s participation in any new support front will not receive the backing of the Shiite community, where opposition to such support fronts is growing. What existed before the support front is not the same as what came after it.
Hezbollah certainly understands that the situation on the ground and within the sect is no longer what it was, that grievances can no longer be silenced, and that the logic of accusing opponents of treason is no longer effective. If Hezbollah knows this and acknowledges it, this may be a starting point for new thinking that moves away from the logic that previously prevailed, which viewed the party as a force that would change the Middle East, together with Iran. If it does not acknowledge this, it will remain trapped in the same rigid rhetoric.
MP Ammar’s expression, “We will not leave Iran alone,” carries a semiotic dimension loaded with deep implications. Hezbollah affiliated with Iran, and this is not an accusation but rather a fact that the party has always confirmed in its literature, the speeches of its late leader, and through its war in Syria and its intervention in Yemen and Iraq at Iran’s request, considers itself, at the core of this statement, a force capable of coming to Iran’s aid and acts as a force capable of confronting America, and with it Israel.
MP Ammar’s statement may be an exaggeration in defiance, a style he personally and many Hezbollah leaders have become accustomed to, including the Secretary General, MPs, and officials. This may be understandable and justified in some situations that require rallying support and displaying deterrence power, but when it becomes a daily refrain, it raises questions about the usefulness of dialogue and negotiations with it.
Hezbollah adopts the principle that an attack is the best means of defense, as if it were part of its doctrine. In the background, Hezbollah has come to consider its weapons as part of its very existence, placing them in the position of a doctrine that cannot be touched. “The hand that reaches out to the weapon will be cut off,” a slogan that echoes the verse about cutting off the hand of the thief.
Hezbollah sought to convince its community that the weapons protect it and secure its rights, while implicitly consolidating its control over the country and its key institutions. It has largely succeeded in doing so, which explains the difficulty of reaching a political solution to the Lebanese crises, greatly aggravated by the last two wars, while some political forces opposed to the party had hoped for a crushing blow, even from Israel, that would completely end its role, something that did not happen and will not happen.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.
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