The emerging alliance signals a shift from US-led security toward a more distributed regional power balance, with Iran, Israel and India watching closely.
The signing of the “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement” by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan was not merely an announcement of new military cooperation. Rather, it could be seen as a founding moment in a broader process aimed at reshaping security and influence in the Middle East and beyond.
However, it is still too early to describe this arrangement as an “Islamic NATO.” The agreement does not yet establish a shared military structure or operational command, nor does it provide a clear mechanism for determining how the parties would respond to aggression. Moreover, the three countries do not view Iran in the same way, nor do they necessarily appear ready for an open war with it. This is one of the agreement’s key contradictions.
The day before the agreement was signed, Pakistan was deepening its economic cooperation with Iran through frameworks aimed at increasing bilateral trade to $10 billion by 2030, while also expanding border trade and transit movements. Islamabad also seeks to maintain its position as a mediator between Tehran, Riyadh, and Washington, rather than becoming part of a hostile axis against Iran.
Turkey, in turn, has complex economic and political interests with Tehran and does not consider Iran a strategic enemy to the extent of making war with it a declared objective. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine Ankara or Islamabad automatically becoming parties to a war with Iran if Saudi Arabia were attacked.
Pakistan’s experience underscores this point. Islamabad joined the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis in 2015 but abstained from direct military involvement following a parliamentary decision. It also remained distant from some US-led naval alliances in the Red Sea.
This question leads to the true nature of the alliance. Saudi Arabia does not appear to be replacing the United States with Turkey and Pakistan, but rather diversifying its security options. The kingdom’s experience with attacks, most notably the targeting of the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities in 2019, followed by Iranian and Houthi attacks, has reinforced Riyadh’s conviction that relying on a single security umbrella carries significant risks. Therefore, the “Mecca Agreement” can be understood more as a restraining alliance than a war alliance, sending its most important message to the United States.
This network also carries a highly sensitive Israeli dimension. The security arrangement Washington has been promoting in recent years involves integrating Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries into a regional system aimed at countering Iran and enhancing cooperation in air and missile defense, intelligence, and the protection of trade routes.
What emerged from Mecca is different. Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif added greater clarity to this dimension when, after signing the agreement, he called for Islamic countries to unite against Israel, describing it as “a threat to the entire Muslim world.” He also affirmed that his position would not change with changes in the Israeli government, as long as the Palestinian issue remains without a permanent solution.
The irony is that the weakening of Iran, which could drive Arab countries closer to Israel, could also push some of them to build an independent power base out of fear that Israeli superiority could turn into a permanent imbalance in the region. This brings another aspect of the equation into focus: India.
New Delhi is watching the Mecca Agreement not only because of Israel, but also because of Pakistan. The alliance brings together a massive financial power, Saudi Arabia; a military-industrial power, Turkey; and a nuclear state, Pakistan, India’s historical rival.
This is why the conversation between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Benjamin Netanyahu before the announcement of the agreement took on particular significance. The two leaders discussed developments in West Asia and the “special strategic partnership” between India and Israel.
India’s concern is not limited to the military dimension. Saudi Arabia is pivotal to the “India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor” project, while Turkey seeks to strengthen competing transport and trade corridor projects. The rapprochement between Ankara and Riyadh therefore gives Turkey greater influence in a central state for a project on which India and Israel are betting.
Thus, the “Mecca Agreement” extends its influence beyond security into the economy: ports, energy, trade corridors, and supply chains have become part of the competition over the region’s next system.
Yet one conclusion can already be drawn: the Middle East is shifting from a phase in which the United States stood at the center of the security system to one in which power centers are becoming more distributed.
Israel will seek to deepen its relations with India, Greece, and Cyprus, while India will need to balance the rise of Pakistan and Turkey. Iran, meanwhile, will strive to prevent the alliance from becoming a containment platform and may use its ties with Pakistan and Turkey to dismantle any hostile trend within it. This is the most significant strategic shift, and this is where the story of real transformation begins.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.
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