Syria's drive to build a national army has entered its most difficult phase: dismantling the armed factions that were formally absorbed into the Defense Ministry after the fall of Bashar al-Assad but retained their commanders, local loyalties, and financial networks. The first stage of the process grouped more than 100 former factions into about 22 army divisions, according to Syrian reporting. That created a formal chain of command without fully eliminating the organizations that had fought the war. In practice, some units remained closely tied to their former leaders, strongholds, and economic interests. Damascus is now reassigning commanders and fighters, changing deployments, and placing divisions under a proposed five-corps structure divided by region. The objective is to prevent former factions from operating as power blocs inside the army and to make military decisions answerable to the state. That arrangement, however, did not end factionalism. It was the first stage of a difficult integration process. The factions adopted new labels, including divisions and brigades, within the ministry's new structure, but did not fully shed their old organizations or the networks of influence and loyalty they had built during the war. In many cases, they remained tied to their former strongholds, loyal to their commanders and connected to economic, administrative, and social networks. The process, therefore, resembled the grouping of factions under one umbrella more than the creation of a unified institutional army. Dismantling factional blocs Damascus later moved into a clearer second phase of rebuilding the military: reorganizing units, combining them into new formations, and dismantling factional blocs from within. This more sensitive phase seeks to break up the power blocs inherited by the new army. Personnel have been reassigned across formations to limit groups’ ability to retain their old structures or to recreate separate centers of influence within the military. Sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat said this was among the most difficult stages of restructuring the army. The challenge was no longer simply to bring factions into an entity called the army, but to "clip the factions' wings inside that army." Some factions that became Defense Ministry divisions after Assad's fall retained their organizational cohesion and regional character. Loyalty to commanders also endured to varying degrees, alongside financial, administrative, and social networks built over more than a decade. An unfinished transition The process has not reached its final goal. Some army divisions still retain elements of their previous structures, while plans continue to redistribute them, appoint new commanders, and change their deployment areas and missions. The Syrian army is therefore caught between two models: the limited administrative absorption of factions that followed Assad's fall, and an institutional army in which factional and regional loyalties disappear and the chain of command and military decisions are tied to the Syrian state. An informed source told Asharq Al-Awsat that "the Syrian state is completing the compulsory integration of all factions and weakening the sources of power they enjoyed in recent years." The source said the step was essential because Damascus could not establish a unified army or a stable state without it. The source, who asked not to be named, said the recent dismantling of military blocs included Jaysh al-Islam, which was folded into the 70th Division, as well as the Sultan Suleiman Shah group, commonly known as al-Amshat, the Hamza Division and Ahrar al-Sharqiya. Similar moves had already affected Ahrar al-Sham and the Levant Front, the source said. Those cohesive factions held economic and regional interests, but President Ahmed al-Sharaa's administration had gradually and quietly dismantled them, reducing their weight within the army. Factions inside the state The central task now is to restructure the security and military institutions after the factions joined them, and then dismantle factional structures within the Syrian state. Some factions remain in the army, but most formations that belonged to the former Syrian National Army have been dismantled, the source said. The Syrian Free Army, a former key US ally based at al-Tanf near the Jordanian border, is also being dismantled, according to the source. The source said al-Sharaa's administration was fully coordinating with Türkiye and the United States to break up factions within the new army. Figures such as Abu Amsha, Hatem Abu Shaqra, and Saif Bakour Bolad were Turkish allies, and officials had once expected that sidelining them might prompt Ankara to object. The opposite occurred, the source said, with Türkiye now supporting the dismantling of groups it had previously backed. HTS in the new structure Despite efforts to integrate the factions and build a cohesive military, the source said the final structure of the army and security services was intended to keep officers and commanders from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, as well as prominent former Nusra Front commanders, in key command and decision-making posts. The source said defected officers and leaders of dissolved factions who were appointed to new positions would ultimately report to an HTS figure. The source described the approach as logical during a sensitive period in which the state faced major internal and external challenges. Political action required a solid core and internal cohesion, the source said, arguing that institutions would remain vulnerable to infiltration and internal rivalry unless the authorities could rely on pivotal military and security decisions. The commanders' account Colonel Abdul Muti al-Halabi, a commander in the new Syrian army who was formerly among the Nusra Front's senior ranks, told Asharq Al-Awsat that dismantling the factions was "not aimed at anyone" but was "an existential necessity for building a real military institution." Keeping factions together as cohesive blocs inside the army would preserve multiple loyalties within the institution, threatening military and security decisions and leaving the state fragile, he said. "We cannot build a national army if every group continues to regard itself as an independent entity with its own economy and loyalties," Halabi said, adding that the state was reassigning commanders and personnel. Halabi disputed reports that corps commanders were being