Lead:
Opinion columnists from al-Addiyar and an-Nahar have spent the past 96 hours dissecting Lebanon's interlocking crises: the constitutional tensions between Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and Defence Minister Michel Manssi, the volatile dynamics between the Free Patriotic Movement and Hezbollah, the collapse of territorial cohesion in the south, and the competing designs of international actors—primarily the United States, France, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia—for Lebanon's future. The pieces oscillate between despair at Lebanese incapacity and anxiety over external manipulation.
Voices & Positions:
In al-Addiyar, columnists emphasize that Lebanon's structural paralysis stems from a refusal to abandon sectarian logic in favour of state logic. One writer notes that international power blocs now treat Lebanon not as an independent entity but as a theater for proxy calculation; the question of whether Tunisia's Ahmad al-Asir could become Prime Minister reflects how Syria has become the pivot of all Lebanese strategy under American, Turkish, and Saudi observation. Another al-Addiyar voice argues that silence on daily governance failures—vehicle safety inspections, market monopolies, food preservation traditions eroding into luxury—reflects how politicization corrupts even mundane administration. The paper's coverage of tensions between Salam and Manssi suggests President Joseph Aoun is attempting to referee a constitutional breach that threatens the government's survival. An-Nahar contributors pivot toward broader regional analysis: one examines how the October 7 events reshaped the Middle East without producing a new order, only fragmentation; another warns that American policy toward Lebanon suffers from the same incoherence plaguing its Iran strategy, creating openings for Israeli escalation in the south that Washington does not endorse.
Tension & Convergence:
All writers converge on a single diagnosis: Lebanon is no longer governed by Lebanese actors alone. They diverge sharply on remedy. Some argue for institutional renovation (building a genuine state), while others suggest this is now impossible without external permission. The deepest divide separates those who see the Salam government as a temporary mechanism of international consensus from those who view it as already delegitimized by its constitutional infirmities and the military aggression in the south.
Editorial Takeaway:
The dominant voice today is one of managed despair—acknowledging that institutional collapse is real but that Lebanon's fate remains hostage to calculations made in Washington, Ankara, Riyadh, and Damascus.