As the September 30 deadline for the US withdrawal and the disarmament of Iran-aligned Iraqi factions approaches, al-Zaidi faces mounting pressure from both Tehran and Washington.
Is Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi promising more than he can deliver? It is a legitimate question given the deadline set by the Iraqi government for the withdrawal of the international coalition forces—primarily US forces—from Iraq on September 30, and for Iraqi factions aligned with Iran to hand over their weapons to the state by that date.
The US forces will most likely leave Iraq on the scheduled date, with the exception of some advisers working to train Iraq’s regular armed forces. It remains unclear whether a number of US troops will stay in the autonomous Kurdistan Region.
The US military withdrawal from Iraq will undoubtedly be welcomed by Iran, which will attribute it to the strong pressure exerted by the “Resistance Front,” of which the Iraqi factions aligned with Iran are considered a key component.
This leads to a related question: Does Tehran consider the US withdrawal from Iraq—a longstanding Iranian demand—sufficient grounds for it, in turn, to agree to the factions handing over their weapons?
It is doubtful that Iran would accept disarming one of its regional arms at the height of its confrontation with the United States. That is why it sent Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani to Baghdad last week to ask al-Zaidi to revoke his decision to disarm the militias.
But what if al-Zaidi refuses and insists on disarming the militias? Tehran could then be expected to use its influence over the parties of the Coordination Framework, most of which are aligned with Iran and which wield considerable power in parliament, to create numerous obstacles for the Iraqi government, potentially pushing it to resign, especially as it is already suffering from vacancies in several key ministries.
That is one option. Another could be to drive supporters of the militias into the streets under flimsy pretexts, such as preserving the system that emerged after the US invasion in 2003, which brought the Shiite majority to power, or arguing that these weapons are intended to support Iran in its war against the United States as part of the “Axis of Resistance,” which also includes Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi rebels in Yemen.
If al-Zaidi fails to disarm the militias, he will find himself facing US economic pressure. Iraq’s oil revenues are known to pass through the US Federal Reserve, and any shortage of hard currency would expose Iraq to further economic difficulties. These revenues have already declined as a result of Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran is watching al-Zaidi’s efforts to open up to Syria with caution, as this would free him from Iranian pressure. Accordingly, he is trying to walk a fine line, seeking to retain the approval of both Tehran and Washington.
This balancing act was possible before the US-Israeli war on Iran on February 28. Today, however, al-Zaidi is required to determine which side he leans toward, because the escalation gripping the region leaves no room for middle-ground solutions.
From now until September 30, therefore, al-Zaidi faces a major challenge unlike any Iraqi prime minister has confronted since 2003. Amid the sweeping transformations taking place in the region, Iraq—with its vast untapped potential—is seen as a key arena in the struggle for influence, and its position could tip the balance one way or the other.
This also sheds light on similar problems in Lebanon and Yemen, where Iran believes their demographic makeup gives it room to exercise influence. The policy Iran has pursued for decades is based on the premise that if it cannot be the one making the decisions, it can at least obstruct decisions made by others.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.
Thank you for subscribing to our newsletter
