Subscribe to our Lens on Sudan newsletter here. In an Armed Forces Day speech on August 14, Transitional Sovereignty Council Chair Abdel Fattah al-Burhan offered temporary immunity to participants in the intra-Sudanese dialogue his government is now rushing to launch, including a suspension of criminal proceedings against those facing charges while they take part. The move is largely aimed at clearing the legal obstacle facing leaders of the opposition Sumud coalition, the civilian coalition led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok that was formed on the back of a factional split in the the Civil Front for Democracy, a previous anti-war civilian front. The charges stem from that earlier coalition over what the military saw as proximity to the Rapid Support Forces. But the legal cases are only one obstacle. Civilian forces want the dialogue to follow a halt in fighting, input on how its preparatory arrangements are made and to know whether whatever comes out of the process will bind state institutions. The military is showing no sign of halting its campaign, while Burhan’s central role in building the dialogue and his apparent ambitions for it do little to settle questions about its independence. Moreover, Khartoum cannot entirely escape the regional and international tracks it is trying to outpace. An African Union diplomat told Mada Masr that any internal dialogue would ultimately need to connect with those tracks and gain acceptance from them. Khartoum may have seen an opening for some African cover. Just hours after Burhan’s speech, a delegation from the African Union’s Peace and Security Council arrived in Port Sudan before travelling to Khartoum for its first field visit to the capital since the outbreak of the war. Sudan has been trying to repair its relationship with the AU since 2021, when the bloc suspended its membership after the military and Rapid Support Forces jointly ousted the civilian wing of the government. Now, with state institutions back in Khartoum, a civilian government appointed last year and a domestic dialogue being hurried toward a September launch, authorities are looking for the AU’s renewed attention to translate into a role in the political process and the restoration of Sudan’s membership. But the visit is not quite the diplomatic endorsement Khartoum might want. Another AU diplomat told Mada Masr that the union is still assessing, speaking to multiple sides and gathering information. There is a lot the bloc needs to know, the diplomat said, and the AU is not prepared to give any political process a “blank check.” Monday was a busy day for what a Sudanese political source described as Khartoum’s effort to “rearrange its foreign relations during the war and beyond.” In Ankara, military Chief-of-Staff Yasser al-Atta held talks with his Turkish counterpart Selcuk Bayraktaroglu and Defense Minister Yasar Guler. Sudanese military sources said contacts between the two establishments have become more regular. The sources said Monday’s talks focused on the military’s needs at the current stage and the support it wants from Turkey after the war, from training and reconnaissance to rebuilding the armed forces’ capabilities and institutions. Turkey’s existing defense relationship with Sudan and its experience in areas where the military needs help make it one of the easier partnerships for Khartoum to deepen, one of the military sources said. On the same day, Burhan was in Riyadh signing the largest agreement in the history of Sudanese-Saudi relations, establishing a bilateral coordination council. A Sudanese diplomatic source said the council is intended to move the relationship “from managing scattered files to a single political and institutional mechanism.” The new mechanism is also intended to give the political relationship a more direct economic dimension, according to a former Sudanese diplomat. Political discussions with Riyadh can now be linked to projects in agriculture, energy, mining, infrastructure and trade. On the battlefield, both the military and the RSF are trying to take back territory following a series of gains by both sides in recent weeks. In Blue Nile, the military has stepped up air and artillery strikes on the RSF’s newly captured positions in Geisan and Kurmuk, while in North Kordofan, the RSF has launched drone attacks on towns recently captured by the military. The military received its second-largest batch of RSF defectors on Tuesday, with 318 fighters arriving in Northern State from North Darfur. A leadership figure in the Darfuri Mahamid tribe said some had coordinated their movements with security agencies beforehand, while others had made contact with previous defectors, including Al-Nour “Gubba” Adam, the former RSF commander in North Darfur and Mahamid tribal leader who defected earlier this year. *** Burhan offers temporary immunity for internal dialogue participants Transitional Sovereignty Council Chair and military chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan gives a speech during the celebration of Armed Forces Day in Khartoum, August 14. Courtesy: