Diplomatic observers warn that Israel is increasingly acting on behalf of the Lebanese state, while the slow-moving negotiations unfold against the backdrop of mounting tensions between Iran, the Gulf states and the United States
Diplomatic observers believe that Israel’s continued escalation in the south, even after ending its control of Ali al-Taher Hill, coupled with the slow pace of negotiations under the framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel, makes Israel appear to be taking it upon itself to make decisions on behalf of the Lebanese state, on the pretext that the Lebanese Army is not acting with sufficient determination to disarm Hezbollah, even in areas where there are now calls for it to do so.
The equation that prevailed after the November 27, 2024 agreement was that, unless the Lebanese state implemented its decisions to place weapons under state control or neutralize their effects in accordance with its obligations under the agreement and Resolution 1701, Israel would take it upon itself to do so on behalf of the Lebanese state. Israel continues to operate according to, or invoke, this equation while disregarding its own obligations under the framework agreement, against the backdrop of statements by Lebanese state officials that the state would not want to take any decisions requiring the use of force against Hezbollah, given the threat this could pose to national unity. At the same time, the group has shown no flexibility in cooperating with the state, despite the public signs of its retreat and weakness, Israel’s control of Ali al-Taher, and calls from southern communities for the Lebanese Army to act.
There are fears that the bets placed by Hezbollah, which have linked Ali al-Taher to Bab al-Mandab and the Strait of Hormuz, are reinforcing the case for maintaining a hard-line stance while waiting for the fog surrounding the ongoing battle in Bab al-Mandab and the Strait of Hormuz to clear, and for it to become clear whether the conflict will produce gains that could help mitigate Hezbollah’s losses in Lebanon and give it greater protection for its positions. What may happen between Iran and the Arab Gulf states will also have a major impact on Lebanon, although Lebanon represents only a very small part of the equation that could shape the regional landscape, given what the Gulf states are facing and the broader regional and even international dimensions, particularly in relation to the United States itself and its current war with Iran, and what could emerge from an agreement between these states and Iran.
Any agreement between Iran and these states could provide Tehran with diplomatic leverage that would help ease the economic and military pressure it is under, and could perhaps also provide an exit for the United States, on the basis that the countries directly concerned with the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab could be the ones to make concessions as part of a partnership with Iran, rather than the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. At the same time, the suffering of the Gulf states is worsening to a frightening degree, as they are the most affected by the ongoing war between the United States and Iran, while they seek to restore stability, whose absence is having a profound impact on them, something the United States does not appear willing to alleviate, as illustrated, for example, by its response to their refusal to become involved against the Houthis.
This raises major questions about the fragility of the region’s defense posture, the agreements signed with the United States and other countries, how these states are responding, and the ineffectiveness of alliances established in the past, as well as those formed more recently. It also raises questions about the reasons that allowed the Houthis to advance toward Bab al-Mandab recently. At the same time, it raises questions about what kind of way out might also be found for Iran from the burden of the economic collapse it is facing as a result of the U.S. blockade.
The United States recently sought, through U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa’s efforts with Israel to secure the release of several Lebanese prisoners held by Israel, as well as to set a date for a meeting between the Lebanese and Israeli ambassadors in Washington in the coming week, to underscore the continuity and effectiveness of the framework agreement and ensure that Lebanon is not left on its own despite the slow pace of negotiations.
But the situation is not static on the other side either. There is the Israeli escalation, which is seeking to capitalize on its “victories” on the ground in an attempt to establish a different reality in southern Lebanon and impose a new equation there that would be difficult to reverse, alongside an Iranian regional escalation through which Iran is seeking to avert the complete collapse of its influence in Lebanon, even if Lebanon has regained control over its own decision-making.
The transformations taking place across the region, which are comparable in scale to the dramatic changes that occurred in the aftermath of the First and Second World Wars, cannot be viewed solely through the narrow Lebanese lens of the framework agreement.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar
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