US Secretary of State Marco Rubio has concluded his Gulf tour, which was primarily aimed at reassuring regional allies concerned about the consequences of Washington’s latest understanding with Iran. Although Gulf states broadly welcomed the end of the recent conflict, convincing their leaders of the merits of the new memorandum of understanding has proven far more difficult. Their concerns are far from speculative. They are grounded in tangible realities that became even more apparent following the agreement reached between the Trump administration and Tehran to bring the war to an end. Notably, the memorandum contains no explicit provisions addressing Iran’s ballistic missile programme or its expanding fleet of armed drones—the very capabilities that have previously been used to strike strategic infrastructure across the Gulf. This omission leaves the region exposed to an enduring military threat without any meaningful deterrent. Equally troubling is the agreement’s narrow focus on ending direct confrontation between Washington and Tehran while leaving Iran’s regional proxy network virtually untouched. As long as these armed groups remain operational, Tehran retains powerful instruments capable of destabilising neighbouring countries whenever it chooses. Adding to Gulf concerns is the proposal to establish a $300bn reconstruction fund alongside the easing of certain sanctions. For many Gulf capitals, this effectively rewards the aggressor at the expense of those who suffered the consequences of the conflict. There is widespread fear that such financial resources could ultimately reinforce Iran’s military establishment and finance its regional proxies rather than contribute to genuine reconstruction and economic development. The memorandum has also raised alarm by implicitly granting Iran a greater role in managing the Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly one-fifth of the world’s oil and gas supplies pass. Although Rubio reaffirmed in Manama that Washington categorically rejects any Iranian attempt to impose transit fees or restrictions on international shipping, diplomatic assurances alone are unlikely to dispel fears that Tehran could still disrupt maritime navigation or impose new realities in one of the world’s most strategic waterways. The absence of a coherent strategic framework during the Trump administration’s second-term “Hundred-Day War,” which began in February, has not only destabilised the region but also shaken long-standing assumptions regarding America’s traditional security umbrella. Gulf capitals suddenly found themselves directly exposed to military retaliation resulting from an escalation over which they had little control. Even sophisticated American air defence systems—acquired at enormous financial cost—proved incapable of preventing Iranian missiles and drones from breaching regional defences during the conflict. The experience challenged the long-held perception of overwhelming American military superiority and demonstrated the limitations of even the most advanced defence technologies when confronted with saturation missile attacks and large-scale drone warfare. Perhaps the most significant strategic lesson was the realisation that the extensive American military presence across the Gulf effectively provided Tehran with a justification for targeting host countries. Instead of serving solely as a deterrent, these military bases increasingly became magnets for retaliation, exposing their hosts to greater risk. Prof. Hatem Sadek Iran’s emergence from the conflict with its political system intact, much of its military infrastructure preserved, and its influence over developments in the Strait of Hormuz apparently strengthened has reinforced perceptions that Tehran succeeded in reshaping the regional balance of power in its favour. The subsequent understandings reached with Washington appeared to prioritise bilateral interests while largely overlooking the security concerns of Iran’s Arab neighbours. This structural failure of the American security architecture, coupled with other strategic considerations, has prompted Gulf states to seriously explore alternative security arrangements. Increasing interest in bilateral defence agreements reflects a growing sense of political realism. Regional governments no longer regard broad multilateral alliances or general American security guarantees as sufficient protection. The coming period is therefore likely to witness intense competition—not only to forge bilateral partnerships with emerging global powers such as China and Russia in an effort to diversify strategic options, but also to explore direct security understandings with Tehran aimed at securing a minimum level of regional stability. The recent conflict has convinced many regional leaders that exclusive reliance on Washington could ultimately drag them into costly wars, the greatest burden of which is borne by the peoples and states of the Middle East. Some Gulf governments now view the inclusion of a formal non-aggression clause in any future agreement as the bare minimum required to address their security concerns after enduring repeated missile and drone attacks from Iran throughout the conflict—attacks that, in several cases, exceeded those directed at Israel. Yet Iran’s long record of regional behaviour makes genuine trust difficult to establish overnight, particularly when Tehran believes it has emerged victorious from a confrontation involving two nuclear powers and now conducts itself with the confidence of a perceived winner. Rubio’s diplomatic mission ultimately appeared to be an exercise in reassuring anxious allies rather than providing the structural security guarantees necessary to alter the strategic reality that Iran has emerged from the conflict with significant geopolitical gains. As has often been the case, Gulf states continue to bear the heaviest costs of every regional confrontation—whether Arab-Arab, Arab-Iranian, or Iranian-Israeli. Some conflicts stem from miscalculation; others from flawed strategic decisions made by external powers. Faced with mounting uncertainty, Gulf governments may increasingly look beyond their traditional Arab strategic environment in search of alternative partnerships capable of establishing a credible balance of power against Iran, at least during a transitional period. What the Iranian attacks ultimately exposed was not merely vulnerabilities within America’s regional defence architecture. They also laid bare the widening cracks in Gulf confidence in the United States itself. Whether Rubio’s reassurances were sufficient to repair that fractured trust remains highly doubtful. Prof. Hatem Sadek, Helwan UniversityThe post Opinion | Rubio’s Gulf Tour Fails to Ease Strategic Anxiety over Iran Deal first appeared on Dailynewsegypt.