Sudan News Agency In an Armed Forces Day speech on August 14 devoted largely to the intra-Sudanese dialogue his government has spent months championing, Burhan announced temporary immunity and legal and security guarantees for participants, along with a suspension of criminal proceedings against anyone facing charges during their involvement in the political process. The move is largely aimed at addressing the criminal cases against leaders of the opposition Sumud coalition based outside Sudan. The announcement comes after weeks of accelerated preparations in Khartoum for the domestic political track, which political sources told Mada Masr last week was being targeted for a September launch. The government is now working to settle the dialogue’s preparatory arrangements, the sources said, but those arrangements remain contested among the forces expected to take part. One of the political sources said last week that the government was preparing to clear the way for Sumud leaders facing charges to join the process. The measure may remove a legal barrier, but it does not resolve the larger dispute over how the dialogue should begin and who should control it. Many civilian forces, including Sumud, want any political process to follow a halt in fighting and a set of humanitarian and political guarantees. They are also seeking a role in determining the dialogue’s preparatory arrangements, rather than being asked to accept them once they are set. The cases hanging over Sumud’s leadership date back to a prosecution campaign that began in the first months of the war and widened as the government turned its attention to civilian political forces. In September 2023, the Public Prosecution announced arrest warrants for around 250 politicians, journalists and activists. The campaign expanded to include RSF commanders. And in April 2024, the Prosecution filed charges against 17 leaders of the Civil Front for Democracy, among them its leader and former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, on counts including inciting war against the state, incitement and complicity, as well as undermining the constitutional order, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Prosecutors later announced arrest warrants for 16 more politicians and moved to seek Interpol’s assistance. Many of those named in the charges now sit under a different banner. The Civil Front for Democracy splintered in February 2025, after members aligned with the RSF broke away to sign the founding charter of the RSF’s parallel government at its Nairobi conference. The remainder regrouped under Hamdok as Sumud, a coalition bringing together political parties, civil society organizations, unions, professional associations and resistance committees. Addressing the Armed Forces Day audience, Burhan said the state would provide participants with the guarantees they needed, but was careful to stress that the suspension of criminal proceedings was temporary and did not amount to an amnesty. The guarantees had already been on the table during consultations Burhan held with political forces in July, according to a political source close to Burhan informed of the TSC’s contacts. Their purpose, the source said, was to “remove the legal barrier to participation” while keeping the court cases formally in place, a distinction intended to prevent the invitation to dialogue from being read as a blanket political amnesty. But the guarantees need clear legal drafting — a defined timeframe and scope, a named authority empowered to order a suspension of proceedings and clarity over whether the protection would cover criminal charges alone or extend to arrest warrants and investigative proceedings, according to a legal source informed of the discussions. Sudanese judicial precedent shows that suspending criminal proceedings has followed defined legal frameworks, the source said, but the authority to order such suspensions and the limits of that authority have historically been contested. That leaves a gap between announcement and enforcement. The promise of temporary immunity still has to be translated into real decisions and executive procedures before it becomes a guarantee that participants can rely on, the source said. The most sensitive question will be whether charges or other legal restrictions can be used as leverage against participants while the dialogue is underway, as the state preserves its ability to resume proceedings once the guarantee expires, they added. Workable legal guarantees may clear one hurdle, but they leave a range of other objections unresolved. Shehab Ibrahim, a leader in Sumud, rejected the premise outright. He told Mada Masr that independence from the warring parties is a basic condition for the process to have any credibility. Holding a dialogue in territory controlled by either side, Ibrahim said, would entrench Sudan’s de facto division and reproduce the logic of the war rather than provide a path out of it. Another Sumud leader set a less sweeping condition, saying participation in a dialogue inside Sudan would require a halt in military escalation. Without