A sweeping proposed framework to curb Iran’s support for regional proxies faces major legal, political, and enforcement gaps that could determine its success or failure.
In late March, the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump presented Iran with a 15-point plan to end the war. It included a demand that Tehran cut support for foreign proxies and partners, including Hezbollah, Hamas, Yemen’s Houthis, and others.
The Iranian regime appears inclined to reject this proposal, which is not surprising given the central importance these groups play in exporting the revolution and extending Tehran’s influence in the region. It is crucial to consider what such an agreement might entail and how the United States could verify and enforce its terms. This is partly to prepare the international community for possible scenarios after the war ends, in which Iran could resume and even expand its alleged terrorist activities through proxy groups.
What are the components of a U.S.–Iranian agreement regarding proxy support? According to a prominent American researcher, it should be highly detailed and comprehensive, covering all financial, military, terrorist, and training activities of these groups. The goal is to deprive Tehran of any room to claim ambiguity.
Policy makers must realize that effectively enforcing this agreement will be extremely complex, requiring cooperation from multiple governments, multilateral organizations, and the private sector. Moreover, it would require the United States to allocate its top diplomatic and intelligence resources to enforcement.
In general, Iran must agree not to provide any form of support to any terrorist groups or militias, whether defined by U.S. terrorist classification lists or a new list agreed upon under a United Nations framework. As a starting point, this list must include Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Houthis, and several Iraqi Shia militias.
The list should be flexible enough to allow for the addition of new members as needed, ensuring that Tehran and its proxies cannot circumvent the mechanism by changing names or creating new ones. Specifically, the Iranian regime must accept the following conditions:
Are there gaps in this agreement? Even if Iranian negotiators agree to halt proxy support under a broader agreement, the regime’s record strongly indicates it will not honor all of these commitments. Therefore, detecting, exposing, and halting violations will be of utmost importance. However, there are gaps that will hinder U.S. and international efforts in this matter, as follows:
Even if a proxy agreement is implemented and authorities can prove that Iran violated the prohibition on transferring military equipment and technology, it would still be difficult to determine whether those materials were supplied before or after the agreement.
Ultimately, the conclusion is clear: in the current environment, Iran would face limited deterrence against evading sanctions and enforcement efforts, allowing it to continue arming and training its proxies around the world.
What can the United States and its partners do to give the proxy agreement any chance of success? First, it must significantly increase U.S. resources allocated to this issue, particularly in intelligence, law enforcement, and diplomacy. Second, it should work to significantly deepen cooperation with the private sector. Third, it must seek greater cooperation from countries where Iran and its proxies are most active. Fourth, it should garner multi-party support capable of making binding decisions. Fifth, it should provide technical assistance to countries willing to cooperate but lacking the capacity to detect and dismantle Iran’s financial and logistical activities. Finally, it should continue building broad international alliances against Iran-related terrorism.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.
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