On 11 October 2026, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi reaffirmed Egypt’s commitment to safeguarding its historical and acquired water rights, underscoring the Nile’s vital importance to the Egyptian people. This reaffirmation came two days before the commemoration by some countries of the entry into force of the Nile Basin Cooperative Framework (CFA) on 13 October 2024, initiating the transition towards the Nile River Basin Commission envisaged under its provisions. Egypt and Sudan remain outside the agreement, which was not adopted through a consensus-based approach amid unresolved disagreements over prior notification, equitable water utilisation, water security and basin governance. Their absence raises a fundamental question about whether an institutional framework excluding two major downstream states can deliver genuinely basin-wide cooperation. A commission intended to advance basin-wide cooperation will need to address all concerns through sustained, good-faith negotiations rather than treating institutional establishment as an end in itself. Progress among participating countries can provide a foundation for cooperation, but lasting legitimacy will depend on whether the framework can accommodate the interests of states that have not joined it. Inclusive governance is therefore not a secondary diplomatic objective; it is central to the credibility and durability of any basin-wide settlement. These concerns are particularly pertinent as Cairo prepares to host the ninth Cairo Water Week, from 25 to 29 October 2026, under the theme “Water as a Catalyst for Peace, Shared Prosperity, and a Sustainable Planet”. Achieving this vision requires arrangements that reconcile competing development priorities with the security of populations dependent on shared water resources. Nowhere is this challenge more apparent than in relations between Egypt and Ethiopia, where the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) continues to test the prospects for regional cooperation. The consequences of failure extend well beyond the distribution of river flows. Relations between Cairo and Addis Ababa remain fraught, while Sudan’s prolonged conflict threatens the stability of a country whose water infrastructure is directly affected by upstream developments. Armed conflict, climate pressures and political uncertainty already place considerable strain on the region. Without mechanisms to manage competing water demands, disputes over the Nile risk aggravating these vulnerabilities, undermining agricultural production, economic development and regional stability. An agreement on the river is therefore not simply a technical necessity but an important component of a wider effort to reduce tensions across the basin. Egypt’s objection to the GERD is not opposition to Ethiopia’s economic development or its pursuit of hydropower. Rather, it concerns the construction and operation of infrastructure capable of affecting the water security of millions of people downstream without an adequate, legally binding framework governing its transboundary effects. Cairo has engaged with development initiatives elsewhere in the Nile Basin, including projects along the White Nile, emphasising its commitment to cooperation between riparian states. The World Bank’s Operational Policy on Projects on International Waterways (OP 7.50) offers a relevant example of procedural safeguards for affected states in applicable Bank-financed projects. Although this policy does not govern the GERD directly, it illustrates the general rule and wider importance of assessing transboundary impacts and giving affected countries an opportunity to raise concerns before decisions create difficult-to-reverse consequences. Nadine Loza The GERD’s position on the Blue Nile makes these questions especially consequential. By controlling the reservoir’s storage and releases, Ethiopia exercises substantial influence over the timing and volume of flows reaching Sudan and Egypt. This creates an asymmetry in which the upstream state has considerable operational discretion while downstream countries must manage the consequences of decisions taken beyond their borders. The imbalance is particularly pronounced for Egypt, where extremely rare rainfall and scarce alternative freshwater resources make the Nile indispensable to agriculture, urban consumption and economic activity. Unlike Egypt, whose arid climate and negligible rainfall make the Nile indispensable, Ethiopia receives substantial seasonal rainfall across much of its territory, giving it a broader natural freshwater base. Understanding those risks requires distinguishing the GERD’s electricity-generating function from its effects on the timing and availability of water. Water passing through the dam’s turbines can continue downstream, but reservoir filling, evaporation and release schedules influence when that water arrives and how much is available at particular times. Under favourable rainfall conditions, changes in releases may be manageable. During severe droughts, however, the demands of electricity generation, irrigation and drinking-water supply can become more difficult to reconcile. The dam’s consequences must therefore be evaluated under adverse hydrological conditions, not solely through average annual flows or its contribution to Ethiopia’s electricity supply. Egypt’s High Aswan Dam and Lake Nasser provide an important buffer against fluctuations in Nile inflows, but their protective capacity is finite. The reserves available during a shortage depend on initial storage, subsequent inflows and the duration of the drought. Egypt retained reserves following the GERD’s initial filling, which did not coincide with a severe multiyear drought. That experience, however, cannot establish how uncoordinated dam operations would affect Egypt during a prolonged sequence of dry years. The droughts that affected the Nile Basin during the 1980s, particularly between 1983 and 1989, demonstrate how successive years of reduced inflows can place sustained pressure on water supplies. The central issue is not whether the GERD necessarily causes a shortage, but whether its operation should be coordinated to prevent avoidable harm when water is scarce. The human right to water was recognised by the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 64/292, adopted on 28 July 2010, which affirms the right to safe and clean drinking water and sanitation as essential to the full enjoyment of life and all human rights. In September 2026, Egypt’s annual per-capita water availability was reported at approximately 472 cubic metres, below the 500-cubic-metre threshold for absolute water scarcity. The government has invested in solar-powered irrigation, groundwater development, wastewater treatment and desalination, but these measures cannot replace the Nile at the scale required by Egypt’s population and agricultural