that, the leader said, the process risks becoming little more than “a political arrangement for the existing authorities.” Legal guarantees are also not going to settle questions around the design of the process, according to a political source in the civilian forces following the consultations. Sumud and other civilian forces, the source said, want clarity on who will set the agenda, how the preparatory committee will be selected and whether the dialogue’s eventual outcomes will be binding on state institutions. Those concerns go to the central ambiguity in Khartoum’s model. The dialogue is meant to be independent, but is being built by the military-led state and alongside its efforts to reconstitute its institutions. The core bet within the TSC, according to a source close to the council and familiar with Burhan’s consultations, is to keep regionally and internationally sponsored tracks in a supporting role rather than as direct organizers. Burhan wants the dialogue to begin on a different footing from the political conferences held abroad over the past two years, the source explained, with Sudan’s existing institutions forming part of the environment in which the next political settlement is produced. In his speech, Burhan sought to distance his government from criticism that the process is state-curated, saying a “national group” of Sudanese had taken the initiative in proposing it “of their own accord.” He called it “an independent national mechanism,” with the state providing only “logistical support” and the necessary guarantees. But that description sits uneasily with how the process has been built so far, as Burhan himself has spent weeks leading consultations with political forces, tribal leaders and national figures, building the political backing for the dialogue and shaping the arrangements around its launch. A political source in the civilian forces close to those consultations said the mechanism will also face practical limits on its independence if its organizers depend on state institutions for funding, protection and facilitation, even as Khartoum seeks to present it as separate from executive and military authority. The question of independence also runs up against what an informed political source previously told Mada Masr Burhan envisions the dialogue to be: a vehicle for rebuilding state institutions. Burhan’s speech earlier this week placed the two agendas next to each other. He said forces that backed the state and its institutions during the war would take part in completing those institutions, including the long stalled legislative council, whose formation is currently under consultation. A political source in government-allied civilian forces familiar with these arrangements said reconstituting the legislative council is one of the tracks Khartoum wants to advance alongside the dialogue. An informed former Sudanese diplomat sees clear political significance in the pairing. Khartoum, in their view, is trying to build a political framework for the coming phase before it can be pressured into a final settlement of the war. “The dialogue here isn’t happening in an institutional vacuum,” the diplomat said, but at a moment when the authorities are working to entrench their institutions and redefine the basis of political participation. The military-led government’s political track, naturally, does not amount to a truce track. Burhan’s speech offered no indication that his government is prepared to suspend military operations. That puts the government at odds with several of the political forces being considered for the process, which have made a halt in fighting and a conducive humanitarian and political environment conditions for their participation. Burhan said the military would continue what he called “completing the cleansing of the country from the terrorist militia,” and repeated the military establishment’s longstanding condition that the RSF must withdraw from the cities before any peace process could begin. A military source close to the leadership said there is no contradiction, in its view, between continuing military operations and pursuing political movement. Military pressure, the source said, is intended to create the conditions for a political settlement built “on foundations that preserve the unity of Sudan and end with dismantling the RSF.” Meanwhile, the Quintet — the African Union, United Nations, Arab League, European Union and Intergovernmental Authority on Development — is preparing to resume its consultations on a political process, after its meetings in Addis Ababa in late July failed to bring the political forces into a joint discussion or produce agreement on the proposed preparatory arrangements. That failure is what created an opening for Khartoum to push ahead with its own domestic track, a political source informed of the process told Mada Masr last week. Burhan’s moves through July and August suggest that the government is trying to establish its process before the regional and international consultations arrive at a conclusion of their own. An AU diplomatic source said the two efforts would