One of the key questions raised by Israel’s upcoming election, as tensions mount and the risk of escalation grows in an already volatile region, is whether the results will lead to a change in the next government’s strategic choices. Historical experience shows that elections can change a government, its leader and its political composition without necessarily altering the strategic and security doctrines that shape Israel’s approach to its regional environment, including the threats and opportunities it perceives. A distinction must be made between the legal authority to make decisions and the factors that shape them. The government has the constitutional authority to declare war or launch a major military operation that could lead to war. Under legislative amendments passed by the Knesset in 2018, the government can delegate this authority to the Security Cabinet, particularly when the prime minister considers it necessary for reasons related to national security or foreign relations, including the need for secrecy. Even so, the prime minister, the defense minister and the army chief of staff play central roles in shaping such decisions. More importantly, the bodies that control the flow of information, assess emerging threats, and present available options and their potential costs can significantly influence decisions on war, even when they lack the legal authority to make them. These bodies are the military and security establishment, whose influence does not exempt them from subordination to the political leadership under Israeli law. The US is another important factor in decisions involving major military operations. A government can change without its strategic choices changing, particularly when rival political forces share the same understanding of threats and interests. Broadly speaking, this applies to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his main rival, Gadi Eisenkot. Although Zionist parties differ over how to wage war, when to fight and which priorities to pursue, they largely agree that Iran, Hezbollah and Palestinian resistance groups pose major security threats. Nor does a new government start from scratch. It inherits military plans, intelligence assessments, commitments and realities on the ground shaped under previous governments. Its choices are also influenced by regional and international conditions, which create threats, opportunities and constraints. All these factors interact within the decision-making system, with the government retaining the final authority. Netanyahu captured this principle when he said that “the elected political echelon must determine the strategic direction,” while encouraging initiative, critical thinking and the expression of independent views within the security services. In conclusion, a change of government does not in itself lead to an end to the military confrontations that have continued for three years. Nor is the continuation of the current approach inevitable. However, historical precedents show that changes in Israel’s government or political leadership can lead to swings in strategic positions, particularly when a new leader has a clear alternative vision, can rally political and institutional support, and believes that continuing the existing course has become more costly than changing it. Yitzhak Rabin’s victory in the 1992 election, for example, paved the way for the Oslo Accords, breaking with the approach of his predecessor, Yitzhak Shamir. Similarly, Ariel Sharon’s decision to withdraw from the Gaza Strip in 2005 triggered divisions within Likud. It ultimately led him to leave the party he had led and establish Kadima. Israel’s elections can therefore alter the country’s political and security trajectory depending on the nature of the differences between rival forces, including whether they disagree over strategic objectives or over the means of achieving them. The outcome also depends on whether a new government can redefine threats and priorities and turn its choices into policy, given domestic power balances and external risks and constraints. A key domestic factor is the military and security establishment, which wields considerable influence but remains subordinate to the political leadership. In conclusion, a change of government does not in itself lead to an end to the military confrontations that have continued for three years. Nor is the continuation of the current approach inevitable. This is an edited translation of an article originally published in Arabic.
