As with every Israeli election, the question has resurfaced less than two weeks before the 120-seat Knesset vote. Will Israel’s decision-makers launch a military escalation on one front or another to improve their electoral prospects? The election comes after a series of wars on multiple fronts, most of which remain unresolved. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces a serious risk of defeat, which could drive him to seek ways to reshape the domestic political landscape. But this factor alone cannot determine a decision of such magnitude. Any move would have to pass through multiple political, military and security layers, with two main considerations shaping the outcome, summed up in the likelihood of achieving the intended objectives and the US position. Israeli public opinion also matters, particularly at this stage of the electoral campaign. Days ago, US and Israeli media reported that Washington had sounded out Tel Aviv on the possibility of Israel striking Iran unilaterally. Israel’s military establishment reportedly rejected the idea, warning of the risks and urging caution until after the elections. One possible explanation is that some US policymakers believe Netanyahu’s electoral incentives could be exploited to encourage an attack on Iran, allowing Washington to reap the benefits without becoming directly involved. While this scenario has some merit, elections alone are insufficient to trigger a war. Moreover, launching an attack before voters go to the polls may not benefit Netanyahu. Would a unilateral Israeli war strengthen his electoral standing? And on which front would such a strategy unfold? Iran, Lebanon, Yemen or Iraq? For an attack on Iran to benefit Netanyahu, it would need to deliver a clear and decisive outcome, rather than another round of inconclusive exchanges. Not every military escalation or security operation influences Israeli voters. The greatest electoral impact tends to come from major, large-scale confrontations, narrowing the likely options to Iran or a front that could lead directly to a wider conflict with Tehran. For an attack on Iran to benefit Netanyahu, it would need to deliver a clear and decisive outcome, rather than another round of inconclusive exchanges. Otherwise, the public backlash could further weaken his position, even if the confrontation led to a postponement of the vote. If Israel could achieve such a decisive result on its own, the US would be even better positioned to do so. Washington would have little reason to seek another party to carry out an operation whose potential consequences it fears bearing itself. President Donald Trump’s administration could instead undertake a move that it could capitalize on in the upcoming midterm elections. A major military operation is therefore more likely to be postponed until after the Israeli elections, unless developments on the ground overturn these calculations. Events could dictate their own course regardless of the electoral timetable. A limited strike in response to attacks on vessels in the straits could spiral into a wider confrontation. Iran could launch a preemptive strike, a possibility discussed in Israeli and US assessments, or escalating security tensions on the Lebanese front could trigger a direct Iranian response. If Netanyahu wins, military action is likely to return to the table with stronger political backing. If he loses, the decision will fall to the incoming government, with no guarantee that it will abandon the military option or necessarily pursue it. This is an edited translation for an article published in Arabic.