eventually have to connect. Any successful internal dialogue, they said, would need acceptance from the regional and international tracks, even if Khartoum organizes it domestically. According to the source, the question is ultimately less about where the dialogue takes place, but whether it can produce a workable political consensus, and whether that consensus can be linked to an end to the war and to humanitarian and security arrangements. *** AU Peace and Security Council delegation arrives in Khartoum TSC Chair Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and a delegation from the African Union’s Peace and Security Council meet in Khartoum, August 16. Courtesy: The TSC Just hours after Burhan’s speech, a delegation from the African Union’s Peace and Security Council, headed by Mohamed Khaled, the council’s rotating chair for August, arrived in Port Sudan on Saturday and travelled to Khartoum the following day. It was the council’s first visit to the capital since the outbreak of the war. Like many regional and international organizations, the AU withdrew its staff and closed its offices there when fighting began. More than three years later, Khartoum is under military control, and the state has spent the past year re-establishing the capital as its seat of power in a campaign that has outpaced its capacity. The return of state institutions has begun to draw regional bodies back toward the capital, with some showing interest in reopening offices and restoring direct contact. Khartoum sees the visit as an opening to repair relations with the continental body and draw African support toward the political process led from the capital. Tasis, the RSF-led government, has objected to the visit, concerned that it could help establish Khartoum as the state’s sole political center. But AU and Sudanese diplomats said the visit should not be interpreted as an endorsement of the government or its political process, but is part of a process of listening and assessment. Khartoum had been waiting for a field visit that would allow the council to assess developments inside the capital following the military’s recapture of Khartoum and the return of state institutions, a Sudanese diplomatic official said. They described the visit as “a first step toward rebuilding the relationship between Khartoum and African institutions.” That relationship has been strained since 2021, when the AU suspended Sudan’s membership after the military and RSF jointly removed the civilian wing of the transitional government instituted following the ouster of former President Omar al-Bashir, saying it “strongly condemns the seizure of power” and branding it “unconstitutional.” It said the suspension would remain in place “until the effective restoration of the civilian-led transitional authority.” The authorities have sought to return to the bloc since the military retook Khartoum last year and the state began appointing a civilian government and reinstating transitional institutions. Khartoum’s efforts to reverse the suspension have yet to produce a change in Sudan’s status. Sources in the continental body previously told Mada Masr that a ceasefire agreement and the launch of a credible political process remain key prerequisites for lifting it. The visit, in the view of an AU diplomat informed of the delegation’s program, allows the council to “engage with the Sudanese reality from within,” rather than relying on briefings from missions and mediators. During its stay, the delegation met with Burhan, Prime Minister Kamel Idris, government officials and political forces, discussing “the political, security, and socioeconomic and humanitarian situation,” the council stated. The government saw the delegation’s arrival as evidence that Khartoum was once again drawing the AU’s attention. For Khartoum, it was “a signal that Sudan is back at the top of the continental institution’s agenda,” according to a Sudanese political official informed of contacts with the AU. The authorities want that attention to lead to concrete steps: an end to Sudan’s suspension and a more direct African role in supporting the internal dialogue. But the council’s return to Khartoum does not amount to an endorsement of the political process there. The AU “wants to know who is running the process, who is guaranteeing its inclusiveness and whether its outcome will actually lead to constitutional arrangements,” a second AU diplomatic source said. Those questions will shape the council’s assessment in the coming period, they added. With the war still underway and political and military forces remaining outside Khartoum, the source said, the AU is not prepared to give the process a “blank check.” A government-aligned political source involved in the initial consultations over the state-led dialogue said the delegation’s arrival had nevertheless raised hopes that the initiative could gain regional recognition. But the source similarly said the AU would need to ensure that the process was not simply a “reshuffling of the political house in areas under government control.” Khartoum, meanwhile, wants to use