For the first time in a long while, the name "Hezbollah" has started appearing in American discussions from a different angle, not only as an organization classified by Washington as a terrorist group and subject to demands for disarmament, but also as an entity that may become necessary to communicate with in order to reach a solution in Lebanon.
At first glance, this seems contradictory. How can the United States consider dialogue with an organization it classifies as terrorist while, at the same time, demanding that weapons be held exclusively by the Lebanese state?The paradox is that the American experience itself offers a partial answer, and that answer may be surprising.
In recent days, former U.S. ambassador Edward Gabriel said that members of his delegation had spoken with American officials at the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, who told him that President Donald Trump was serious about the possibility of direct dialogue with Hezbollah if it could help end the conflict and achieve peace.
Gabriel later clarified that his words had been taken out of context and that he was not personally calling for dialogue with Hezbollah. His statement, therefore, cannot be considered an announcement of ongoing negotiations between the U.S. and Hezbollah. What it does reveal, nevertheless, is that the idea of dialogue itself has entered American discussions.
U.S. envoy Tom Barrack then set boundaries for this idea. According to his position, Washington deals with the Lebanese government as the legitimate authority representing the state, while Hezbollah is classified by the U.S. as a "foreign terrorist organization." However, Barrack also acknowledged that any resolution to the Lebanese crisis cannot ignore the forces with real influence on the ground.
This leads to the question that concerns Lebanon most: If Washington does not want to replace the state with the party, why might it need to talk to it?The answer may lie in Gaza. To understand this, one only has to look at what the Trump administration did with Hamas.
The United States classifies Hamas as a terrorist organization, but it engaged in direct contacts when reaching an agreement in Gaza required speaking to Hezbollah capable of influencing the war, the hostages and the implementation of any agreement.
In August, Trump's envoy Jared Kushner met Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya in Egypt as part of an effort to advance a new American plan to end the war. This contact was not aimed at protecting Hamas's weapons, nor at recognizing it as a state or as an alternative to the Palestinian Authority.
Practically, the aim was to reach the entity capable of agreeing to or rejecting the agreement, and then obtain from it a commitment that could be implemented. This is where the distinction becomes important.
When Washington talks to an armed adversary, merely sitting down with it does not mean that it has become supportive of it. Sometimes, dialogue is a means of convincing an armed group to abandon the power that allows it to disrupt solutions, in exchange for guarantees or gains that make a settlement acceptable to it.
In Lebanon, the problem is more complex. The Lebanese government states that weapons should be exclusively in the hands of the state. The United States supports this goal. But the practical question is: What happens if the government wants to implement this decision while Hezbollah refuses to hand over its weapons?
This points to the potential need for communication—not because Hezbollah would become an equal partner to the state, but because the state might need an agreement with it to implement its decision.
From this perspective, Mahmoud Qmati's words become important. Qomati said that Hezbollah had not completely closed the door to direct communication with the Americans, and that it depended on the appropriate interests and circumstances.
This statement is noteworthy because Hezbollah had for years adopted a highly antagonistic discourse toward the United States. More importantly, Hezbollah's media circle did not deny the principle of communication with Washington, but clarified that Qmati was referring to the Islamabad path, not the American path. This does not mean negotiations have begun, but it indicates that the idea of communication no longer seems impossible.
Here, specifically, the Hamas experience becomes relevant. If Washington opens a channel with Hezbollah, it is difficult to imagine that its goal would be to protect its weapons. The announced American policy is based on supporting the Lebanese state and army and ensuring that weapons are exclusively in the hands of official institutions.
The likely scenario is that, if dialogue reaches a serious stage, it would be about how to end the role of weapons—not how to protect them.
But ending the weapons does not necessarily mean asking Hezbollah to give them up without compensation. There may be security guarantees, arrangements in the south, protection for civilians, reconstruction, political guarantees and perhaps understandings that prevent the return of war. In other words, the equation may become: abandoning military capability in exchange for the prices of security and participation in the upcoming phase... And this is the lesson that Hamas's experience can offer Lebanon.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.
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