Israel’s elections are nearing their decisive moment. Yet the word “decisive” may be misleading, because what follows the announcement of the results could prove more difficult than the electoral process itself. The real struggle often begins the day after the votes are counted, when political parties confront the challenge of forming a government.
This structural crisis can be traced to several key factors. The first is Israel’s system of proportional representation, under which seats in the Knesset are allocated according to parties’ electoral performance, subject to a relatively low electoral threshold. As a result, the legislature is consistently fragmented among numerous parties, including smaller ones, making it exceedingly difficult for any single party to secure an outright majority of 61 seats in the 120-member parliament.
A second factor is the leverage wielded by smaller parties and the coercive dynamics of coalition-building. Because even the largest party cannot govern alone, it must engage in arduous negotiations to assemble a governing coalition. Smaller parties—whether ultra-Orthodox or far-right nationalist factions—therefore become kingmakers. They exploit their pivotal position to advance narrow agendas or demand powerful ministerial portfolios disproportionate to their electoral weight.
Ideological divisions and competing visions of national identity further complicate the process. Israeli coalitions are not formed solely around economic or social policy; they must also navigate deep-rooted disputes over religion, statehood, and the relationship between secular parties, ultra-Orthodox factions, and religious Zionist movements. The management of the conflict with the Palestinians presents another major fault line, with sharp divisions between the right, left, and centre over a two-state solution, annexation, and the expansion of settlements. These disputes are compounded by questions of institutional legitimacy, judicial authority, and the limits of the Supreme Court’s powers.
These dynamics produce weak and fragile governments, with coalition-building often yielding two recurring outcomes. The first is political instability: a small coalition partner can bring down a government simply by withdrawing its support, leaving administrations with a much shorter lifespan than a full parliamentary term would suggest. The second is political paralysis. When coalition negotiations reach an impasse, the Knesset may be dissolved, plunging the country into repeated elections within a relatively short period.
Winning an Israeli election, therefore, is only the first step. The real crisis begins when political leaders attempt to construct the intricate web of alliances and compromises required to form a government.
Prof. Hatem Sadek
Another fundamental problem lies in the reluctance of Jewish political parties to include Arab political forces in future governing coalitions. The deliberate exclusion of roughly one-fifth of the country’s population creates a dead end for the opposition. The arithmetic suggests that securing a majority of 61 seats is exceedingly difficult without Arab representation or, at the very least, external support from Arab parties. This contradiction has repeatedly given Benjamin Netanyahu a political lifeline, allowing him to remain in power by capitalising on fears among Jewish voters about Arab parties’ participation in government.
Arab citizens of Israel represent an electoral force whose potential remains far from fully realised. Their votes can influence coalition negotiations and reshape the balance of political power, as demonstrated in 2021, when the United Arab List, known as Ra’am, joined the governing coalition and helped bring an end to Netanyahu’s government. Yet the red lines imposed by the Zionist right and centre continue to make this political pathway deeply uncertain.
Arab voters, meanwhile, face a dual challenge. Disillusionment and fragmentation among competing Arab lists threaten to depress voter turnout, particularly as Arab political forces struggle to regain the confidence of their constituents. At the same time, elements of Israel’s political establishment and the right-wing camp continue to challenge the legitimacy of Arab political representation, using it as a spectre to mobilise right-wing Jewish voters.
Despite these obstacles, the demographic and political reality remains clear: it is difficult for any opposition bloc to secure a sustainable majority without engaging Arab citizens as genuine partners in decision-making rather than relegating them to the margins.
Moreover, parliamentary experience has demonstrated that the Arab vote matters for more than the arithmetic of coalition formation. It also carries substantive weight in shaping social and economic policy affecting Arab communities inside Israel. The scale of Arab political participation can directly influence the allocation of public funds to combat crime, improve infrastructure, and challenge discriminatory planning and construction laws. Overcoming electoral disengagement and transforming the Arab vote from a marginal numerical presence into an organised, proactive political force may therefore be essential to compelling Israel’s political establishment to recognise Arab citizens’ rights and acknowledge their electoral weight as a constituency that can no longer be ignored.
Israel is once again approaching a perilous political crossroads. Although every election is often presented as a last chance to save the country, the numbers and political realities suggest that the underlying calculations have changed little. The struggle to secure a governing majority remains unresolved.
Over the longer term, however, Israel’s political landscape appears headed towards structural changes that may prove impossible to avoid. Despite persistent efforts at exclusion, demographic trends suggest that the growing Arab population will make its indefinite political marginalisation increasingly difficult to sustain.
The coming period will require Arab political leaders to develop a bold strategic vision that moves beyond day-to-day reactions towards meaningful institutional influence. This could involve pursuing a strategy of conditional coalition participation to secure substantive gains, or building a strong civic and parliamentary front capable of establishing itself as an indispensable force in any future political settlement.
The future of political stability in Israel will no longer depend solely on the contest between right-wing and left-wing blocs. It will also hinge on whether Israeli society can recognise Arab citizens as essential partners in shaping the country’s future—or continue to sink into a cycle of recurring political crises.
Prof. Hatem Sadek, Helwan University