the opening to make the case that a political solution can begin from within Sudan while continuing to frame the RSF as a rebel force, the source added. Idris made that position explicit in his meeting with the African delegation. According to a statement from the Cabinet, he laid down “red lines” for any political process, foremost among them a rejection of any equivalence between the armed forces and the RSF. He called on the AU to support the government’s efforts to have the RSF designated a terrorist organization. The position puts Khartoum at odds with the central premise of the international effort around Sudan — that ending the war will require bringing the country’s competing political and military forces into a negotiated settlement. The AU has pursued that objective both independently and through the Quintet, in efforts to bring Sudanese parties together and lay the groundwork for a new transitional arrangement. But the AU’s support for an inclusive political process does not mean accepting rival centers of government. Khaled affirmed during the meeting the council’s rejection of attempts to create parallel governments that could undermine Sudan’s unity and sovereignty. “The only path to achieving lasting peace in Sudan is through dialogue, national reconciliation and reaching a comprehensive political settlement that meets the aspirations of the Sudanese people,” he said. The visit drew opposition from the RSF-led government. On Tuesday, Tasis Prime Minister Mohamed al-Taaishy sent a letter to the Peace and Security Council objecting to the delegation’s trip to Khartoum and its meetings with the authorities there. He called on the council to deal with Sudanese parties even-handedly. A political source close to Tasis told Mada Masr that the concern was that the visit could become a step toward treating the Khartoum government as the state’s sole center of authority, particularly after government institutions returned to the capital. “The problem for Tasis is not the AU visiting Sudan, but Khartoum becoming the only address the council listens to,” the source said. Tasis, they added, wants African engagement to extend beyond the capital, including to areas controlled by other parties. But a Sudanese diplomatic source and the AU diplomat informed of the delegation’s program said the meetings in Khartoum do not amount to a final AU position on Sudan’s broader political arrangements. According to the AU diplomat, the council is hearing from multiple parties while operating within its previous decisions on Sudan. The Khartoum visit is “part of a process of listening and assessment,” the diplomat said, and the AU’s eventual position on any political process will be based on the outcome of its contacts with the various sides. *** Military chief-of-staff in Ankara Military Chief-of-Staff Yasser al-Atta, his Turkish counterpart Selcuk Bayraktaroglu and Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler meet in Ankara, August 17. Courtesy: Sudan News Agency Military Chief-of-Staff Yasser al-Atta arrived in Ankara on Monday on an official visit at the invitation of his Turkish counterpart Selcuk Bayraktaroglu and Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler. According to a Sudanese diplomatic source informed of relations between Khartoum and Ankara, the visit focused on “developing military cooperation between the two countries and opening files related to training, capacity building and technical cooperation.” The source told Mada Masr that the visit comes as contacts between the two military institutions have become more regular. “The presence of the military chief of staff in Ankara, and his reception by the Turkish defense minister, reflects the level the military relationship between the two countries has reached,” the source said. Sudan is now seeking to broaden its defense ties with countries that have shown a willingness to work with Sudanese state institutions, they added. According to a Sudanese military source informed of the visit, the talks are tied to the military’s needs, created by more than three years of war. These range from training, communications, reconnaissance and operational management. The military is also looking to rehabilitate a number of its institutions and facilities, the source added. Turkey’s experience in these areas makes it a useful partner as the Sudanese military reorganizes its capabilities, a second military source said. The source did not say whether the discussions covered particular systems or equipment. Ankara and Khartoum had already expanded cooperation into defense and military industries in the years before the war, the first military source said, describing the current effort as the “reactivation and expansion of existing channels in line with the needs created by the war.” That history gives Ankara an advantage over countries with which Sudan would have to build military ties from scratch. “Turkey is one of the countries with which a partnership can be developed more quickly,” a third Sudanese military source said. The Ankara diplomacy is part of a wider attempt by Khartoum to “broaden its network of foreign relations,” a Sudanese political source informed of the country’s foreign affairs told Mada Masr. The government is pursuing several relationships at once, including with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the AU and neighboring countries. “Khartoum wants its relationship with Turkey to be part of a broader arrangement of its foreign relations during the war and beyond,” they added. Atta’s visit, however, carries a significance beyond the usual political diplomacy, a second Sudanese diplomatic source said. By sending the military chief of staff to Ankara, the military establishment itself is taking part in the process of reshaping Sudan’s external relationships, they added. The military is also beginning to look beyond the immediate demands of the war and toward what comes after it, when, the source said, Sudan will need to “rebuild the capabilities of the armed forces and its institutions.” The military relationship also benefits from the broader ties spanning political, humanitarian and economic areas already linking Sudan and Turkey, according to a former Sudanese diplomat who served at the Sudanese embassy in Ankara and a Turkish diplomat at the Turkish embassy in Sudan. A former Sudanese diplomat said the timing is also significant because it coincides with Khartoum’s moves on the internal dialogue and international efforts to mediate the war. “The government wants to enter any upcoming political arrangements with a more balanced network of foreign relations,” they said. For Ankara, the Turkish diplomat said, Sudan is “a strategically important country in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa region.” Maintaining communication with Sudanese official institutions is part of Turkey’s policy toward Sudan, the source said. Turkey significantly upgraded its involvement in Sudan following the fall of Fasher in October 2025, expanding its support for the Sudanese military. An Egyptian official told Mada Masr at the time that Ankara is pursuing a strategy in Sudan that is similar to the one it adopted in Libya in 2020 against the Libyan National Army — an intervention that effectively froze the war along distinct eastern and western spheres of influence, and ultimately cemented Ankara’s influence in Tripoli. *** Khartoum, Riyadh establish bilateral coordination council Sudanese Foreign Minister Mohie Eddin Salem and his Saudi counterpart Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud sign the agreement establishing the Sudanese-Saudi Coordination Council, in Riyadh, August 17. Courtesy: Saudi Foreign Affairs Ministry Sudan and Saudi Arabia inked the largest agreement in the history of their bilateral relations in Riyadh on Monday. Sudanese Foreign Minister Mohie Eddin Salem and his Saudi counterpart Faisal bin Farhan al-Saud signed the agreement establishing the Sudanese-Saudi Coordination Council, nearly ten months after Saudi Arabia formally set the process in motion. The council is meant to bring the relationship under a comprehensive institutional umbrella, with a mandate covering ten areas including politics, security, economic affairs, investment and trade, according to a source at Sudan’s Foreign Ministry. The ministry said it would also facilitate joint projects and programs. A Sudanese diplomatic source informed of Khartoum-Riyadh relations described its purpose as moving ties “from managing scattered files to a single political and institutional mechanism,” bringing economic, political and investment matters together rather than leaving them spread across ministries and different bilateral contacts. The agreement follows a process that began on October 21, 2025, when the Saudi Council of Ministers authorized the foreign minister or his deputy to negotiate and sign an agreement with Sudan on establishing the council. Its creation has since moved through Saudi Arabia’s formal government channels. For Khartoum, the council comes as it seeks to put its war-long political relationship with Riyadh on more durable footing, the diplomatic source said. A former Sudanese diplomat informed of the relations said Khartoum sees Saudi Arabia as one of the few capitals able to combine political weight with economic capacity, giving Riyadh a particular place among the capitals Sudan is seeking to cultivate as political and economic partners. For Riyadh, the relationship with Sudan is tied to the kingdom’s interests in Red Sea security, humanitarian files and economic and investment interests. The council gives those interests a more formal structure through which they can be pursued, the first diplomatic source said. A Sudanese source informed of the economic file said the council would allow Khartoum and Riyadh to connect political negotiations directly to economic projects, with agricultural investment, energy, mining, infrastructure and trade among Sudan’s priority areas. The council’s practical value will hinge on the ability of its committees to translate agreements into concrete timelines and projects, a Sudanese official involved in earlier talks with the Saudi side told