The threats to the security of the Gulf and the Red Sea can no longer be treated as separate challenges, just as the war in Yemen can no longer be regarded as a local conflict that can be contained in isolation from regional and international rivalries. Developments in October 2026, from renewed confrontations between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia to attacks on critical infrastructure and civil aviation facilities, reveal a shift in the nature of these threats: maritime corridors, energy infrastructure and national economies have become instruments of pressure in regional conflicts. The question is not simply whether the region is heading towards a wider war, but whether Arab states can protect their interests and prevent their adversaries from dictating the terms of their security without having to choose between escalation and strategic exposure. On 17 October, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi declared that Egypt was prepared to take the necessary measures to defend Saudi Arabia if the Kingdom requested such assistance, stressing that Cairo had no intention of attacking anyone. He also called for an emergency parliamentary session to consider authorising potential military support should Saudi Arabia submit a formal request. The following day, Egypt’s National Defence Council announced that the country would provide the necessary and feasible forms of support to the Kingdom, while intensifying political and diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tensions. Egypt’s position came at a time when Saudi security had become directly linked to the war in Yemen, maritime navigation in the Red Sea and the protection of energy facilities and civil aviation. Yet Cairo faces a delicate equation: translating its commitments to a regional partner into practical measures without becoming entangled in an open-ended confrontation carrying military and economic costs that could prove difficult to contain. Egypt regards Saudi Arabia’s security as an integral part of its own national security, given the impact of Gulf stability on its economic and strategic interests and the importance of the Red Sea to the Suez Canal and international trade. This interdependence, however, does not mean that every threat to Saudi Arabia automatically warrants Egyptian military intervention. A prudent response requires assessing the nature of the threat, selecting the appropriate instruments and preserving sufficient strategic flexibility to prevent a crisis from escalating into a regional war. Dr Marwa El-Shinawy Recent developments also expose the weakness of the assumption that military superiority, defence spending and security partnerships are sufficient to guarantee security. Houthi attacks have demonstrated that an actor with fewer conventional resources can use missiles, drones and pressure on maritime corridors to generate disruption far beyond its material capabilities. A weaker adversary does not need to win a conventional battle to impose substantial political and economic costs. It may be enough to make the protection of airports, oil facilities, ports and maritime routes a continuous and expensive undertaking, while undermining confidence in the state’s ability to guarantee stability. Attacks on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh, alongside strikes targeting facilities operated by Saudi Aramco, have highlighted the scale of this challenge. On 11 October, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres condemned the attack on the airport, called for an end to the strikes and warned that attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure violate international law. The consequences of such attacks extend well beyond immediate physical damage. Airports and energy facilities underpin investment, tourism and the movement of goods and people. As confidence in their security erodes, insurance, transport and protection costs rise, forcing governments to balance development priorities against growing defence requirements. This is particularly significant for Saudi Vision 2030, which depends on economic diversification, attracting investment and expanding tourism. These ambitions require a stable operating environment, while persistent attacks may prompt investors to reassess regional risks even if economic activity does not come to a complete halt. It cannot be concluded that these attacks will derail Saudi Arabia’s economic transformation. However, their continuation could create tension between economic openness and the need to devote greater resources to protecting critical assets. The central challenge may ultimately be the cost of keeping the economy open in an unstable environment, rather than the ability to retaliate against any single attack. These concerns become even more consequential when the focus shifts to the Red Sea, where Saudi, Egyptian and Yemeni interests intersect with global trade. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a critical link on the maritime route connecting the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal. Prolonged disruption could force shipping companies to reassess routes, transit times and costs, with potential repercussions for supply chains and shipping rates between Asia and Europe. In a briefing to the United Nations Security Council on 15 September, Khaled Khiari, the UN Assistant Secretary-General, warned of mounting security volatility around Bab el-Mandeb, noting that Houthi advances towards the strait had heightened market concerns amid disruptions in the Gulf. He called for respect for freedom of navigation, restraint and engagement in political efforts. The available evidence does not establish that the maritime corridor will be closed. It does, however, suggest that elevated risks or repeated attacks could prompt shipping companies and insurers to revise their calculations. Geography can thus shift from an economic advantage to a strategic vulnerability, as the importance of a maritime corridor gives those who threaten it influence extending far beyond their own borders. For Egypt, a decline in the attractiveness of the Red Sea-Suez Canal route could place pressure on one of the foundations of its economic position. Potential losses for the Suez Canal cannot be quantified in advance; they depend on shipping volumes, the duration of disruption, corporate decisions and the availability of alternative routes. Nevertheless, persistent risks make preventing escalation an essential part of protecting Egypt’s economy, rather than merely a diplomatic objective. The Gulf and the Red Sea should therefore be understood as a single strategic security space. Escalation in the Gulf may redirect pressure towards the Red Sea, while threats to Bab el-Mandeb may constrain the ability of states to rely on alternative routes. In this environment, maritime security becomes inseparable from energy, food supplies, trade, investment and governments’ capacity to prevent the costs of regional conflicts from spilling over into everyday life. Dr Marwa El-Shinawy, academic and writer
