Saudi Arabia’s new trilateral defense alliance with Pakistan and Turkey strengthens its military partnerships and regional position, but its real significance will depend on how the three countries respond to future conflicts involving Iran, India, and the wider Middle East.
Saudi Arabia has finally signed a mutual defense treaty with nuclear-armed Pakistan and Turkey. It is worth noting that Pakistan is the main mediator between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. This means that any attack on one of these countries would be considered an attack on all three treaty members. What, in practical terms, is the significance of this treaty?
An Asian researcher who is not Arab answers this question by noting that a Saudi journalist observed that the alliance provides Saudi Arabia with significant military capabilities. It represents some 400 million people, a figure four times larger than Iran’s population. For this reason, the trilateral defense treaty appears to be important. But its true significance, and therefore its ability to deliver what its members require of it, will only become clear once it is put to a serious test. Pakistani military forces are stationed near the Saudi-Yemeni border.
However, they are under orders not to intervene on the Yemeni side of the border. This is part of the Pakistani-Saudi defense agreement signed last year. The only addition to it is Turkey’s entry as a member. We will have to wait to see what happens if a military conflict breaks out, and also what would happen if a conflict erupted between Pakistan and its traditional, longstanding rival, India.
Would Saudi Arabia, whose second-largest major trading partner is India, with $46 billion in bilateral trade, jeopardize all this by honoring its alliance with Pakistan and joining it in confronting India? Moreover, Turkey and Pakistan, both of which share borders with the Islamic Republic of Iran, would have to decide what they would do if war or limited military operations broke out between Saudi Arabia and Iran. For all these reasons, the members of the new alliance mentioned above are likely to remain alert and cautious, particularly Turkey and Pakistan.
It should be noted that all three members of the alliance publicly stress that the defense agreement mentioned above is not directed against any country outside it. It should also be noted that an Iranian official warned Saudi Arabia that it would be mistaken to believe that signing the “paper” alliance with Pakistan and Turkey would prevent Iran from attacking it.
He insists that Saudi Arabia must change the nature of its relationship with Iran, and even its regional strategy, if it wants to avoid confrontation or war with Iran. There is no doubt that Iran will view the aforementioned trilateral alliance as hostile to it. The same applies to Israel, although its position may be somewhat cautious. The truth is that Saudi Arabia is involved in a conflict with Iran, but not by its own intention or because of anything it has done.
This is a statement that fairness requires. But Iran’s repeated attacks on Saudi Arabia, carried out because of the presence of U.S. military bases on its territory—a policy it has also pursued against other Gulf states—raised Saudi Arabia’s concerns and pushed it toward the trilateral alliance. It should be noted that Saudi Arabia has long enjoyed excellent relations with Pakistan, both politically and militarily. What has happened, and what may happen, will be part of Saudi Arabia’s strategy. It should also be noted that, before the trilateral alliance between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey was announced, another naval alliance was announced with the aim of protecting Saudi shipping in the Red Sea.
Did Saudi Arabia pursue the aforementioned alliances because it no longer trusts the United States, its longstanding ally? “I do not think so,” the same non-Arab Asian researcher replies. Diversifying defense relations, and relations in other areas as well, has been underway for several years. The issue of dependence on the United States first emerged in 2019, when the Houthis attacked Saudi oil facilities and infrastructure and managed, within a week, to “knock out” nearly half of the kingdom’s oil production. The United States’ response—or rather its reaction, as Donald Trump was not president at the time—was that this was a Saudi issue.
And that the kingdom could deal with the matter or the situation in order to prevent it from happening again. Of course, Donald Trump is now president of the United States and is an ally of the kingdom. But a question arises: What does the growing diversification of alliances mean? Could the future of U.S. military bases in the region become a subject of discussion?
The three countries—Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey—have set aside the possibility of other Middle Eastern and Islamic countries joining their alliance. But much will depend on whether the Saudi-Pakistani-Turkish trilateral alliance is a real and serious alliance, rather than merely a paper alliance and a symbolic political step more than a military move. Neither has been established so far.
Does this affect Pakistan’s role as a mediator between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran? It should be noted that Pakistan’s longstanding alliance with Saudi Arabia did not affect its mediation efforts between the United States and Iran. Will the situation be different after Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan sign their trilateral security alliance? Will Pakistan be able to maintain the neutrality it demonstrated toward the Iranian-American conflict, and war, and continue mediating between them?