Mada Masr. Sudan needs a follow-up mechanism capable of cutting through slow government procedures and connecting agreements to implementation. But implementation will also depend on conditions beyond the council’s internal mechanisms. A Sudanese official in charge of economic files told Mada Masr that the war has made investment increasingly contingent on security, stability and legal guarantees, particularly in sectors requiring long-term capital. *** Military downs 3 RSF drones in North Kordofan, pushes west Military troops announce shooting down an RSF drone over Gabra al-Sheikh in North Kordofan, August 15. Courtesy: @AbedaMoham6183 on X Three RSF strategic drones were shot down over North Kordofan this week as the military pushed westward from positions it captured last month, sweeping areas around Gabra al-Sheikh, according to two military sources who spoke to Mada Masr. The first of the three drones, an FH-95, was shot down over Gabra al-Sheikh on Saturday, the military said. Two more drones of the same type were brought down on Monday, one over Gerigikh and the other over Bara. A military source told Mada Masr that the military’s surveillance systems and drones detected and destroyed the RSF drones before they could reach their targets. All three towns fell to the military in late July, when a two-day ground offensive seized one of the RSF’s most important logistics hubs in North Kordofan. The RSF has since been trying to recover the territory, mounting attacks on the newly captured positions. To stem the attacks, the military advanced on Saturday from Gabra al-Sheikh westward and cleared the areas of Kogmor and Abu Hadid, which had been used as a launching point for the RSF’s attacks on Gabra al-Sheikh last week. The sweep reached the outskirts of Mazroub, around 150 km southwest of Gabra al-Sheikh, a second military source said. The military’s advance has also extended into West Kordofan. On Wednesday, it regained control of Mamsouka in Sunut locality, along the road connecting Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan, to Nuhud in West Kordofan, according to the source. The military has also targeted the supply network supporting RSF positions farther west. Military aircraft struck RSF supply lines in Abu Zabad on Monday, destroying seven fuel tankers, as well as supply warehouses in Khawi, the Dar Hamar emergency room in West Kordofan stated. The escalation in fighting has seen the RSF move personnel out of the area this week. The second military source said the RSF gathered captured military personnel and abducted civilians held in North Kordofan on Monday and transported them toward North Darfur in cargo trucks. A day later, according to the Dar Hamar emergency room, the RSF evacuated wounded fighters from northern localities in neighboring West Kordofan, transporting them to Nyala in South Darfur in 40 cargo vehicles. *** Military hits RSF positions after Blue Nile’s Kurmuk, Geisan losses The military has stepped up air and artillery strikes across the Blue Nile front following last week’s RSF advances into the towns of Kurmuk and Geisan, while its forces in the Kurmuk locality have repelled ground and drone attacks, according to a field source in the military-allied Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), led by Malik Agar. On Tuesday, following intelligence surveillance, the military destroyed a launch platform for suicide drones and killed its crew before the platform could be used in an attack on the Baraka garrison near Kurmuk, the source told Mada Masr. The source said the garrison had also repelled a ground assault the previous day by the RSF and its ally, the SPLM-N (Hilu) faction led by Joseph Tuka, inflicting heavy casualties and destroying military equipment. Air and artillery strikes have meanwhile intensified along the Geisan front, particularly around Khor Dahab and Khartoum Bileil. The strikes have killed and wounded fighters and destroyed vehicles and other military equipment, the source said. Some wounded RSF and SPLM fighters have been transferred to a hospital in the Ethiopian city of Asosa in recent days, they added. The military’s strikes have prompted competing claims over the condition of a key bridge in the area. RSF-supporting media platforms had reported that military artillery struck the bridge over Khor Tammat, which connects Amoura and Bakory in the Geisan locality. They said the strike was aimed at blocking an RSF advance toward Damazin, the Blue Nile capital. The Geisan locality administration denied the reports, saying the Tamat bridge remained intact and undamaged. The administration accused the RSF of circulating the claim to conceal its battlefield losses and create fear that could discourage displaced residents from returning. The bridge is an important crossing for the surrounding communities, particularly during the rainy season, when damage to the route could significantly restrict movement. The latest fighting follows a major RSF and SPLM advance on the Blue Nile front last week. The two forces captured Geisan and, two days later, retook Kurmuk, both near the