Since the initiation of direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, Hezbollah has insisted on referring to Nawaf Salam's government as "the authority," a choice that deserves attention.
I see no harm in the word "authority" itself, as we have executive, legislative, and judicial authorities. But in the Lebanese political insult dictionary, when the word is coupled with accusations that the government is relinquishing sovereignty or siding with the enemy, its meaning changes.
The term becomes a tool to strip state institutions of their moral legitimacy, portraying decision-makers as a transient group that seized power, rather than as elected state and constitutional institutions representing the Lebanese people.
We recall that Hezbollah itself boasted of "respecting the state" when Salam visited the south early last February. Now, however, it returns to distinguishing between the "state" and the "authority" when institutions make a decision that does not suit it.
One of Hezbollah's deputies stated it plainly: "We always differentiate between the state and the authority." This is not so much constitutional philosophy as it is political engineering of legitimacy: the state is acceptable when it accommodates Hezbollah's choice, and it becomes "authority" when it attempts to regain control over decisions of war and peace.
The more dangerous aspect is that the dictionary of disdain does not stop at the name. Another Hezbollah MP spoke of "a fall of the authority from a high place," accusing its course of undermining Lebanon's sovereignty.
A senior official went even further, invoking the "Vichy government" to describe its betrayal and confronting "this political authority," although the official himself did not close the door on "direct communication with Americans," attributing it to a decision taken according to interests and suitable circumstances after American envoy Tom Barrack gave Hezbollah a "kiss of life."
We are not witnessing an ordinary political objection here, but a discourse that reduces the government to the status of an agent, while granting Hezbollah the position of the judge who decides who is legitimate and who is a traitor, as if there were no blatant Israeli violation of its lines.
In our modern history, this is a familiar game. The term "authority" psychologically separates the citizen from the state, telling him that this state is not his, but rather a group imposed upon him. And when such a term is repeatedly used by an armed party, its impact is stronger because it is backed by force that surpasses rhetoric.
The accumulation here is intentional: the goal is not to criticize a government decision, but to build a mental image suggesting that those negotiating to drive Israel out, return the people, and initiate the path to reconstruction are not representatives of the state, but defendants before it.
This is an old method in Lebanese politics. When a team fails to overturn a decision within the institutions, it attempts to delegitimize the institutions themselves in the public consciousness. The Council of Ministers becomes the "authority," and the president a "team."
Hezbollah then elevates itself to the rank of "resistance," requiring neither elections nor a new mandate—not only objecting to how negotiations are conducted, but also challenging the state over the very definition of sovereignty: What kind of sovereignty does not preserve its weapons is suspect, while sovereignty begins with the state when military and security decisions return to its institutions.
This is not a linguistic spat. The struggle over terminology is a shortcut to the larger battle: Who holds the authority in Lebanon?
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.
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