Some were killed, while others remain on the battlefield defending the cause and bearing arms. Years of cooperation and solidarity have forged a distinctive relationship between Yemen’s Ansar Allah and the wider resistance axis, rooted in a shared understanding of the conflict and each side’s role. The particularly close ties between Ansar Allah and Lebanon’s Hezbollah also help explain their relationship with Iran, challenging the colonial narrative that movements resisting occupation, hegemony and authoritarian rule are merely foreign proxies. Neither Hezbollah nor Ansar Allah emerged from administrative decisions. Their rise reflected the aspirations of millions seeking liberation. Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution then created a major regional center supporting resistance movements against US and Israeli occupation and helping oppressed movements confront injustice at home. Hamas, rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood, developed its own ties with Iran and other resistance forces based on its interests and the Palestinian cause. Yet its opponents interpret those ties through its ideological roots while denying Hezbollah and Ansar Allah any autonomy, portraying them simply as branches of Iran’s revolution. The enemy has long understood the reality because it needs to know how to fight the resistance. Israel’s leadership has recognized the nature of these relationships for years. When Benjamin Netanyahu boasted of assassinating Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, he called him “the axis of the axis,” reflecting Israeli intelligence assessments of the depth of Hezbollah’s ties with Iran. Israel does not do this to grant its opponents credit. It does so because it focuses on the realities of the conflict. Since its establishment, Israel has largely treated Arabs as enemies to be killed. Western powers and their regional allies see the picture differently. The US, its European allies and the subservient ruling monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula view resistance groups’ ties with Iran through the same framework they apply to their own alliances and client relationships. This helps explain why Saudi Arabia and most Arab governments portray Ansar Allah as an Iranian force acting on Tehran’s instructions. The aim is not merely to discredit the Yemeni movement, but to deny that it represents an independent Yemeni cause and portray its agenda as purely Iranian. The relationship between Ansar Allah, Hezbollah and Iran deserves closer examination. One point is fundamental. Ansar Allah’s independence is central to the resistance axis. Iran’s influence over Hezbollah, for example, is far greater than its influence over Ansar Allah. This has required officials in Tehran and Beirut to develop, through years of engagement, effective channels for communication, discussion and consultation. The late Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah played a major role in establishing this framework. On the ground, it was mastered by the late Hezbollah commander Haitham Tabatabai, known as Abu Ali, who managed relations with Ansar Allah for years. He traveled repeatedly to Yemen, studied its history and social structure, and remained closely involved in its political, military and security affairs. According to Ansar Allah leader Sayyed Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, Abu Ali played a role that the Yemeni people will remember for generations. Abu Ali repeatedly recalled Sayyed Nasrallah’s instructions. “Sayyed Hassan advised me to be careful about how I spoke and discussed matters with Ansar Allah. You must understand that your task is to serve them and offer advice where necessary. You are not authorized, nor are you religiously permitted or entitled, to ask anything of them or present an idea as an order. Never try to impose your view. Always remember that they are the people of the land and know their country best. Experience shows that they take responsibility with courage and only need assistance.” Sayyed Nasrallah also intervened when gaps showed in communication between Iran and Ansar Allah, helping Tehran develop a more precise understanding of the Yemeni movement. He insisted that Iranian support should come without conditions or demands. In conversations with Sayyed Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, he discussed the needs of the resistance in Lebanon and Palestine while stressing that Yemen was not expected to assume burdens beyond its capacity. He was deeply moved by Ansar Allah’s support for Palestine and Lebanon. Many remember him weeping as he spoke of a fundraising campaign launched by the movement to support Palestine despite its struggle to secure basic necessities under the Saudi, Emirati and US blockade. On the ground, Ansar Allah’s actions in Bab al-Mandab marked a qualitative turning point. They were part of the wider regional conflict, but the movement demonstrated its ability to assess events independently and choose the timing of an operation that could achieve its objectives at the lowest possible cost. The liberation of Yemen’s western coast is widely viewed as part of the confrontation with the US, but its benefits to Yemen were far greater than those to Iran. Iran and the wider resistance axis could benefit from the outcome, but those who insist on portraying the operation as an Iranian service need only lift the blockade, leave Yemen and let its people determine their future. Then they can talk about Iran’s interests. More importantly, Ansar Allah’s role shows that the trajectory of the resistance is not inevitable. Israel has inflicted severe blows on resistance groups in Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, but Yemen’s actions demonstrate