Syria and Lebanon are pursuing separate tracks with Israel, as Beirut seeks to advance its interests without compromising coordination or security with Damascus.
Syria has every right to approach its relationship with Israel in whatever ways best serve the country’s interests. Lebanon, too, has every right to pursue the avenues it deems conducive to ending the war and curbing the catastrophe. In accordance with the principles of national interest imposed by the sovereignty of both countries, Damascus and Beirut should manage the negotiations file.
While Damascus is engaged in negotiations with Israel, having taken the lead over Beirut, there is nothing wrong with the two capitals pursuing their respective talks on their own Syrian and Lebanese terms, without requiring prior coordination or mutual subordination of positions and approaches.
The assurances coming from Damascus that it intends to respect Lebanon’s sovereignty and independence and refrain from interfering in its affairs should also apply to the negotiations with Israel. If, days after Israel’s attacks on Abu al-Duhur Airport, Syria moves to send its foreign minister to meet the Mossad chief at the urging of the United States, this should prompt Beirut to capitalize on the development and draw Washington into an intervention on a level comparable to that expressed by U.S. presidential envoy Tom Barrack, whether by refusing to recognize the occupation of the Golan Heights or by condemning the bombing of Abu al-Duhur and the messages it conveyed.
Lebanon’s negotiations with Israel do not require prior coordination with Syria. Beirut has no intention of jumping into understandings that would undermine Syria’s security or resilience. Although the Shebaa Farms remain an issue intertwined between Lebanon, Syria and Israel, it is not an urgent priority for all the parties that requires an immediate resolution.
If Damascus approaches its conflict with Israel according to the logic of its established principles, its regional and international relations, and the requirements of pragmatism that we have adopted as a doctrine and approach, then the speed of its response to the latest developments on the ground rests on its control over the domestic front and the outside world’s embrace of the dynamics of its policies.
Israel may be benefiting from the fact that it deals with the various “fronts” separately, rather than as interconnected arenas. Accordingly, Benjamin Netanyahu’s government is handling the files of Gaza, Syria, Lebanon and Iran according to different rules, governed by multiple sets of operational parameters, many of which the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump has been forced to accept as a fait accompli.
Trump’s plan for the Strip has no bearing on the memorandum of understanding concluded between Washington and Tehran. Nor does the framework agreement with Lebanon have any connection to the understandings between Israel and Syria that are currently being breached. Moreover, the Arab world has changed and abandoned the unifying rhetoric over the conflict, a rhetoric that has proven outdated and wooden, feeding official statements without having any meaningful impact on the balance of power.
The regional and international system supports Beirut’s and Damascus’ efforts to restore the strength of the state, resolve outstanding disputes, and establish a sound connection with the broader international order. There has been virtually no opposition or reservations, apart from those emanating from Tehran, whose confusion is currently driving it to seek an end to the conflict in Iran, while its arm in Lebanon has come to favor negotiations and engagement with Washington.
Against this backdrop, Lebanon and Syria, each according to its own circumstances, are seeking to capitalize on an encouraging international climate to dismantle the mines and untangle the riddles, and to place Israel’s conduct within the framework of Washington’s pressure. The capitals are taking note of the tools required by the Knesset elections, perhaps their outcomes could alter something in the rules of a game that has become a curse on the region since the "Al-Aqsa Flood" three years ago.
Under the pressure, Israel has been forced to change its tone toward Syria and give greater space to views critical of escalation with Turkey. At the meeting between the Mossad chief and the Syrian foreign minister, it presented a list of conditions confined to the basic tenets of security and defense, as well as concerns and apprehensions. Its policies toward Lebanon likewise remain within these same parameters, which Israel has continued to find marketable in Washington and around the world since October 7, 2023.
And if we conclude that there is no coordination between Beirut and Damascus, there is nevertheless a convergence of interests around the goal of finding security-oriented understandings that are easier to manage, without taking any risk by leaping into a political agreement that remains out of reach amid obstacles understood by all sides and reflected in the prevailing climate.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.
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