Iran was able to become a regional powerhouse in the Middle East for two decades, but this was not due to its economic, technological, or military strength, nor to the strength of its model as a state, as much as it was due to the availability of various factors, the most important of which are:
First, American and Israeli investment in the functional role that Iran played in their attempts to impose hegemony in the region through its armed militia arms, which contributed to undermining political and social stability in the Levantine Arab countries, particularly in Iraq and Lebanon, in line with Israel’s interests.
Second, the absence of an effective Arab axis, amid a lack of agreement among Arab countries on needs and priorities.
Third, the United States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its subsequent handover of the country, effectively, to Iranian-affiliated militias.
Fourth, Israeli obstinacy toward the settlement process, which allowed Iran to ride the Palestinian cause by claiming “resistance and rejection,” particularly through its unlimited support for “Hezbollah” in Lebanon.
Fifth, and against all of this, it appeared that successive American administrations dealt with a degree of indifference toward what Iran and its militias were doing in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, considering that it served U.S. policies in two directions. First, it ensured the long-term security of Israel through the devastation taking place in the Arab Levant. Second, it allowed Washington to use the Iranian threat as a scarecrow for some Arab regimes, pushing them toward seeking U.S. protection, including openness toward Israel and normalization with it, or involving them in some form of shared regional political, security, and economic system.
But all this did not work for long. The period of American investment in the Iranian role, which extended over two decades from 2003 to 2025, ended after its effectiveness ceased amid the developments taking place in the Middle East.
However, this also came about, driven by two main factors.
First, the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, which led to Israel’s ferocity toward the Palestinians and its attempt to break Iranian influence in the Middle East, including by striking its militia arms.
Second, Iran’s attempt to acquire nuclear and missile power.
A third, new factor was Iran’s attempt to strangle the global economy by using the Strait of Hormuz as a weapon in its hands, along with threats to neighboring countries in the Gulf.
The paradox here is that the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, which was sudden and powerful, represented the peak of the military militia option for the “resistance and rejectionism” camp led by Iran. “Hezbollah” supported “Hamas” in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen launched missile attacks against Israel, and factions in Iraq adopted the slogan of “Unity of the Arenas.” Yet it was also the peak of Iran and its affiliated militias’ failure.
To recall, this happened in a horrific, blatant, and rapid manner, as Israel, within three months, was able to undermine the power of “Hezbollah,” destroy the capabilities of the Syrian army following the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, and reduce the influence of the Iraqi militias.
The United States and Israel did not stop at this point. They launched a war against Iran in two phases and carried out attacks in a third phase last July, a war that is not yet over.
Protesters in Baghdad raising Iranian and Iraqi flags and '
Perhaps Iran’s biggest loss in this ongoing war is its narrative about itself, both at the regional and international levels and before its own people. Over the past two decades, it had built an image of itself as an invincible state, not only against Israel but also against the United States. This was accompanied by its claim that it could erase Israel within days. Yet all these claims proved to be slogans that quickly lost their credibility when put to the test.
Additionally, Iran lost its image and standing as the leader of the “resistance and rejectionism” axis after distancing itself from the genocidal war Israel waged against Gaza over two years, leaving “Hamas” to its fate. It also distanced itself from supporting “Hezbollah,” the crown jewel of its militias in the region, after the harsh strikes Israel dealt it in the fall of 2024.
On the external front, Iran’s losses include the exposure of its vision of a multipolar world and the supposed nearing collapse of the United States. It turned out that the BRICS countries, namely China, India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa, are not effective and cannot do anything against what the United States wants or does, whether politically, economically, technologically, or militarily.
In the end, Iran lost a great deal, including human and material losses, damage to its nuclear program installations, and destruction across sectors of its infrastructure. Moreover, Iran’s attempt to prevent navigation in the Gulf backfired, with the United States imposing a strict blockade on its ports and deploying the largest American military gathering in the region.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.
As Iran’s regional influence comes under mounting pressure, its allied armed groups are facing a new reality. From Hezbollah and Hamas to the Houthis, each is being forced to reassess its weapons, political role, funding, and regional reach. This special Annahar dossier examines how Tehran’s network is adapting after major battlefield and geopolitical shifts, and whether its once tightly connected axis can survive as its links begin to pull apart. Read our special dossier:
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