Iran has drawn encouragement from Republican losses in the U.S. midterm elections, reinforcing its determination to stand firm on its demands in negotiations with the United States. From Tehran's perspective, President Donald Trump's party paid part of the price of the war with Iran at the ballot box, a view further reinforced by Vice President J.D. Vance's comments linking the conflict to the electoral defeat. But to what extent have these losses strengthened Iran's position in negotiations with Washington?
Dr. Firas Elias, an expert on Iranian affairs, tells Annahar that "it can be said that Republican losses in the U.S. midterm elections have provided Iran with additional political leverage in managing its negotiations with Washington, but they have not necessarily brought about a fundamental change in the balance of power between the two sides. Tehran views these results through the lens of their impact on Trump's ability to manage foreign confrontations and the extent of domestic pressures that could push his administration toward a diplomatic settlement rather than another military confrontation."
Iranian officials told The New York Times that they viewed the election results as a victory over Washington, arguing that closing the Strait of Hormuz had achieved its goal of making American voters bear the economic cost of the war. They concluded that Iran could make fewer concessions in negotiations.
They also interpreted Vance's statements following the vote as evidence of deep divisions within the White House, particularly after Trump later excluded his vice president from the negotiating team and asked him to focus on domestic issues.
Elias says: "The Iranian leadership realizes that the Republicans' declining political position within U.S. institutions could force the administration to make more complex calculations, particularly amid internal divisions over the economic and security costs and implications of the confrontation with Iran. Tehran may therefore view the election results as an opportunity to improve its negotiating terms, but not as a strategic shift that guarantees American concessions."
The priority each side assigns to the first step remains a major obstacle to reaching an agreement. According to current and former U.S. officials who spoke to the newspaper, Tehran wants sanctions relief and payments from Arab countries before allowing ships to pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Washington, meanwhile, insists that Iran halt its attacks on ships before releasing any frozen funds or lifting sanctions. Previous rounds of negotiations have stumbled over the sequencing of these steps.
As indirect talks continue, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has visited Pakistan and Oman, both of which have played mediating roles. U.S. and European intelligence services estimate that Tehran remains open to a deal that would give it access to billions of dollars in frozen assets. Meanwhile, military pressure and sanctions have severely reduced Iranian imports, according to Democratic Representative Jim Himes, who will chair the House Intelligence Committee next year.
Elias points out that "domestic pressures on Trump do not necessarily reduce the likelihood of escalation. They may also push his administration to adopt a tougher stance on certain foreign policy issues in an effort to demonstrate resolve and regain the political initiative. Iranian calculations are therefore not based solely on exploiting the relative weakness of the Republican position, but also on avoiding giving Washington reasons to shift from economic and political pressure to broader military options."
Meanwhile, some officials in Washington believe that a new round of strikes could bring the Iranian economy closer to collapse, particularly if energy facilities are targeted. Others, however, point out that previous predictions of economic collapse have failed to materialize.
Elias says that "the most significant impact of the midterm elections is that they have enhanced Iran's room for maneuver in negotiations and its ability to manage timing, rather than its capacity to impose its terms on the United States. Ultimately, Iran's negotiating position remains tied to Washington's willingness to provide tangible guarantees on sanctions, the nuclear file, and regional security arrangements, rather than to the election results alone."
He concludes that "Republican losses may have improved the political environment surrounding the negotiations from Tehran's perspective, but they have not changed the fact that America's decision to pursue a settlement or escalation remains governed by strategic calculations that go beyond domestic party balances."