A force of dozens of fighters led by General Musa Khamsin has defected from Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and joined the army, the latest in a series of defections in recent months involving field commanders, fighters, and political officials from the RSF-led Sudan Founding Alliance (Tasis). The defections are raising questions over what is happening inside the RSF: whether they mark the start of deeper military and political erosion, or remain limited losses that its leadership can contain and replace. Khamsin said that after reaching army-held territory, his group had come from North Darfur and that Major General al-Nour Ahmed al-Qubba, one of the most prominent RSF defectors, had helped them reach Khartoum. He also cited disappointment with the Tasis project, saying they had initially believed it would establish a new state but later reached a different conclusion. Welcoming Khamsin and his fighters, al-Qubba said he expected more commanders and forces to defect. He urged RSF fighters in Darfur and Kordofan to join the army. Army moves to absorb defectors The latest defection comes as the army takes further steps to integrate former RSF members. On Wednesday, it said it had completed the first phase of procedures to regularize the status of those who had joined its ranks. The process included taking an oath and completing security and administrative arrangements ahead of their deployment to army formations and units. The army did not disclose how many people were involved. Major General al-Walid Abdel Qader Ajabna, director of the army’s Administration Branch, welcomed the new arrivals and praised what he called their decision to “side with the state” and leave the RSF. One of the most significant defections came in October 2024, when Abu Aqla Keikel, commander of the Sudan Shield forces and a senior RSF commander responsible for Gezira state in central Sudan, left the RSF and joined the army. The trend gathered momentum this year. In April, Major General al-Nour al-Qubba, one of the RSF’s most prominent commanders in Darfur, defected and joined the army. He later said he had been the “third man” in the RSF by military rank and had left with three groups, along with their vehicles and equipment. More defections follow Further defections followed. In May, field commander Ali Rizqallah, known as al-Safna, announced his departure from the RSF after fighting on several fronts. Smaller defections were also reported in Kordofan. The trend spread to Blue Nile state in southern Sudan, where Dhaifallah Adam, deputy commander of the Fourth Combat Group, defected in June. He said his decision was driven by what he described as “racism and the absence of a cause or purpose for the war.” The defections have also reached the RSF’s political circle. Faris al-Nour, a former adviser to the RSF commander and a member of the Tasis alliance’s Presidential Council, resigned from the council and from his post as governor of Khartoum. He was followed this month by Hamed Mohammed Khalifa, a Presidential Council member whom the alliance had appointed governor of the Kordofan region. The resignations add a political dimension to the military defections, as Tasis seeks to present itself as the political framework for the RSF-led project and its allies. Questions over loyalty Journalist and political analyst Osman Mirghani said the developments represented a “major shift” that had moved beyond the military sphere into politics. He said the defections reflected the “collapse of the political project” and declining belief among some RSF members that there was a genuine political cause worth fighting for. Mirghani said the way the government and army received defectors, particularly al-Qubba, had encouraged others to follow, after seeing that the army was prepared to accept and absorb them. At the same time, comments by Major General Ahmed Qajja, a senior RSF commander, have raised concerns within the group about the loyalty of some political and military figures. Qajja recently said there was what he called a “fifth column” inside both the RSF and Tasis. He said his forces had information raising suspicions about around 50% of political advisers, without providing evidence. He also said he had information about politicians planning to defect and that a file containing their names was being prepared for submission directly to the RSF leadership. He added that there were similar concerns among military personnel. Qajja called for tighter controls on the movements of senior leaders, saying: “No senior political figure should move without the commander-in-chief’s permission.” He denied the existence of any agreement with the army and described joining it as “a betrayal of the cause.” RSF still able to fight Despite signs of internal strain, the RSF has not yet lost its ability to operate militarily. It remains capable of mobilizing fighters, moving forces and launching attacks on several fronts, as seen recently in North Kordofan and Blue Nile, despite conflicting accounts from the two sides over the outcome of those battles. That continuing capacity makes it difficult to treat the defections alone as evidence of an imminent military collapse. As long as the RSF can recruit, move units and sustain operations across distant fronts, the impact of the defections remains uncertain. Retired army Lieutenant Colonel al-Tayeb al-Malkabi cautioned against viewing them as proof that the RSF’s collapse was inevitable. He described the defections as “an indicator that needs to be monitored.” Their impact, he said, depended on the importance of the commander who defects, the size of the force leaving with him and the RSF’s ability to replace its losses. Still, al-Malkabi said the defections were “not a good sign” for the RSF because of their potential effect on cohesion and troop movements, as well as their psychological and political impact. What does the army gain? The defections also raise questions about the army’s motives for absorbing former RSF members. Is it mainly seeking to turn the defections into a political gain and weaken its rival from within, or is integrating them also a way to make up for any shortage in its own fighting forces? With defections spreading from the battlefield into politics, public concern inside the RSF over the loyalty of some advisers and military personnel, and the army moving to absorb those leaving its rival, the picture remains mixed. Pressure on RSF cohesion is growing, but the group has so far retained its ability to mobilize, fight and open new fronts. The key test will be whether the RSF can replace those who leave and preserve cohesion in its command and control. That will determine whether the current defections remain manageable losses or mark the start of a broader process of internal erosion.