Ethiopian border, across which the attacks were launched, according to three military sources who spoke to Mada Masr at the time. The offensive has brought the two sides back into a fight over the state’s most strategically important border positions, only weeks after the military recaptured Kurmuk. The key cross-border gateway had fallen to the RSF and SPLM-N in March after the allies moved into Blue Nile from Ethiopia, opening a route for supplies and military support to reach their forces. Despite the losses, the military retains several garrisons in Kurmuk and Geisan localities, including Baraka, Keili and Sali in Kurmuk and Bakory in Geisan, according to a former military officer who spoke to Mada Masr. The officer said military forces remained deployed in the area as part of a plan to wear down the RSF before launching offensives to take back the two towns. *** Joint force says it secured North Kordofan’s Ambro after taking Kreiker The joint force of military-allied armed movements took control of Kreiker in North Darfur, a strategic node between the towns of Tawila, Kutum and Ambro. The force’s spokesperson said to the press that the operation secured Ambro. A joint force field source told Mada Masr that the assault on Kreiker was one of a series of rapid operations targeting RSF concentrations and disrupting its supply lines, rather than an effort to establish a permanent presence in the area. The force is likely to withdraw from Kreiker after the operation, the source said. The assault inflicted losses on the RSF, including the death of a prominent commander in the area who was related to RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, the source added. The operation comes after a week of fighting and shifting control around Ambro. The joint force briefly entered the town last week before withdrawing following clashes with the RSF. The RSF captured Ambro, along the Chadian border, on June 23 as part of an offensive that brought the group deeper into the Zaghawa tribal territory, where the military retains its last positions in Darfur following the fall of Fasher last year. *** Second-largest single group RSF defection arrive in Northern State Former RSF commander Musa “Khamseen” Ahmed speaks to the press after his defection, August 19. Courtesy: @sport6780 on X A force of 318 fighters and 50 combat vehicles arrived in the Northern State city of Dabba on Tuesday, in the second-largest single group to defect from the paramilitary force in recent weeks. The fighters arrived with their weapons and equipment, according to a military source and a tribal leader who spoke to Mada Masr. The military source said preparations to receive the force in Northern State had been underway for several days with the support of military intelligence. Another RSF commander also defected and arrived in Northern State on Wednesday, the source said, adding that authorities were making arrangements before releasing further details. Anwar Ahmed Khater, head of the Mahamid tribal coordination committee, told Mada Masr that Tuesday’s group had come from Tawisha, Um Kadada and surrounding areas in North Darfur. The fighters were familiar with the desert routes leading toward military-held areas, he said, allowing them to avoid RSF ambushes and checkpoints on their way to Dabba. Khater said some in the group had coordinated their movements in advance with security agencies, while others had established contact with previous defectors, including Al-Nour “Gubba” Adam, the former RSF commander in North Darfur and Mahamid tribal leader who defected earlier this year. Musa “Khamseen” Ahmed, the commander of the force that arrived in Dabba, told the press that the decision to join the military was prompted by what he described as a lack of institutional work within the RSF and disappointment with the Tasis project. At a reception for the force, Mohamed Saleh Younes, the commander of the military’s Border Guards, said the doors remain open to anyone wishing to return to the military’s ranks. Khater said defections could affect the RSF’s capabilities in ways that direct military confrontations may not, given the group’s reliance on tribal mobilization and recruitment. He said the conduct of the war had contributed to the defections and that some tribal groups were increasingly reluctant to continue fighting alongside or supporting the RSF. He added that the RSF has come to rely more heavily on foreign fighters from Colombia, South Sudan, Chad and elsewhere. The latest arrival follows the defection in late July of 280 RSF fighters who reached Omdurman in 30 combat vehicles to join the military, according to a senior military officer who spoke to Mada Masr at the time. Those fighters had previously served under Gubba in Darfur. *** Subscribe to our Lens on Sudan newsletter here.The post Sudan Nashra: Burhan offers temporary immunity for internal dialogue participants | AU Peace, Security Council in Khartoum | Khartoum, Riyadh establish bilateral coordination council | Second-largest single group RSF defection arrive in Northern State first appeared on Mada Masr.
