Israel’s pressure campaign is weakening Iran’s regional influence, but the erosion of Tehran’s power could carry an unexpected risk: pushing Iran to launch a direct attack before its options narrow even further
At a time when Iran is facing unprecedented military, economic, and political pressure, while the ability of its regional allies to provide protection and deterrence is waning, Israel nevertheless appears concerned that Tehran may launch another attack against it. This paradox raises the fundamental question: Why would Iran, despite being in a weaker position, choose to enter a confrontation when it knows in advance that Israel will respond forcefully?
The Israeli assessment is not based on the belief that Iran has regained military superiority, but on precisely the opposite possibility: that the erosion of Iranian power could make Tehran’s leadership more willing to take risks. As Israeli strikes begin to hit Iran’s instruments of influence one after another, refraining from responding becomes a problem in itself. From Tehran’s perspective, continued failure to respond could mean the collapse of the deterrence image on which it has built its regional influence.
This is precisely where the dilemma lies. Does weakening Iran deter it, or push it toward escalation? And could the pressure Israel is exerting on Iran ultimately drive the Iranian regime to “double down” with a direct attack, rather than prompting it to back down?
This question is no longer entirely theoretical. In southern Lebanon, Israel took control of the Ali al-Taher area and destroyed underground infrastructure belonging to Hezbollah, even though Iran had warned, according to Reuters, that an attack on the site would trigger an Iranian response. Yet the response fell short of the level Tehran had threatened.
The significance of this incident lies in the fact that it puts the limits of Iranian deterrence to a practical test. If Iran is unable or unwilling to carry out its threats when Israel strikes one of its main allies’ positions, the message is not reaching Hezbollah alone, but also Iran’s other allies and adversaries: Is Tehran still capable of defending the red lines it has drawn?
Iran is therefore faced with two contradictory choices. The first is to refrain from responding, with the risk that this will erode its deterrence. The second is to respond, with the risk of opening a direct confrontation with Israel at a time when Iran’s capabilities appear weaker than they once were, while the country is also facing an economic crisis at home and growing security and political pressures.
This is precisely what makes Iranian weakness a source of concern for Israel. A state that feels strong can afford to wait and choose the right moment for confrontation. But a state that feels its options narrowing may see waiting itself as increasingly costly. If Iran’s leadership believes that continued Israeli strikes will gradually dismantle its network of influence, launching an attack now, despite the risks, may appear less costly than waiting until its ability to respond is weakened even further.
But there is a strong argument to the contrary. Iran knows that a direct attack could give Israel what it needs to expand its targets from military facilities and regional networks to critical infrastructure inside Iran. The Jerusalem Post quoted Israeli officials as saying that Israel is monitoring Iran’s internal crisis and that its message to Tehran is that any Iranian attack would trigger an irreversible response, potentially including strikes on vital facilities that a beleaguered Iranian regime would find difficult to rebuild.
This means that deterrence works both ways. Iran is trying to deter Israel from continuing its strikes, while Israel is trying to deter Iran from responding to them.
But even refraining from responding comes at a cost. Iran is not confronting Israel in a vacuum. Its regional influence is built on a network of allies and instruments that are meant to give it the ability to impose a cost on its adversaries. If this network’s ability to operate declines, Tehran will have to find other ways to demonstrate that attacks on its interests will not go unanswered.
This may explain Iran’s growing focus on maritime theaters. As its room for maneuver in some land-based arenas narrows, Tehran still has cards such as the Strait of Hormuz, while the Houthis retain the ability to exert pressure in the Bab el-Mandeb. In other words, a decline in Iran’s ability to respond in Lebanon does not necessarily mean the end of its ability to apply pressure; rather, it may mean shifting that pressure from one theater to another.
But turning to these tools does not resolve the fundamental dilemma. The further Iran moves away from a direct response, the more it preserves its capabilities and avoids a wider war, but at the same time, it risks eroding its image as a deterrent power. The closer it moves toward a direct response, the more it restores part of that image, but the greater the risk of confronting Israel at a time when its military and economic circumstances do not appear ideal.
This helps explain Israel’s concern about an Iranian attack despite all the signs of Iranian weakness. Israel is not necessarily afraid that Iran has become stronger; rather, it fears that Iran’s sense of weakness could prompt it to make an even riskier decision.
And herein lies the paradox behind Israel’s concerns: The more successful Israel is in weakening Iran, the closer it may come to achieving its goal but at the same time, it may also be drawing closer to the moment when Iran decides it must strike before it becomes even weaker.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar
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