that an independent regional movement can still influence the wider conflict despite intense international pressure. That hostility reflects the anger of a world confronted by the fact that a handful of free people managed, with a single blow, to knock down castles of sand. The Houthi School: Minds Working Around the Clock Months of planning preceded the western coast operation. Ansar Allah worked to secure every element needed for success. This included choosing the right political moment and preparing the personnel, weapons and equipment. At the same time, the movement developed advanced security capabilities. These allowed it to gather intelligence and build a clear understanding of its adversaries. They also helped it penetrate enemy networks and establish the intelligence foundation for the confrontation. Specialists drew on nearly two decades of continuous fighting. They also benefited from experience provided by Iran and Hezbollah, as well as lessons from operations elsewhere. Most importantly, they relied on expertise developed inside Yemen itself. The western coast and Bab al-Mandab operation has its own story. First, it is important to understand the capabilities Ansar Allah built over two decades of political, military and security activity. Those capabilities help explain how it carried out an operation of this scale in record time. The movement did so with minimal losses and, crucially, with minimal casualties among its opponents. The Gradual Development of Military Power After Ansar Allah’s March 2015 campaign in the southern provinces, it faced a major confrontation with southern factions backed by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and others. Its leadership began a detailed review of its military methods. The reviews continued, including after the battle of Marib more than four years ago. The leadership concluded that several combat methods needed to be reconsidered. At the same time, it confirmed that offensive operations could be effective when the necessary conditions were in place. A key factor was the tribal council. It brought together Yemen’s main northern tribes and provided tens of thousands of fighters. Northern Yemen has a distinct tribal structure. Its tribes have deeply interconnected relationships. The south followed a different path. It spent 22 years under socialist rule. That period weakened tribal structures, nationalized land and property, expanded compulsory education and increased women’s role in society. It also introduced agricultural reforms. As for the north, Ansar Allah emerged under martyr Hussein al-Houthi amid severe state neglect in development, education and welfare. It also faced a Saudi campaign promoting Wahhabism in areas where the movement was active. When Ali Abdullah Saleh sought to unify the country under his leadership, southerners lost the advantages of the socialist state, while northerners retained their distinct social structures and the traditional role of tribal networks. Over time, Ansar Allah became a major center of support among Yemen’s Zaydis. Its tribal ties and religious overlap with Shafi'i Sunnis helped it expand beyond its traditional base. Opposition to Saudi dominance and US influence further strengthened its popular support. The movement eventually became a central reference point for the tribal-political alliance that governs northern Yemen today. It gained broad tribal support by arguing that Yemen should not remain dependent on foreign states that had deprived the country of its resources, impoverished its people and sought to impose an ideology at odds with the region’s longstanding traditions. Armament, Local Industries and Resource Recycling Alongside its geographic expansion, Ansar Allah worked to build a distinctive military and security infrastructure. It focused on securing equipment and recruited educated specialists whose expertise could help develop military capabilities under a severe blockade. The movement had a program for obtaining weapons from Iran and other markets. At the same time, it invested in local production. It inherited equipment and logistics from the Saleh regime, providing a foundation for domestic manufacturing. It later upgraded and expanded production lines, particularly for missiles, drones and naval systems. Over time, the Sanaa government led by Ansar Allah developed advanced capabilities through local manufacturing. It also drew on modern global technologies, particularly dual-use equipment. Its opponents, especially forces led by Tareq Saleh, focused on tracking supply routes in coordination with US Central Command (CENTCOM). They intercepted numerous shipments and displayed some of the seized dual-use equipment. Sanaa acknowledges close cooperation with Tehran in exchanging technical expertise and scientific knowledge. But local production extends beyond missiles and aerial or naval drones. It also covers intelligence, communications and reconnaissance equipment, indicating that many of these capabilities are now being produced inside Yemen. The US has repeatedly accused China and Chinese companies of supplying Ansar Allah with dual-use technologies and materials. These are civilian technologies that can be adapted for military purposes, including targeting ships in the Arabian Sea and Red Sea. In a report released yesterday on the misuse of artificial intelligence, Anthropic said it had identified a weapons development cell in northern Yemen that used its Claude Code model on three programs. These included a multistage ballistic missile with a range of more than 2,000 km, the R2000 series of missiles, including one based on a hypersonic glide vehicle variant, and a guided missile that had undergone a field test in Yemen. Anthropic said the test failed, after which