US confidence in the latest sanctions on Iran was short-lived. After 47 years of confrontation with Washington and the West, few sanctions remain that have not already been imposed. Those able to comply with the latest package are likely already complying with earlier measures. Those benefiting from US exemptions, or ignoring Washington’s demands, are likely to continue doing so. Consider Iranian gas exports to Iraq, which fuel around 40% of the country’s electricity. Years of US efforts to find an alternative have failed, including through Gulf interconnection. Technically, the Gulf is the easiest solution, but its countries already face heavy summer electricity loads. Any disruption could leave them unable to meet domestic demand. Can the US, given its extensive interests in Iraq and the near-total dominance of US companies in its oil sector, cut off half of Iraq’s electricity when the country already suffers from a severe power deficit? Even US contractors would have little to gain. Can Washington also stop China from importing 1.38 million barrels of Iranian oil a day, or 13.34% of its total oil imports, at prices up to $10 a barrel below global levels? Tehran can also rely on the extensive networks it has developed to evade sanctions. However, the new measures will not be "empty talk." They will hurt Iran. The currency lost further value after Washington announced what it called its "toughest" sanctions, while Tehran will face greater difficulty securing the hard currency needed to import goods and services smoothly. Trump will not accept a humiliating defeat, while Iran, with the military now holding greater sway, is not prepared to make concessions. But Americans who have long tested sanctions know they cannot decide a war that military action failed to resolve. Washington has already acknowledged that it has largely abandoned a return to military operations. It accompanied the latest sanctions with intensified diplomacy, apparently hoping the shock would soften Iran’s position or widen divisions within its leadership over negotiations. Those divisions are not new. The rivalry between Iran’s conservative and reformist camps has long been settled by the country’s ultimate authority, the supreme leader. He is likely to decide again now. Yet the lines between the two camps have blurred since the war. Neither has the luxury of political theorizing amid what the regime and much of the public regard as an existential confrontation with Washington and its allies. Iran may, in fact, be experiencing its strongest internal cohesion in decades. The economic battle may be harder for Iran than the military one. It could have been more effective had it preceded the war. Now, though, it is too late. Iranians understand that the latest siege is simply an alternative to war, with the same objective: bringing down the regime and dividing the country. That explains the recent diplomatic activity. Pakistan’s army chief, Asim Munir, the main mediator, visited Tehran at US President Donald Trump’s request. Qatar’s Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani followed. Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr Al busaidi also arrived in Iran and reached a new understanding with Iranian officials on arrangements for passage through the Strait of Hormuz. Details have not been announced, pending a US response. Trump therefore appears to rely less on sanctions than on negotiations. But the conflict has reached a point where a winner-loser outcome may be unavoidable, while a win-win formula remains elusive. The latest mediation efforts are unlikely to produce a deal. Trump will not accept a humiliating defeat, while Iran, with the military now holding greater sway, is not prepared to make concessions. Tehran increasingly sees the conflict as a rare opportunity to escape, once and for all, the difficult circumstances it has endured for more than four and a half decades and help create a different regional order. This is an edited translation for an article published in Arabic.