selected exclusively from HTS. He said HTS was the first group to dissolve itself and merge into the state, and that it had more organizational, security and administrative experience than other factions. It had governed Idlib, managed complex security operations and developed the ability to control territory and institutions, he said. "If we kept the previous arrangement, regional sensitivities and old loyalties would return," Halabi said. "At this stage, we want a unified, solid leadership that is not subject to rival pressures, with everyone taking part without discrimination." Five corps and expected changes Rashid Hourani, a military affairs specialist at the Jusoor Center for Studies, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the new structure would probably retain a five-corps model, although commanders, troop composition, deployment areas and operational duties could change. The previous phase had shown the need to make the formations more mobile in responding to internal and external threats, he said. The next structure could therefore change commanders and adapt each corps' methods to its assigned mission. Hourani said the reorganization was part of a broader effort to rebuild the Syrian army and develop its working methods for the state's next phase. Syrian news outlets reported that the proposed arrangements would place the eastern corps under Brigadier General Ahmed Mohammed al-Jassem, known as Abu Mohammed Shoura, whose name had previously been associated with command of the 66th Division. Other reports said Brigadier General Awad al-Jassem, known as Abu Qutaiba al-Shami and previously linked to the 60th Division, would command the northern region as its four divisions were reorganized. Some sources named Brig. Gen. Haitham al-Ali, known as Abu Muslim Afes, as the prospective commander of the central corps. Other reports said the Damascus corps would be led by Brigadier General Omar Mohammed Jaftashi, known as Mukhtar al-Turki, who currently commands the Damascus Division. Local platforms reported that Brig. Gen. Munir al-Sheikh, known as Abu Osama, would oversee the western region and the coast through a corps comprising four recently reorganized divisions. The problem of more radical factions Halabi said the state was dealing carefully with more radical factions and would distribute their personnel among the corps to prevent them from forming blocs inside the army. "These factions have important combat experience, but they must operate within an institution, not with the mentality of a group or organization," he said. "They will therefore be distributed carefully among the corps so that they are absorbed into the new military structure." The main challenge was to move from a factional mentality to a state mentality, Halabi said. Hourani said foreign fighters, including Turkistanis and others, had joined the army, particularly the 84th Division, and were in principle subject to the same military rules and laws as other units. "Foreign Islamist groups joined the army, particularly the 84th Division, and the rules that apply to all military units now apply to them," he said. "Any violations are handled under the military law in force." Asked whether international demands could lead to further moves against radical factions inside military formations, Hourani said the issue would remain part of the army-building process and its effort to draw lessons from earlier phases. He said two main considerations governed the matter, but the source text did not specify them. How the factions view restructuring Hourani said factions that joined the Defense Ministry understood the difference between formations created during the campaign to overthrow Assad and the requirements of an army operating through state institutions. The factions had largely accepted integration even though Western reports warned about the method and its effects, he said. Their shared objective had eased the task and allowed the army formation to proceed smoothly. Hourani said the continued presence of some commanders associated with particular factions reflected the experience accumulated by HTS's military wing before Assad's fall. HTS's military wing had developed substantially in training, organization and methods of warfare, and the leadership now wanted to use that experience, he said. Syrian Turkish coordination and a US role Hourani said Syrian-Turkish military coordination was public and included organization and training, as reflected in repeated visits by senior military officials from both countries. He said Washington had accepted that cooperation. He also referred to US congressional scrutiny of the Syrian government's counterterrorism performance as part of the consideration of future security cooperation. Türkiye's aims Hourani said Türkiye's role in building the Syrian army served objectives tied to Turkish national security as well as Ankara's political and military position in Syria and the region. He said the aims included building a unified Syrian army that would prevent separatist entities from threatening Türkiye, citing the former presence of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in eastern Syria. He also cited Türkiye's desire to strengthen its political and military influence, draw on its experience training armed forces in African states and support a Syrian administration it had backed during the uprising. Building an army rather than merely merging factions Syria's military restructuring shows that Damascus faces a challenge that goes beyond merely placing former armed factions under the Defense Ministry. It must also end their ability to operate as independent blocs within the armed forces. The first phase brought factions under the state umbrella. The current phase focuses on dismantling their internal structures, reassigning personnel and commanders, and adjusting deployments and missions to prevent regional and factional loyalties from re-emerging. Military officials say the goal is a unified army for all Syrians. Questions remain, however, about the authority that figures drawn from HTS will retain, the doctrine of the new military and the limits of Turkish and international influence over its development. The restructuring is ultimately a test of whether Syria's new state can move from an alliance of victorious factions to a military institution subordinate to the state. The process remains unfinished, and its outcome will help shape Syria's government and security.
