The US-Iran confrontation has entered its seventh month without achieving any progress or tangible results on the issues for which the war was launched. On the contrary, the situation has become even more complicated after the Strait of Hormuz was turned into an additional issue with potentially devastating economic implications for global oil supplies. The course of this conflict and its transformations reveal, to a significant extent, the scale of randomness and confusion in the decision-making process of a major power of the size and stature of the United States. The US-Israeli military conflict against Iran began on 28 February, with airstrikes targeting military, nuclear and missile sites. President Donald Trump initially described the operation as a “short trip” or a “skirmish” lasting four to six weeks, with the aim of destroying Iran’s military capabilities, preventing its nuclear programme, and forcing the regime to make major concessions or collapse. More than six months later, the war has evolved into a prolonged confrontation with economic and maritime dimensions, accompanied by successive failures to achieve its stated objectives. Trump expected a swift end. In the early days, he asserted that the Iranian military had been “destroyed”, and then repeatedly extended the timetable, from two to three weeks and then beyond. The military campaign reached its peak during the first weeks, with thousands of strikes, but it did not bring down the regime or put an end to the threats. Instead of collapsing, Iran installed a new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, and continued to respond with missiles and drones. Major military operations largely subsided after approximately 40 days, amid attempts at ceasefires and negotiations. However, the most complicated issue emerged with increasing force: the Strait of Hormuz. Iran closed or restricted the vital waterway, through which around one-fifth of the world’s oil passes, demanding permits and fees. This transformed the conflict into a battle for control over a global energy lifeline. US casualties reached dozens of fatalities and hundreds of wounded, while the cost exceeded $37bn, accompanied by rising oil and fuel prices in the United States. The objectives of a “quick victory” or regime change were not achieved. Following the temporary truces, including a 60-day memorandum of understanding that ended without results, negotiations failed. Last August, Trump announced sanctions under the name of “Economic D-Day”, through an “economic exclusion operation”. These measures included extensive secondary sanctions targeting shipping, oil, gold, digital assets, aviation and shadow companies, along with threats against any country or company dealing with Iran. Prof. Hatem Sadek The campaign targeted around 60 entities and vessels, particularly the shadow fleet transporting Iranian oil, most of which is exported to China. However, Iran has been accustomed to sanctions for decades and continued to export through circumvention routes. It did not bring down the regime, nor did it force it into serious negotiations. US officials acknowledged the difficulty of targeting major partners, particularly China, without harming the global economy. By late August, the focus had shifted towards economic pressure, accompanied by a relative military de-escalation, but without a diplomatic breakthrough. Earlier this month, Trump launched a “tanker-for-tanker” strategy. The United States struck Iranian oil tankers, reaching five tankers in one round, in response to attempts to target US or commercial vessels. Iran responded by imposing a strict maritime exclusion zone on oil vessels, announcing new routes or prohibited areas, and threatening to target energy assets in the Gulf, including US interests. Trump repeatedly announced that the United States “controls” the Strait and even suggested naming it the “Trump Strait”. However, the reality showed partial effective Iranian control through threats and attacks. The strategy failed to fully reopen the Strait or break Iranian resolve. The result was a three-dimensional failure: militarily, the Iranian military was not completely destroyed and the regime did not fall. Economically, severe sanctions did not eliminate oil revenues or force surrender. At sea, the Strait of Hormuz remained an effective Iranian source of leverage, with partial disruption to global supplies and rising costs. This failure placed Trump before a dilemma: greater military escalation that could threaten to ignite a wider regional war just days before the midterm elections, or accepting a deteriorating situation that would harm the US and global economies. At the same time, there are several possible scenarios for escaping the triangle of failure in which Trump has found himself. The first is sustained, limited maritime escalation, which is currently the most likely, based on the continuation of the “tanker-for-tanker” strategy and intermittent attacks. Iran, meanwhile, could expand the restricted areas or target tankers belonging to other countries. The United States could increase naval escorts and strikes against mining capabilities and coastal missile systems. The result would be chronically high oil prices, supply disruptions and economic pressure on both sides without a full-scale war. The second scenario is broad military escalation, involving a US response and strikes targeting Iranian infrastructure, including electricity, oil and bridges. This could include renewed Israeli military support. However, this would carry risks, including the possibility of an Iranian missile response against US bases in the Gulf or against Israel, or a complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz, pushing oil prices above $120-150 per barrel and threatening a global recession. The third scenario is the intervention of third parties or the outbreak of a regional war, such as the involvement of the Houthis or other militias, or a Saudi or Emirati response if their facilities were damaged. In this case, China or Russia could intervene and increase their diplomatic or economic support for Iran. This scenario could be catastrophic if it extended to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait or the Red Sea. The expectation is that we will face a prolonged war of attrition. The continuation of the current situation, low-intensity clashes, partial blockade and sanctions, would exhaust both sides, with a greater economic impact on Iran and domestic political pressure on Trump because of fuel prices, in addition to the erosion of American prestige over the medium and long term. In reality, the war against Iran has evolved from a short military operation into a multidimensional war of attrition, in which the United States has so far been unable to translate its military and economic superiority into a decisive political outcome. The strikes have inflicted significant damage on Iranian capabilities, the sanctions have imposed severe economic pressure, and the US Navy has managed to reopen parts of maritime traffic. Yet none of this has produced a final agreement, regime change, or the stable and affordable restoration of oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz. This is where the fundamental paradox of the war lies: Washington has been able to inflict significant damage on Iran, but it has so far been unable to transform that damage into political surrender. At the same time, Tehran has been unable to defeat American power or completely close the Strait of Hormuz, but it has succeeded in making control of the Strait sufficiently costly and unstable to keep the energy crisis as a central element of the equation. Prof. Hatem Sadek, Helwan University
