Joint Defense agreement signals alternative Saudi approach to confronting Iran

The Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani agreement marks a turning point in the Kingdom’s approach to Iran, its proxies and the growing security threats across the region.

Saudi Arabia has taken a decision of a different kind: to defend itself against the “Islamic Republic” of Iran. This indicates a deep understanding of the games and manoeuvers Iran has become accustomed to practicing, on the one hand, and a genuine and realistic understanding of the changes taking place in the region and the world, on the other.

The defense-oriented agreement reached by the Kingdom with Turkey and Iran is nothing less than a very clear message. The message has strategic importance and a regional dimension. Its substance is that there is a regional understanding, in Turkey and Pakistan as well, of the danger posed by the “Islamic Republic” and the ideology it has adopted and continues to adopt.

Iran now sees attacking its nearby Arab neighbours as a standing alternative to attacking the American naval vessels stationed in the Gulf waters, not far from the Iranian coast. More than that, Iran is reluctant to attack Israel for fear of a response from it that would be more damaging and precise than any American response.

The importance of the new Saudi position lies in an approach that takes into account that dealing with Iran and the hostility it displays also means dealing with the Iranian tools, including the “Popular Mobilization Forces” militias in Iraq, which are attacking the Kingdom and the State of Kuwait.

From this perspective, one can understand Saudi Arabia’s insistence on holding the Iraqi government accountable. It is not an ordinary event for a Saudi official, namely Intelligence Chief Khalid Al-Humaidan, to go to Baghdad to meet Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaydi. The visit means a great deal, including the identity and position of the Saudi envoy. Above all, the visit means placing security at the forefront of Saudi-Iraqi relations.

From Riyadh’s point of view, the Iraqi government must prove that it is in control of its own decisions, after the Saudi security official presented all the precise information in his possession confirming that the “Popular Mobilization Forces” militias are acting independently of the government.

The “Popular Mobilization Forces” have become nothing more than a distinctly Iranian tool. There can be no normal Saudi-Iraqi relations without the Iraqi government controlling the decision of war and peace and maintaining a monopoly on arms. Al-Humaidan’s visit to Baghdad is nothing more than confirmation of a new reality summed up in one phrase: Saudi Arabia’s security comes first.

The coming days will show whether the Zaydi government has what enables it to seek normal relations with the other Arab countries, or whether it will remain captive to Iranian hegemony, represented by the “Popular Mobilization Forces” militias.

Any new Iranian attack on the Kingdom will take on a more complicated nature in light of the Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani agreement. What is clear, at least for now, is that the “Islamic Republic” remains determined to believe that it can continue pursuing a policy based on holding the Yemen card.

There is no doubt that Iran has decided to use the Houthis to carry out attacks, on Iran’s behalf, against Saudi Arabia. The evidence for this is the targeting of the “Aramco” refinery on the Red Sea. The Houthis’ attack on the Saudi refinery, when they are nothing more than an Iranian tool, came at a time when they were conducting military activity in all directions in Yemen.

This included attacking the Yemeni port of Mokha, which controls the Bab al-Mandab Strait, using drones. In 2014, the United Arab Emirates, through local forces, played a decisive role in preventing the Houthis from remaining in Mokha after they had been driven out of Aden itself. The local Yemeni forces prevented the Houthis from directly controlling Bab al-Mandab.

What role will the Saudi-Turkish-Yemeni alliance play in putting an end to the threat posed by the Houthis to the security of navigation in the Red Sea, whose gateway is the Bab al-Mandab Strait? Such a question will impose itself in the future, particularly since the Houthis’ recent actions indicate, among other things, a rejection of any political solutions or settlements, and that they are unable in any way to emerge from under the mantle of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The Saudi-Turkish-Pakistani agreement remains a turning point at both the Saudi and regional levels. Naturally, one cannot speak of a Sunni alliance confronting Iran in light of the presence of important Shiite figures participating in decision-making in Pakistan.

In the end, Israel’s position on the agreement remains an open question, particularly since it is also concerned with what the regional balances will look like from a security perspective, after the war has moved inside Iran and after the Strait of Hormuz has become the biggest of all problems.

What cannot be ignored is that an American confrontation with Iran, with or without Israeli participation, remains possible at any moment, after the “Islamic Republic” decided to impose impossible conditions for reopening the Strait of Hormuz to international navigation.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.

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