Hamas sources have disclosed how an urgent intelligence warning helped Ali al-Amoudi, who oversees the movement’s political bureau in Gaza, escape an Israeli assassination attempt on Oct. 3. Amoudi survived a strike on a residential building hit by several missiles and suicide drones. Five Palestinians were killed. An urgent warning Three sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that an urgent intelligence report reached Amoudi about three hours before the attack, prompting him to leave. It did not, however, confirm that he was the intended target. In separate, matching accounts, the sources said Amoudi was in the apartment later struck. He took the warning seriously and moved to a safe location. The warning followed hours of drone surveillance. During daylight on Oct. 2, two members of the air unit of the al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ armed wing, spotted two Israeli reconnaissance drones repeatedly circling the building and the port area west of Gaza City. The drones were of a type Palestinian security personnel knew for its dangerous capabilities, the sources said. They use artificial intelligence and other technologies to pinpoint targets. After tracking the drones for hours, the two members suspected preparations for an assassination attempt against a senior figure in the area. They alerted higher-level security officials. Their urgent report reached those responsible for protecting senior Hamas figures, including Amoudi. The sole person responsible for Amoudi’s security, who knew his location, went to him immediately after receiving the report and briefed him. Amoudi suspected he was the target and decided to leave without delay. About an hour or more later, powerful guided missiles and one or two suicide drones struck the apartment, confirming his suspicions, the sources said. A central figure Amoudi was very close to former Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, both inside and outside Israeli prisons. They were imprisoned together before their release. Amoudi was freed in the prisoner exchange for Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, which Hamas called “Loyalty to the Free.” In the days and weeks before the assassination attempt, Amoudi contested an internal election to lead Hamas in Gaza against Nizar Awadallah. Neither secured a decisive result. A runoff was halted after it was challenged. Amoudi is a central figure in Hamas, both in Gaza and beyond. Reading the drones Operatives on the ground are becoming more adept at identifying the drones that constantly fly over Gaza and assessing their danger, the sources said. Some conduct reconnaissance; others are suicide drones. Their capabilities vary by model. Israel deploys several types, some with known military names and others whose names remain unknown, the sources said. Palestinian factions and others in Gaza give some drones their own names, drawing on information about their models and capabilities from websites covering Israeli military affairs. With drones constantly overhead, the factions’ armed wings monitor the skies to try to avert attacks on potential targets or limit their impact. Gaza residents call drones of all types “zannana,” or “buzzers.” Many know little about their actual names or differing missions, while Palestinian factions are building their capacity to observe them and learn more. Similar warnings Senior Hamas security official Moein al-Arabid received a warning about similar drones before his abduction on Sept. 2, one source said. Other security officials received the warning too, but it was ignored. No one expected a ground operation to abduct Arabid or anyone else. They anticipated an aerial assassination attempt instead, and some officials took precautions to conceal themselves. The sources said drones are constantly monitored across Gaza to assess whether Israel is preparing to target a senior figure. Izz al-Din al-Bayk, commander of the al-Qassam Brigades’ Northern Brigade, received a similar report days before his assassination, one source said. He left one location for another but was killed there, in a residential building in the al-Nasr neighborhood of northwestern Gaza City. The source suggested that certain technologies had pinpointed Bayk’s new location, citing Israel’s heavy reliance on artificial intelligence and other technologies, alongside collaborators working with its domestic security agency, Shin Bet. The source said the agency exploited collaborators’ economic circumstances and personal and social vulnerabilities to recruit them.
