Most people in today’s Middle East were born after 1979. Yet they often overlook how profoundly that year shaped their countries, their stability, and their daily lives. It unleashed storms, wars, and leaders whose ambitions and dangers far exceeded the borders from which they emerged. Some observers even see a direct link between that pivotal year and what is unfolding today around the Strait of Hormuz following the recent US-Israeli war against Iran and its military arsenal. Few years in modern history can rival 1979 in significance or consequence. That year, Khomeini returned to Tehran from exile in Paris. The reactor of the Iranian Revolution quickly began emitting its political radiation, especially after the institutionalization of the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist. The same year, Iraq’s presidential palace effectively fell into the hands of the country’s strongman, Saddam Hussein, who eased President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr into retirement under the burdens of age—and perhaps regret. In 1979, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat also signed the Camp David Accords with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin in Washington under the sponsorship of President Jimmy Carter. These developments soon intersected with a major international event. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev committed what many would later regard as the grave error of invading Afghanistan. The Kremlin walked into a trap. From among the fighters who flocked to that battlefield would emerge Osama bin Laden, the man who would inaugurate the new century with the attacks on New York and Washington, unintentionally paving the way for the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime. On January 16, 1979, amid mounting protests and demonstrations, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi left Iran, entrusting the country to the government of Shapour Bakhtiar. Those around him tried to portray the departure as a temporary vacation. In reality, it was a one-way journey. America had abandoned its ally. The decisive turning point came swiftly. On February 1, a plane from Paris landed at Tehran’s Mehrabad Airport carrying an extraordinary passenger: Ayatollah Khomeini, returning after fourteen years in exile. The massive crowds that greeted him delivered an unmistakable message. The Shah’s regime had fallen. The revolution had triumphed. Ruhollah Khomeini (L) prays with the Iranian opposition leaders after receiving them at his Pontchartrain mansion, west of Paris, on November 6, 1978. (Photo by Joel ROBINE / AFP via Getty Images) Decision-makers across the region watched carefully. Few were more alarmed than Saddam Hussein, then the powerful deputy leader of Baathist Iraq. Events in Tehran accelerated rapidly. The Islamic Republic was proclaimed. The doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih was enshrined. The constitution incorporated language committing the new state to “exporting the revolution” under the banner of supporting the oppressed. Saddam Refuses to Kill Khomeini History could easily have unfolded differently. During Khomeini’s years in Najaf, he was a difficult guest. Iraqi authorities frequently complained that he sought to evade the restrictions attached to his residency. After the Algiers Agreement of March 6, 1975, signed by the Shah and Saddam Hussein under the auspices of Algerian President Houari Boumédiène, both sides pledged to cease supporting each other’s opponents. Iraqi officials repeatedly reminded Khomeini of the understanding. He effectively refused to commit himself to ending political activity against the Shah. According to former Iraqi officials, Iraqi intelligence one day proposed arranging Khomeini’s assassination and blaming the Shah’s security services. Saddam’s response surprised them. He reportedly asked: “Do the people making this proposal not understand that Iraq does not betray its guests?” Thus Khomeini remained alive. Once the Iran-Iraq War began, however, eliminating him became an obsession for Saddam’s half-brother Barzan al-Tikriti, the head of Iraqi intelligence. Reaching Khomeini was difficult, though Iran in 1981 had not yet fully consolidated its security institutions. Iraqi intelligence developed ties with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran and with the Mujahedin-e Khalq. It helped coordinate operations that culminated in the devastating bombing of Iran’s parliament complex, killing dozens of senior figures. Soon afterward, Ali Khamenei was targeted by a bomb hidden inside a tape recorder, leaving him permanently injured in one arm. Barzan remained determined to reach Khomeini himself. According to accounts from former Iraqi intelligence officials, Baghdad eventually recruited a cleric close to the Iranian leader and managed to plant a small explosive device inside Khomeini’s wool pillow. The bomb detonated when he was away from it. The attempt failed. The Paris Interlude Chance played an important role in Khomeini’s journey to power. Forced to leave Iraq, he searched for a new place of exile. Years later in Paris, former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam recalled that Khomeini’s associates discreetly explored the possibility of relocating to Syria. President Hafez al-Assad was not interested. Khaddam said Assad feared that hosting Khomeini could trigger not merely a political crisis with Iraq but perhaps even war between the two Baathist rivals. Khaddam advised Khomeini’s entourage to consider Algeria instead. They dismissed the idea, believing Algeria was too distant and likely to impose strict restrictions. What surprised Khaddam was France’s willingness to receive Khomeini and provide him with a global platform. During his stay in Neauphle-le-Château outside Paris, visitors streamed in from around the world. Iraqi authorities sought to gauge his intentions. Khomeini