the group returned to Claude within hours to determine the cause. Developing Intelligence Capabilities Under President Ali Abdullah Saleh, ties between Sanaa and Washington expanded. After September 11, 2001, the two sides began extensive intelligence cooperation. The US spent about $500 million a year on programs to train and equip Yemeni security forces under the banner of fighting Al-Qaeda. The programs covered special forces, coast guard units and counterterrorism teams. Documents later showed that Saleh’s intelligence agencies had become a regional hub for counterterrorism and espionage against neighboring states, including Saudi Arabia. After Saleh’s fall and Ansar Allah’s takeover of Sanaa, the movement seized military assets left behind by the former regime. These included highly advanced equipment supplied by the US for electronic surveillance and monitoring the electromagnetic spectrum, as well as a large archive of intelligence gathered over years. US intelligence officials later asked Yemeni contacts whether Ansar Allah could establish workshops to maintain the equipment or reverse-engineer it. Over time, Ansar Allah built security and intelligence units operating at multiple levels. The aim was to cover most of Yemen, including areas controlled by allies of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This required a broad network of specialized capabilities. After restructuring its forces under the Yemeni army, Ansar Allah created an operational environment for intelligence teams to identify threats and risks. Its capabilities expanded to include analysis of Yemen’s internal situation and assessments of regional and international developments. This enabled regular and urgent reports to be sent to political and military leaders, including assessments of available options for action. Within this framework, Saudi Arabia and its forces were naturally a major intelligence target. Ansar Allah monitored Saudi air force activity, communications with allied groups, arms transfers and training operations. It also developed a broad target bank inside Saudi Arabia. This included not only military targets but strategic sites considered important to the Saudi leadership. These capabilities played a key role in preventing Saudi Arabia from denying its air support for forces fighting on the ground. US officials themselves reportedly warned Riyadh that Ansar Allah had developed the technical capacity to track Saudi aircraft over Yemen and even inside Saudi airspace. Lessons From the Naval Battle With the US In its naval confrontation with the US, Yemen did not rely on a conventional force capable of matching the US fleet. Instead, Sanaa built an intelligence and operational system that tracked enemy movements while concealing its own capabilities, changing positions and preserving the element of surprise. This turned the Red Sea into a difficult operating environment for the US Navy. US officers later said they had to operate around the clock because Ansar Allah’s counteroperations never stopped. Yemeni intelligence was closely integrated with military operations. Information was quickly turned into action, while deception efforts prevented the US from developing an accurate and updated picture of Ansar Allah’s positions and capabilities. Misleading information and the failure to locate key leaders and targets forced Washington to reconsider its strategy. The US was no longer confronting a fixed target that could be destroyed to end the mission. It faced a system capable of disappearing, re-emerging, changing tactics and sustaining pressure over time. The approach undermined US naval superiority. Missiles and drones exposed the limits of conventional naval power against a mobile and elusive threat. The success of Yemeni intelligence was measured not simply by targets identified or attacks thwarted, but by denying the US Navy enough intelligence to eliminate the maritime threat. American officials later acknowledged that Ansar Allah had forced a carrier to maneuver, disrupting its normal operations and keeping the possibility of an attack constantly present. The nature of this intelligence war was further highlighted when Washington accused Chinese satellite company Chang Guang of providing Ansar Allah with imagery used to target US warships and monitor international shipping across the Red Sea. Countering Air and Intelligence Superiority Ansar Allah’s military doctrine has traditionally emphasized offense as a form of defense. Through cooperation with allied resistance groups, it also developed the concept of “passive defense” to withstand the enemy’s superior surveillance and air power. This involves more than air defenses. It includes measures that make military targets harder to locate and strike. Ansar Allah drew on past experience and infrastructure inherited from the Ali Abdullah Saleh era to conceal and disperse its capabilities. This proved important during wars with Saudi Arabia, the US and Israel. US military officials have acknowledged the group’s use of camouflage, deception and fortification to reduce its “technical signature” and complicate detection. Yemen’s vast territory and rugged mountains have further aided concealment and redeployment. Ansar Allah also benefited from tunnel networks built under Saleh near Sanaa. Former Vice President Ali Salem al-Beidh once described them as underground cities after touring them with Saleh. US and Israeli officials have also said they detected newer tunnel networks in northern Yemen and near the Saudi border. Foreign media published images of tunnel entrances in the north, describing them as highly fortified sites. Some have nevertheless come under repeated US airstrikes. This is an edited translation for an article published in Arabic.
