With November approaching, the political cost of the conflict is rising for Trump and the Republicans, as Tehran seeks to exploit the electoral timetable and pressure Washington on multiple fronts.
The U.S. midterm elections have entered the calculations surrounding the confrontation with Iran well ahead of schedule. President Donald Trump expects the war to end immediately after the elections and has accused Tehran of trying to influence their outcome by prolonging the conflict. His linking of the two tracks underscores the extent to which November 3 is shaping the decisions of an administration fighting a war abroad while facing a political challenge at home.
November is becoming increasingly important because the cost of the war is reaching American voters through higher fuel prices and rising living costs, at a time when Republicans need to preserve their majority in Congress. Losing either chamber would give Democrats broader tools to scrutinize the administration and military spending. As the election approaches, the continuation of the war is becoming an electoral liability for Republicans.
The Iranian regime is aware of the sensitivity of the timing, with assessments suggesting that it is seeking to increase the political cost for Washington as the elections draw closer. The equation between the two sides appears to be reversed. Trump is betting that Iran will not be able to withstand the pressure beyond Election Day, while Tehran believes that continuing the war will make his political position increasingly difficult as the election approaches.
Washington is leaning toward a more selective approach to managing the war, combining targeted strikes with economic and maritime pressure and sanctions, while seeking to contain operations without opening additional fronts. The approach could be described as a more measured use of force or as risk management. Its success, however, depends on its ability to prevent its adversary from exploiting restraint in escalation and expanding the conflict into other arenas.
Iran has deliberately increased the risks to maritime navigation and the cost of insurance, contributing to higher energy prices, but it is also paying an economic price as its exports are disrupted and its oil tankers become targets of U.S. strikes. Continued use of the Strait of Hormuz as a tool of confrontation is encouraging countries in the region to accelerate the development of alternatives, which could reduce its value as an Iranian bargaining chip. Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s call to end the war, along with his more flexible position on the Strait of Hormuz, has also sparked an internal debate in Iran over the cost of continuing the current course.
The narrower Iran’s options become in the Strait of Hormuz, the greater the strategic importance of Yemen’s geography around Bab el-Mandeb. The Houthis’ advance in Mokha, Dhubab, Mayyun and Hanish has brought them closer to trade and energy routes in the Red Sea and increased their ability to threaten ships using simpler, shorter-range military capabilities. Reports of Iranian support and advice further strengthen the connection between the two fronts. For years, the approach to the Houthis has largely been based on containment, but they continue to operate as an armed militia and have returned to areas that had previously been liberated. As a result, the scope of the pressure has expanded from one maritime corridor to two, creating a strategic setback that requires a reassessment of the Yemen issue in both the north and the south.
The Trump administration is seeking to ensure continued passage through Bab el-Mandeb without a direct military confrontation with the Houthis, preferring to support its partners while concentrating its capabilities on the confrontation with Iran. However, avoiding the opening of an additional front could allow the Houthis to consolidate gains that would make them more difficult to deal with later. The growing risks in the Red Sea are also putting pressure on the alternatives intended to reduce reliance on the Strait of Hormuz, with repercussions extending to the Suez Canal.
The UAE is pursuing an approach that combines firmness with keeping the door to dialogue open. The meeting between Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in New Delhi reflects a position that has dealt firmly with the Iranian regime and applied economic pressure on it without closing the political channel. Dialogue is possible if it is backed by a strong position, but rebuilding trust after the attacks will not be easy and will depend on a change in Iranian behavior.
The outcome in November will affect Trump’s room for maneuver. A Republican victory would give him greater political space to continue with his approach, while losing one or both chambers could increase political, oversight and financial constraints, without necessarily bringing the war to an end. In either case, the Gulf needs genuine cooperation to strengthen its ability to protect its interests and security, combining deterrence with diplomacy, regardless of which party holds the majority in Congress.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar
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