economy. Groundwater extraction carries depletion risks, desalination remains expensive for extensive agricultural use, and coastal facilities cannot readily supply inland farms. These limitations make reliable Nile inflows a structural necessity for Egypt, as disruption to the river threatens the country’s ability to secure this essential resource for its population. The dispute also reflects competing interpretations of the legal framework governing the river. The 1959 Agreement for the Full Utilisation of the Nile Waters allocated Egypt 55.5 billion cubic metres annually and Sudan 18.5 billion. Egypt maintains that its historical and acquired water rights and established uses must be protected. Upstream states, however, dispute the extent to which an agreement concluded without their participation determines their obligations. This disagreement cannot be resolved simply by invoking historical allocations or unrestricted development rights. Equitable and reasonable utilisation requires consideration of the river’s hydrology, the populations dependent on it, socioeconomic needs, available alternatives and the effects of proposed changes on existing uses. The task is to reconcile these considerations through rules that recognise the legitimate interests of all riparian states. International water law provides principles for pursuing that reconciliation. The 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses establishes equitable and reasonable utilisation, cooperation and the prevention of significant harm as central principles. Article 12 addresses notification of planned measures that may significantly affect other watercourse states. The 1993 Framework for General Cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia, signed in Cairo on 1 July, also recognises international law, the avoidance of appreciable harm, consultation and mutually advantageous cooperation. Efforts to address these concerns have a long history. The International Panel of Experts established by Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan in 2012 submitted its final report in May 2013, identifying shortcomings in the available documentation and the need for further assessments, including dam safety, hydrological modelling and environmental impacts. The international dimension of the dispute resurfaced on 9 October 2026, when US President Donald Trump waded into the GERD controversy, calling US financing of the project “a stupid thing to do” and accused Ethiopia of taking all the water from the Nile. His remarks brought renewed attention to Washington’s past involvement in the project, and Egypt has called on European Union institutions to examine its transboundary environmental, economic and social effects, including the responsibilities of European companies involved in its construction. Research suggests that cooperation could improve outcomes for all three countries. A 2023 study by Basheer and colleagues, published in Nature Climate Change, found that cooperative adaptive management could strengthen economic outcomes and resilience in Ethiopia, Sudan and Egypt. A legally binding agreement should establish coordinated filling and operating procedures, transparent exchanges of reservoir and inflow data, independent monitoring, predefined drought-response measures and effective dispute resolution. Agreed hydrological thresholds could trigger consultations and contingency measures before shortages become acute. This would help protect downstream water supplies while allowing Ethiopia to plan hydropower generation with greater certainty. Operational flexibility is compatible with legal certainty, provided it functions within agreed and enforceable limits. Sudan illustrates why these arrangements must work in practice. Roseires Dam lies approximately 115 kilometres downstream of the GERD on the Blue Nile, making its operations sensitive to changes in upstream releases. During the GERD’s initial filling in July 2020, falling river levels disrupted drinking-water pumping stations in Khartoum. Chatham House’s 2023 analysis also reported that a Roseires Dam technician had described media reports as his only source of information about GERD operations in 2021. These accounts expose a basic operational weakness: downstream infrastructure cannot be managed effectively when reliable information about upstream decisions is unavailable. Although the GERD could benefit Sudan through flood moderation and improved agricultural planning, those benefits depend on timely data-sharing and coordination. Sudan’s continuing conflict makes dependable communication and water-management arrangements even more important, as damaged infrastructure and weakened emergency-response capacity can magnify the consequences of sudden changes in supply. Shared hydrological monitoring, satellite observations, predictive modelling and artificial intelligence can improve drought forecasting, reservoir planning and the identification of emerging risks. Environmental assessments should also account for sediment transport, aquatic ecosystems and river-dependent livelihoods, ensuring that the focus extends beyond electricity generation and annual water volumes. Cairo Water Week 2026 offers an opportunity to connect these technical capabilities with diplomatic engagement and practical negotiations. Egypt and Sudan require binding guarantees that protect downstream water supplies against both droughts and floods. These must include advance notification of changes in river conditions and planned releases, transparent and continuous data-sharing, coordinated reservoir operations and enforceable procedures for managing periods of severe water stress. In particular, agreed drought-management rules should establish clear hydrological thresholds for adjusting reservoir filling and releases when essential downstream supplies are at risk. The flooding experienced in Sudan in September and October 2025 further demonstrated the consequences of inadequate coordination, with the severity of the flooding attributed to sudden, unannounced changes in GERD releases. Cairo also opposes further unilateral Ethiopian dam projects without prior notification, consultation, comprehensive impact assessments and basin-wide agreement. Iteru, the ancient Egyptian word for ‘Great River’, has sustained Egyptian civilisation for millennia. Today, its waters flow into a new confluence: Ethiopia’s regional ambitions and Egypt’s imperative to safeguard its water security. The basin’s future will depend on whether its riparian states can move beyond competing positions and establish a durable framework that protects the interests of all, particularly those whose survival depends on the river’s reliable flow. The Great River poses a great test—and meeting it will require great political will. Nadine Loza is a development strategist, opinion columnist, and Founding Director of the Egypt Diaspora Initiative.