had already demonstrated his ability to move Iranian public opinion through audio recordings that supporters distributed secretly inside Iran. The Iraqi intelligence officer responsible for liaising with Khomeini during his years in Najaf was Ali Baweh, who had often facilitated his activities. Baghdad decided to send him to Paris. Former intelligence officials claim Baweh traveled with another man wearing a watch capable of recording conversations. Khomeini received them politely but showed no flexibility. Asked about his plans after the Shah’s fall, he delivered an answer that landed like a bomb. After overthrowing the Shah, he said, the next objective would be “the overthrow of the infidel Baath regime.” Saddam’s Obsession with Wilayat al-Faqih When Khomeini appeared in Tehran surrounded by unprecedented crowds, Saddam understood that the storm would soon reach Iraq. According to former presidential aides, the issue that troubled him most was not the revolution itself but the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih. Saddam believed it implied that a non-Iraqi cleric could demand the allegiance of Iraqi Shiites. To him, this represented a direct threat to Iraq’s sovereignty and cohesion. He reportedly kept a booklet explaining the powers of the Supreme Jurist as understood by Khomeini and studied it carefully. By September 1980, Saddam had concluded that war was inevitable. He believed Khomeini intended to penetrate the Arab world by first bringing down Iraq. Waiting, in his view, meant eventually fighting Iran in the streets of Baghdad. Better to fight on the border. Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein visits soldiers in northern Iraq. (Photo by Jacques Pavlovsky/Sygma via Getty Images) Many who knew him believe this conviction also strengthened his determination to remove Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and assume full power. Since the Baath Party’s return to government in 1968, Saddam had chosen to remain formally second in command, benefiting from Bakr’s legitimacy while gradually reshaping the military and state institutions around himself. On July 16, 1979, Bakr finally departed. The age of Saddam had begun. Former Foreign Minister Hamed al-Jubouri later recounted a revealing conversation with Bakr. When Jubouri once attempted to resign, Bakr reportedly pointed to the presidential chair and declared: “I would urinate on the presidency if it cannot even preserve the dignity of the president.” Then, with tears in his eyes, he added: “Forget resignation. I cannot accept yours. Who can accept mine? We are prisoners. We do not possess the right to resign.” “We Will Smash the Iranians’ Heads” Saddam’s decision to go to war preceded his formal assumption of the presidency. Salah Omar al-Ali, one of the veteran Baathist leaders who helped bring the party to power in 1968, recalled a revealing conversation during the Non-Aligned Movement summit in Havana in September 1979. Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and Saddam met Iranian Foreign Minister Ebrahim Yazdi. Despite tensions along the border, the atmosphere was constructive. Hoping to reinforce that mood, Salah Omar al-Ali later spoke privately with Saddam and stressed the importance of peaceful solutions and economic development. IRAQ - JANUARY 01: Iranian POW's waiting in line for food at the Ramadt detention camp under a smiling portrait of Iraq leader Saddam Hussein during the war between Iran Iraq. (Photo by Bill Foley/Getty Images) Saddam listened attentively before responding. “Pay attention, Salah,” he said. “This opportunity may come only once every hundred years. The opportunity exists today. We will smash the Iranians’ heads. We will recover every inch they occupied. We will restore the Shatt al-Arab.” Then he added sharply: “I never want to hear you speak again about peaceful solutions, humanitarian solutions, or settling problems with Iran. Listen carefully. I will smash the Iranians’ heads and recover every inch from Khorramshahr to the Shatt al-Arab.” A year later, he launched the war. Saddam believed several factors worked in his favor. Khomeini’s revolution had turned America into Iran’s enemy. The Soviet Union feared revolutionary contagion among its Muslim republics. The Gulf monarchies felt threatened by Tehran’s ambitions. He convinced himself that Iraq alone could break the revolutionary wave threatening regional stability. He miscalculated. He assumed Iran’s post-revolutionary chaos would guarantee a quick victory. He failed to understand how rapidly Iranian nationalism would fuse with religious fervor once Iraqi troops crossed the border. The war did not destroy the Islamic Republic. Instead, it strengthened it. Khomeini ruthlessly consolidated power and entrenched the rule of the Supreme Jurist. Saddam’s greatest achievement after eight years of war was a ceasefire. Iran survived. Iraq was exhausted. The Kuwait Gift In the years that followed, Tehran received another unexpected gift. General Nizar al-Khazraji, Iraq’s chief of staff at the time, later described how he learned of the invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. “I was asleep at home,” he recalled. “Early in the morning I received a call summoning me to General Headquarters. When I arrived, I was told: ‘We have completed the occupation of Kuwait.’” Khazraji was stunned. Defense Minister Abdul Jabbar Shanshal was informed in exactly the same way. Imagine, Khazraji said, an army being pushed into such an adventure without the knowledge of either its defense minister or its chief of staff. A few days later Saddam explained that secrecy had been necessary to preserve surprise. He added that Kuwait had been liberated by forces reporting directly to him rather than to the regular chain of command. Khazraji saw the decision as the product of arrogance born from Saddam’s belief that he had emerged victorious from the war with Iran. The consequences were enormous. The world’s attention shifted decisively from the “Iranian threat” to the “Iraqi threat.” Operation Desert Storm expelled Saddam from Kuwait and left Iraq wounded, isolated, and under sanctions. Meanwhile, Iran caught its breath and resumed its long-term regional project. The Gifts of Osama bin Laden and George W. Bush Another chain of events that began in 1979 would transform the Middle East. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggered alarm throughout the West. Washington resolved to make Moscow pay dearly. Volunteers poured into Afghanistan from across the Arab and Muslim worlds. The United States encouraged the jihad against Soviet forces and supported many of the fighters. Among them was a wealthy young Saudi named Osama bin Laden. On Afghan soil, al-Qaeda was born. ARLINGTON, VA - SEPTEMBER 12: President George W. Bush and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld survey the damage at the Pentagon building September 12, 2001 in Arlington, VA. (Photo by David Hume Kennerly/Getty Images) On September 11, 2001, bin Laden carried the conflict to the American mainland. Civilian airliners destroyed the towers of the World Trade Center. Thousands were killed. America had been struck at the heart of its power and prestige. The world waited for the response. Under President George W. Bush, encouraged by military and security institutions and by the neoconservative movement, the United States first overthrew the Taliban and then invaded Iraq, toppling Saddam Hussein. For the generals of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, the scene was almost unbelievable. The Taliban regime, hostile to Tehran, had fallen at American hands. Saddam’s regime, which Iran had failed to overthrow during eight years of war, met the same fate. Iran neither obstructed these outcomes nor mourned them. Yet Tehran also saw American forces deployed on both its eastern and western frontiers. A new phase in US-Iran relations began. Qassem Soleimani and officers of the Quds Force focused on undermining the American military presence, especially in Iraq, while avoiding direct confrontation with Washington. Without intending to, bin Laden had delivered Iran another extraordinary gift. After the attacks on New York and Washington, the world became obsessed with al-Qaeda. Soon afterward, attention shifted toward Saddam Hussein, whose danger was magnified relentlessly by Western political and media narratives. The result was that Iran moved out of the center of the international spotlight. The Bush administration advanced numerous arguments to justify war against Iraq: alleged weapons of mass destruction, obstruction of international inspectors, and suspicions that Saddam had never abandoned nuclear ambitions. Most consequential was the effort to suggest a connection between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. No meaningful partnership ever emerged between the Iraqi regime and bin Laden’s organization. Yet Saddam did make the mistake of exploring the possibility. While bin Laden was living in Khartoum, Iraqi intelligence officer Farouq Hijazi met him through the mediation of Sudanese Islamist leader Hassan al-Turabi. The discussion was lengthy and difficult. After returning to Baghdad, Hijazi advised Saddam to close the file. Contacts ended. But the allegation lingered—and helped justify the invasion. Syria, Soleimani, and the Iraqi Prize Another event left a lasting mark on the region’s future. Days before the American invasion of Iraq, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad flew to Tehran. Anxiety about the coming war dominated his discussions with President Mohammad Khatami and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Bashar Assad meets with Qassem Soleimani Both sides agreed that if American forces consolidated their position in Iraq, Syria or Iran could be next. The answer, they concluded, was to bleed the American presence through resistance movements. Qassem Soleimani participated in some of those discussions. Syria subsequently facilitated the movement of fighters into Iraq, while Soleimani methodically built resistance networks. Iran wagered on geography—and won. It encouraged its Iraqi allies to participate in governing institutions and successive governments, especially after executive power became concentrated in the office of the prime minister, a position conventionally held by a Shiite politician. When the last American soldier left Iraq in December 2011, Iran had become an indispensable actor in Iraqi affairs. The fingerprints of Soleimani were visible throughout the Iraqi state. After his death, many of those networks remained under the stewardship of his successor, Esmail Qaani. Then came another opportunity. In July 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi appeared in Mosul after the dramatic collapse of Iraqi army units. Soleimani moved immediately, dispatching weapons to both Baghdad and Erbil. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued his famous call to arms. Iran later helped transform the resulting mobilization into the Popular Mobilization Forces, which eventually became an official institution under the authority of the Iraqi prime minister. Iranian influence now extended across parliament, government, the military, and the PMF. From Iraq to Lebanon, from the Palestinian arena to Yemen, Tehran steadily expanded its reach. The cumulative result is difficult to miss. Khomeini survived. Saddam’s war failed. Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait redirected international attention. Bin Laden’s attacks transformed global priorities. George W. Bush’s invasion removed Iran’s most formidable Arab rival. Each actor pursued his own objectives. Together, however, Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, and George W. Bush delivered three of the most valuable strategic gifts the Islamic Republic of Iran has ever received.
