As the US-Iran confrontation reaches an unprecedented level, Washington is seeking to prevent Tehran from opening new fronts through its regional allies, while restraining Israeli intervention and keeping the conflict within limits that serve its strategic objectives.
The US-Iran confrontation is no longer about who has the ability to escalate, but rather who can succeed in controlling escalation. After the conflict reached an unprecedented level, it appears that the US administration is pursuing a strategy different from the Israeli approach, centered on preventing Iran from turning a bilateral war into a multi-front regional conflict.
Washington understands that the more direct military pressure on Tehran increases, the more Iran will seek to shift the battle beyond its borders through its allies and proxies spread across Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. This would make the cost of any US strike the outbreak of a wider Middle East conflict. Therefore, the US administration is working to establish a containment framework around these arenas, even if this requires limiting Israeli military momentum in more than one area.
In Lebanon, the picture is the clearest. Washington does not want Israel to return to an open war with “Hezbollah” at this stage, even when the group carries out limited operations, such as the one that targeted an Israeli bulldozer with a drone on Ali al-Taher Hill. The US goal is to contain such incidents and prevent them from becoming the spark for a broader confrontation that would allow Iran to claim that it has succeeded in opening a new front against Israel.
This does not mean that the United States is turning a blind eye to “Hezbollah’s” activities. Rather, it distinguishes between deterrence and expansion of the conflict. It wants to keep the group under political and military pressure, but at the same time does not want a war to spiral out of control and disrupt the main confrontation with Iran.
The same logic applies to Iraq. Iran-backed factions continue to launch drones toward Israel, but Washington does not appear willing to allow these operations to become a pretext for Israel to open a military front inside Iraqi territory. The US objective is not to broaden the scope of the war, but to prevent it from spreading across additional fronts.
In Yemen, meanwhile, indications point to a US-Saudi understanding to keep military action against the Houthis at its lowest level until further notice. Weakening the Houthis through attrition is not a priority at this stage, because opening a broad front in the Red Sea or inside Yemen could serve Iran’s strategy more than it would harm it, by diverting US military efforts.
At the same time, Washington is keen to prevent Israel from becoming directly involved in the US-Iran war. It wants to remain the party that controls the military and political decisions in this confrontation, and does not want Israel to become an actor that imposes a pace of escalation that could push the region toward a comprehensive explosion that does not serve US priorities.
The US administration is also keeping the level of its military operations against Iran directly linked to the security of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. At this stage, it is not seeking an open war aimed at toppling the Iranian regime or completely destroying its military infrastructure. Rather, it seeks to impose a high cost on any threat to international maritime routes, while keeping the door open for de-escalation whenever Tehran stops escalating.
Alongside this military approach, Washington is pressuring the legitimate authorities in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen to assume their responsibilities in confronting Iran’s proxies inside their territories, based on the belief that reducing the influence of these groups must begin from within, rather than remain an American or Israeli mission.
From Washington’s perspective, Iran is attempting to escape the predicament of a direct war with the United States by igniting regional arenas, turning its proxies into tools of pressure to compensate for its inability to confront the Americans directly. However, the paradox is that these same proxies have become constrained by domestic and regional considerations that leave them with less room for maneuver than Tehran would like.
“Hezbollah,” for example, does not want to appear as the party that reopened the war with Israel, given the potentially catastrophic consequences this could have for Lebanon as a whole, and particularly for its own support base. Therefore, it limits itself to calculated military provocations that remain below the threshold of major escalation, relying on the principle of “the minimum right to self-defense,” without moving toward a full-scale confrontation.
As for the Iraqi factions, they are attempting to send a different message: that they do not operate under direct Iranian orders, and that their operations do not automatically make Tehran responsible for any attack launched from Iraqi territory. This is an attempt to separate their field decisions from Iran’s decisions, reducing pressure on Baghdad and giving it greater political room to maneuver.
In Yemen, the Houthis justify the limited nature of their actions by pointing to the blockade and international sanctions imposed on them under UN Security Council resolutions. However, the most influential factor remains the sharp deterioration in their financial and economic situation, which limits their ability to pursue a broader escalation or engage in a long-term confrontation.
Thus, the United States appears to be fighting a dual battle: confronting Iran where its direct strategic interests are at stake, while at the same time preventing it from turning Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen into simultaneous war zones. It is not seeking to extinguish every fire, but rather to contain them within limits that can be controlled, pending a clearer outcome of the confrontation with Tehran.
