Since the early 2000s, the US, backed by Israeli political and media campaigns, has portrayed the tri-border area between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina as a hub for Hezbollah’s financial and commercial networks. It linked the business activities of Lebanese communities that had settled there decades earlier to the party’s alleged financing, money laundering, drug trafficking, and currency and document forgery. Intelligence reports, security investigations, sanctions and prosecutions reinforced this narrative, which gradually became the established framework for dealing with the Lebanese community and its economic activities in the region. But a former US intelligence official who worked with the CIA in South America for years has revealed that some intelligence reports underpinning these accusations were produced "on demand", without evidence, in response to political directives and pressure. David Hathaway, who spent nearly 30 years with the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), described how intelligence personnel were instructed to fabricate allegations against traders of Middle Eastern origin, including Lebanese nationals, accusing them of financing Hezbollah or Hamas and preparing reports to support those claims. Hathaway, now police chief of Santa Cruz County, Arizona, has shed light on a longstanding system of manufacturing suspicion and the role of political and financial interests in directing intelligence work. His account raises questions about the narrative surrounding Lebanese traders in South America. These accusations became official US policy in 2004, when the Treasury Department sanctioned Lebanese businessman Assad Ahmad Barakat and two companies he owned for allegedly financing Hezbollah. Two years later, Washington expanded its measures to include nine individuals and two entities accused of providing financial and logistical support to the group. In subsequent years, it added Lebanese nationals accused of involvement in drug trafficking and counterfeit currency operations, or of using import-export companies as fronts for Hezbollah’s "financial wing". Sanctions, accusations, investigations and prosecutions gradually placed Lebanese commercial activity in South America under sustained security scrutiny. But how much of this was actually based on evidence? In an interview on November 11 with Judging Freedom, a political talk show hosted on YouTube by former US judge Andrew Napolitano, Hathaway said he had rarely seen directives from Washington reach intelligence officers in the field except “when major donors, the Israeli lobby or the military-industrial complex wanted something done in the region as a condition for continuing their donations." Their main concern, he said, was to tell intelligence officers, particularly those working in South America, to identify Middle Eastern traders, including Lebanese businessmen, and classify them as supporters of Hezbollah or Hamas. Hathaway described specific demands made of intelligence personnel. He said senators, congressional delegations, White House officials, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and even the vice president regularly attended intelligence briefings. Their main concern, he said, was to tell intelligence officers, particularly those working in South America, to identify Middle Eastern traders, including Lebanese businessmen, and classify them as supporters of Hezbollah or Hamas. "You need to find Middle Eastern merchants like Lebanese merchants, and you need to characterize them as supporting Hezbollah or Hamas. we need you to produce an intel package that states this," he said. Hathaway described the process as a form of regulatory capture, calling it "anticipatory obedience". Intelligence analysts seeking career advancement understood that producing such reports could open professional opportunities while helping donors tighten their grip on Congress. “So, they'll produce an intelligence product that has no factual basis that says yes the Lebanese merchants in the tri-border area between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina are only in business so they can make money to support Hezbollah.” Even without credible evidence, these reports would reach Washington, serve the interests of wealthy donors and help members of Congress secure re-election. "That's the only time that orders kind of come from the top down”, he said, with intelligence targets selected according to the interests of donors. Hathaway's account raises broader questions about intelligence assessments and accusations produced over decades in different countries and contexts, and how unsupported claims may have become the basis for sanctions and prosecutions. Over time, the area became a major center of Lebanese commerce, with family-based networks and businesses extending their reach into other South American markets. A History of Security Suspicion in the Tri-Border Area Security suspicion surrounding Lebanese traders in South America dates back to the 1970s, when regional security agencies began viewing the growing Lebanese presence through the lens of the Arab-Israeli conflict. They linked immigrants' commercial activities to possible political or security involvement. Over time, this approach evolved, turning the tri-border area between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina into a focal point for US accusations of Hezbollah financing. Lebanese traders there faced successive waves of investigations, security classifications and sanctions. One early episode took place on May 4, 1970, when two Palestinians opened fire on the Israeli Embassy in Asuncion, Paraguay's capital. After Brazilian media reported that the weapons used in the attack might have been purchased in the border city of Foz do Iguaçu, Brazilian police launched an investigation targeting Lebanese traders in the city. Investigators worked on the assumption that the traders might have links to the Palestinian cause or involvement in the attack. They named three Lebanese nationals as suspects. But after about a month, the local officer assigned to the case concluded that there was no evidence connecting traders in the area to the shooting. His report nevertheless included extensive personal information on the Lebanese suspects, including passport and identity numbers, home addresses and business locations. The absence of evidence did not end the security inquiry. Instead, an investigation into an attack with no proven links to the Lebanese community became an opportunity to collect extensive information about its members and commercial activities. Researcher John Tofik Karam documents the incident in his study, The Lebanese Diaspora at the Tri-Border and the Redrawing of South American Geopolitics, 1950–1992. The study traces the development of Lebanese migration and trade networks in Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina, changes in the community's role in local economies, and its gradual reclassification from a population of merchants and immigrants into a security concern linked to conflicts in the Middle East. The Lebanese presence in the tri-border area dates back to the 1950s, when the first migrants settled in Foz do Iguacu in Brazil and Ciudad del Este in Paraguay. Most came from western Bekaa in Lebanon. Migration expanded during the 1970s and 1980s, bringing larger numbers from the Bekaa and South Lebanon as civil war and deteriorating security and economic conditions drove people out of the country. The newcomers initially worked as street vendors before opening shops selling clothing, fabrics and household goods. They later expanded into importing consumer goods, electronics, perfumes and cosmetics, while distributing Brazilian products in neighboring markets. The overlapping borders of the three countries provided favorable conditions for cross-border trade. Merchants took advantage of differences in customs duties and taxes, as well as Paraguay's position as a commercial hub that attracted large numbers of Brazilians seeking cheaper imported goods. Over time, the area became a major center of Lebanese commerce, with family-based networks and businesses extending their reach into other South American markets. This is an edited translation of an article originally published in Arabic.