As efforts to address Hezbollah’s weapons continue to stall, along with the domestic dialogue over the issue, discussion of Palestinian weapons inside the refugee camps has simultaneously receded, despite the fact that the process of withdrawing those weapons actually began some time ago. With key stages in the handover of weapons belonging to Palestinian factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization now completed, attention has turned primarily to weapons held by factions close to Hezbollah, foremost among them Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Both movements have refused to cooperate with the official Lebanese-Palestinian understanding on the issue, raising questions over whether the fate of these weapons will be addressed separately or whether it has, in one way or another, become tied to the fate of Hezbollah’s own weapons. Since August 2025, the Lebanese Army has taken possession of a large portion of the medium and heavy weapons belonging to PLO factions. The process took place in stages, in implementation of the resolutions of the Lebanese-Palestinian summit held on May 21, 2025, between Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. The resolutions affirmed Lebanon’s sovereignty over its entire territory, the extension of state authority, and the principle that weapons must be held exclusively by the state. However, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other allied factions rejected the resolutions of the Lebanese-Palestinian summit. They believe the Lebanese state should address the Palestinian issue in Lebanon as a single package, meaning that priority should not be given to weapons over Palestinian rights and demands. A Bargaining Chip After US President Donald Trump announced at the end of July that the “Board of Peace” he chairs had reached an agreement calling for the “full disarmament” of Hamas and other armed groups in the Gaza Strip, questions emerged over whether the fate of Hamas's weapons in Lebanon was linked to the fate of its weapons in Gaza. However, a senior Lebanese official told Asharq Al-Awsat that “what is preventing the completion of the process of taking possession of Palestinian weapons deployed inside the camps, specifically the weapons of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and their allies, is that Iran and Hezbollah have linked the fate of these weapons to the fate of Hezbollah’s weapons, believing that they can be used as a bargaining chip in any future negotiations.” He noted that “when Hamas is asked to hand over its weapons in Lebanon, it says the matter is in Hezbollah’s hands. When Hezbollah is asked about the issue, it says the time is not right to settle it.” The source explained that “around 60 percent of the weapons belonging to PLO factions have been handed over, and most of the remaining weapons are small arms that the factions say they need to maintain security in the camps and defend themselves in any internal Palestinian conflict.” He added that “Hamas's main weapons are concentrated in Rashidieh camp south of the Litani River, including the Grad rockets located there.” Hamas's Position On whether the fate of Hamas's weapons in Lebanon is linked to the fate of its weapons in Gaza, sources within the movement said that, regarding Palestinian weapons in the Gaza Strip, “the discussion was about restricting and collecting the weapons, not handing them over, with the weapons to be collected by a Palestinian party, whether the local administration in the Gaza Strip or the Palestinian factions.” They stressed that “the weapons in Gaza cannot be compared with those in Lebanon because Gaza is under Israeli occupation, and the Palestinian people have the right to resist the occupation with all the means at their disposal. As for the weapons in Lebanon, the movement does not have heavy weapons in Lebanon. There are many Palestinian factions that possess weapons, and they predate Hamas in terms of their presence in the camps and may possess quantities of weapons far greater than those held by Hamas. Therefore, we said that in Hamas's case in Lebanon, the discussion primarily concerns small arms held by the Palestinian resistance or by the movement, rather than heavy weapons in the conventional sense.” The source told Asharq Al-Awsat that “the movement supports any steps that would strengthen Lebanon’s stability and security. It has held several meetings with the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee to reach a comprehensive solution to the conditions of Palestinians, covering humanitarian, social, economic, and rights-related aspects. But recently we have observed new measures restricting Palestinians, contrary to what had been agreed, including preventing them from owning property and denying Palestinians certain professional and social rights.” The source added: “As for the weapons, they have been there for decades and are historically linked to the issue of the Israeli occupation. Today, their presence is more symbolic than a means of confronting the occupation. If the Lebanese state wants to address this issue, we are open to dialogue and understanding to reach solutions that satisfy everyone, away from any tension or confrontation.” Palestinian Factions in Lebanon Palestinian armed forces in Lebanon are broadly divided into three main groups, although their situations today differ significantly. The first group consists of PLO factions, most notably Fatah, the largest Palestinian force in Lebanon, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Palestine Liberation Front, along with smaller factions. The second group consists of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the two most prominent Palestinian Islamist armed forces outside the PLO. The two movements were part of the Palestinian forces alliance, which also included factions historically linked to Syria. In 2025, they announced that their weapons were tied to the “Palestinian cause,” rather than to PLO weapons, and therefore did not take part in the handover process that began in August 2025 in the same manner. The third group consists of factions that were linked to the former Syrian regime and whose presence inside the camps has now become largely symbolic. Three main forces fall into this category: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, the most prominent Palestinian faction that was closely linked to the Assad regime and maintained military bases outside the camps, most notably Qusaya and Sultan Yacoub in the Bekaa. Fatah al-Intifada was also closely linked to Syria and maintained positions and weapons outside the camps, most notably in Naameh, south of Beirut, and in the Bekaa in eastern Lebanon. The third was Al-Sa'iqa, a Palestinian faction established by Syria's former leadership. Its ties to the Syrian regime were direct, although weaker in Lebanon than those of the General Command and Fatah al-Intifada. These three factions effectively lost their Syrian political and military backing after the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024. The Lebanese state did not wait for a comprehensive agreement on disarming Palestinian factions inside the camps. Instead, the Lebanese Army began dealing with the military bases of Syria-linked factions outside the camps. It took control of General Command positions in Qusaya and Sultan Yacoub, including their weapons, equipment, and rockets. Several positions belonging to other factions were also dismantled. Notably, this took place at the end of 2024 and beginning of 2025, before the process of handing over weapons in PLO camps began in August 2025. Fatah al-Intifada, meanwhile, maintained a presence in some of the camps, and the handover of its weapons was not directly linked to the transfer of control over General Command bases. A month ago, the movement began handing over its heavy and medium weapons to the Lebanese Army at Beddawi camp in northern Lebanon, in a move described as the first instance of a Palestinian faction outside the PLO proceeding to hand over its weapons.
